4th month 1828; which last meeting Elias Hicks attended, gave it his countenance, and received a minute of its unity with him and his services.

20. In the yearly meeting of Friends in New-York, in the 5th month following, he encouraged and supported a large number of those separatists, in their intrusion into said meeting, many of whom had been regularly disowned from the society; yet he manifested his full unity with them, and with their meetings; and also took an active part with his followers in their disorderly and tumultuous proceedings; and continued in connexion with those of similar views, in holding a separate meeting, which they call a yearly meeting.

21. Since that time, he has travelled into Ohio, Indiana and elsewhere, encouraging his followers, in holding meetings, in different parts of this continent, in opposition to the order of our society.

22. His erroneous opinions, published to the world under his own signature, and also his printed sermons, which he has acknowledged to be generally correct, are recited and testified against, in the Epistle and Testimony of our last yearly meeting held in New-York; and in the Declarations and Testimonies of the yearly meetings of Friends in Philadelphia, Virginia, North-Carolina, Ohio, and Indiana, who are also supported therein by the Testimonies of the yearly meeting of Rhode Island, and the minutes of the yearly meeting of London. Hence it is evident, that Friends of all these yearly meetings, remain united together, in the faith and fellowship of the Gospel.

23. For a number of years past, many of his friends have been deeply exercised on his account, and have been concerned, from time to time, tenderly to admonish and warn him; but he being in a confident state of mind, their admonitions have not had the desired effect; 24. and the support which he received from many of his adherents, prevented the timely exercise 2.

of the discipline, in his case, especially in the monthly and quarterly meeting of which he was a member; 25. but the separation taking place at our last yearly meeting; and this monthly meeting being now in a situation to extend the necessary care therein; the same has been duly attended to, according to the order of our society, to convince him of his errors; 26. which having been in like manner rejected by him, it becomes our incumbent duty, for the clearing of truth, and our religious society, from the imputation of his unsound opinions, and the reproach thereby brought upon it, to testify and declare, that they are not, nor ever have been, the doctrines of the society of Friends. 27. And as we can have no unity with them, nor fellowship with him therein, we do hereby disown him, the said Elias Hicks, from being a member of the religious society of Friends; desiring nevertheless, that through the convictions produced by the operation of the Holy Spirit, he may be brought to a sense of his error; and through sincere repentence, may obtain that salvation which is freely offered, by our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Signed on behalf, and by direction of the monthly meeting of Friends of Westbury and Jericho, held at Westbury the 29th day of the 4th month, 1829.

By VALENTINE WILLETTS, Clerk."

The foregoing Testimony against Elias Hicks, purporting to have been issued "by direction" of a monthly meeting, is a unique production. It is not easy to decide, which ought to be admired most, the bold effrontery of the charges it contains, or the folly a:.d presumption of its authors. We shall examine it in detail; and shall consider each of the charges and allegations, in the order in which they occur in the instrument; and accordingly we have numbered them, for the convenience of reference.

1. "For want of abiding in a state of watchfulness" &c." he has become exalted in his mind.”

If by exaltation of mind we are to understand, that he has risen superior to the narrow prejudices, and puerile notions of bigoted sectarians-that his mind has been elevated above the fogs and mists, which envelope the intellects of those whose religion is derived from no higher source than education and tradition, we at once acknowledge the truth of the charge. But if this exaltation of mind is to be viewed in any other light, or understood in a different manner, it is a gratuitous assertion, unsupported by any evidence and therefore requires no refutation.

2. And giving way to a disposition of reasoning, he has indulged in speculative opinions”

"Speculative," is defined, by our best lexicographers to be something "theoretical, not practical." What those "speculative opinions" are, in which he has indulged, which are not "practically" applicable to the important interests of an immortal, accountable being, remains to be decided. We have yet to learn, that it is inconsistent with the standing and offices of a gospel minister, to indulge in a disposition to reason upon the doctrines and precepts of the Christian religion; and to examine, and understand the important duties enjoined by them. The great Apostle, who recommended us to "prove all things" and to "hold fast that which is good" (I. Thes. 5—21) and advised, that every man be fully persuaded in his own mind" (Rom. 14-5), would fall under the same condemnation; for he has left, in his Epistles, some rare specimens of his " disposition of reasoning." How are we to "prove all things," so as to be "fully persuaded in our own minds," unless we enter into a serious examination? And how can such examination be conducted to any useful results, if we have no "disposition" to exercise our 66 reason."

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For we can examine or "prove"

nothing, but by the use of this faculty. If the framers of this document had " given way to a (better) disposiof reasoning," they would scarcely have introduced such frivolous charges as this, and that which immediately follows.

3." Asserting that we must always take things rationally."

What then! Is it heterodox to take things rationally? Then, "by good consequence" as Wm. Penn says, it must be Orthodox to take things irrationally. If it was wrong in the estimation of his accusers, for Elias Hicks to advance such a sentiment, the converse of the proposition must, in their opinion, be right. For if not rationally, how are things to be taken? There is no medium between the positive and the negative, between the rational and irrational. Why is this sentiment made a ground of accusation against him, unless it is considered criminal and heterodox? And if heterodox and criminal, the conclusion is irresistible, that in order to become sound and Orthodox Quakers, we must consent to take (or understand) things irrationally, foolishly, and nonsensically. This is the only fair and natural result, to which the position assumed by them will lead. And we are inclined to think, that in this instance Orthodoxy is consistent. The fabric of traditional religion, and the dogmas of human invention, which constitute, what is called, an Orthodox faith, will not bear the test of "rational" investigation.

4. "And that we are not bound to believe any thing that we do not understand.”

I would ask these sage expounders of the law, and the testimony, what part of the bible, the book of discipline, or the writings of primitive friends, they find any law or precept, by which such an opinion is condemned. Did you ever give your assent to, or believe in an abstract proposition, until you understood the terms of the proposition? Did ever a reasonable being possess

a rational belief in a thing of which it had no knowledge or understanding? Never. But though we cannot have a belief in a thing which the understanding does not perceive to be true; yet this does not necessarily oblige us to deny that about which we know nothing. A proposition not understood is to us "as Nothing." It is, as it regards the mind, a perfect nonentity. We have no means of forming any judgement or belief about it. Belief and disbelief in an abstract proposition depends upon the perception of the understanding. In the former it perceives its truth, in the latter its falsehood. But a thing not understood is neither believed in, nor denied. Historical belief is determined by the probabilities of the facts related, and the credibility of the testimony. In all cases, belief is the natural result of evidence-and that evidence is addressed, or presented to the understanding, and must be of a kind and quality to produce conviction, otherwise we are left perfectly in the dark, and there can be no such thing as belief.

But when sufficient evidence is furnished to convince the understanding, belief is a matter of course.-There is an involuntary assent of the understanding to the truth of a proposition, when it perceives the connexion and dependence of those ideas of which it is formed. But to suppose the mind can assent to the truth of any proposition without evidence, is as absurd, as it would be to assert, that the eye can perceive objects, or distinguish colors without light. Evidence is to the mind, what light is to the eye. It is the medium through which all things are manifested. And belief is no more an act of the mind, than vision is an act of the eye. The faculty and the organ, are in both cases passive. There is a capacity in the eye to receive an impression of external objects, and to distinguish one object from another, through the medium of light. There is also a capacity in the mind to perceive truth and error, and