complete community of goods, if it could possibly exist on a large scale, might diminish the temptations to fraud and robbery; but these constitute only a small part of the moral guilt of mankind; while, on the other hand, all those virtuous habits which derive both their origin and their perfections from the varieties of the human

ries of life, food and fuel, clothes to cover our nakedness, and a home to shelter us from the storm, comforts, which it is pretended, the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injustice. The greatest crimes are committed for none of these things. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themselves with blood; and states decree the most illustrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an usurper. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is useful, therefore, against the least and most inconsiderable only of the evils which infest society, evils against which there is an appropriate remedy in industry and moderation.

"The equalization of fortunes may have some slight tendency to stifle animosity and prevent dissension. But its effect is always inconsiderable, and often doubtful; since those who think themselves entitled to superiority will not patiently brook equality. The wickedness of man is boundless; and is an evil that cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables." Lib. 2. de Polit. chap. vii.; or v. of Dr. Gillies's translation, from which I here quote, as being sufficiently accurate for the purpose.

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condition, all the dispositions of mind to which the different circumstances of civilized life give play and action, would lose the occasions under which they are now formed, and the opportunities in which they are displayed. The Platonic view of moral virtue, which places it in the contemplation of ideal excellence, may be consistent with a state of perfection, but is incompatible with a state of probation. Virtue is an active and energetic habit, arising from the various relations of human life, and exercised in the practice of real duties; so that, as you increase the num ber and variety of those relations, you enlarge its sphere of action; and in proportion as you contract them, in proportion as you bring down the conditions of mankind towards an uniform level, you lower the standard and reduce the degree of moral excellence.

It may possibly be argued, that this description of virtue originates not in the nature of virtue itself, but in the situation of man; and that I represent as its essential property what is only its accidental quality. It may be thought, that

although, according to the present constitution of things, man must certainly deny himself many gratifications, and repress his natural feelings and desires, in compliance with the laws ordained for his conduct; yet that he would be an equally virtuous being, if placed in circumstances that required no such reluctant exertion.

It is undeniable that there may be a species of virtue, visible and pleasing to the Creator, which shall consist in the internal habit of the mind, independent of any outward action; an equable, unmoved, pious, and pure state of the soul, not shining by victorious exertion against opposition, but admirable for its intrinsic excellence. There is nothing unintelligible in this idea of virtue, though it is rather an object of our conception than of experience. Such is probably the virtue of beings, higher than ourselves in the scale of creation; such may be our virtue hereafter, in a purer state, and in a purer 'world. It is superior in positive excellence to any that we can possibly acquire, because the difficulties and repulses which man encounters in his endeavours towards

the perfection which he sets before him, are all so many proofs of his inferiority, and of the weakness of his moral principle.

The Deity however, when he determined to make this stage of existence a passage to another, in which the virtues here cultivated and exhibited should be rewarded, and the contrary habits punished in proportion, had it not in contemplation to create a perfect character, but to discipline an imperfect one. Therefore, he did not place human beings in a state where inherent virtue should be most sublime, but where practical virtue should be most conspicuous, and most properly the subject of reward. But untried virtue is the object of love, esteem, or admiration, rather than of reward; which being a recompense for good performed, requires, or supposes, that such good should not have been the unavoidable consequence of the circumstances in which the agent was placed, but his voluntary election from various conflicting objects set before him. Virtue, therefore, cannot become justly rewardable, till it has been proved equal to

trial; in other words, till it has shown itself capable of enforcing the practice of some duty, or the sacrifice of some inclination, in obedience to certain obligations by which it is bound.

Humble, therefore, as the pretensions of the fairest human virtue must ever be in regard to intrinsic worth, it may, notwithstanding, be more deserving of reward than virtue far superior to it in dignity and stability. Its comparative value is proportioned to the difficulties it has overcome. The intellectual powers of the laborious student may never arrive at the vigour of the lofty genius; yet though the mind of superior mould commands the highest admiration, the industrious exertions of the other are the object of more just approbation to the impartial observer of their mutual progress. The Creator is such an observer of the actions of mankind; and, in appreciating their deserts, will take into consideration their natural powers, opportunities, and difficulties, rather than the positive degree of moral virtue they have attained.