409 Londen Theatres-Haymarket.-Bastardy Laws. Colman, who spoke from the boxes, prevented further mischief. That gentleman claimed the liberal consideration of the audience, as the damage doing was to his property, having let the house, and he had therefore no responsibility for, nor joined in the preparing the condemned entertainments. 1790. The Opera House being destroyed by fire, June 17, 1789, Italian Operas performed here. 1793. The house opened under Drury Lane patent, while that Theatre was rebuilding. 1794. Feb. 3. Upon our late revered King and Queen going to this Theatre, the loyal eagerness and violent rushing of the crowd to the pit door occasioned the melancholy accident of fifteen persons being trampled to death or suffocated, and others were severely hurt. (See vol. LXIV. p. 175.) 1795. July 10. A lease granted by the tenant in possession, and the executor of the late Mr. Colman, to Geo. Colman "the younger" for seventeen years, at 400l. per annum. 1805. Jan. 8. Mr. Colman "the younger" entered into an agreement with David Edward Morris and Thos. John Dibdin, esqs. to assign one moiety of the Theatre. Instead of the name of Mr. Dibdin we find afterwards those of Mr. Winston and Mr. Tahourdin, and the latter seceded after a short period. 1808-9. A winter season formed here conjointly with the Opera House by the company from Covent Garden Theatre, which was destroyed by fire, 20 Sept. 1808. 1810. An extension of the license first to five, then seven months, led to an increase of prices, and a new regulation (1811-12) for admission at half [May, price* during winter months. Boxesfis. second price 3s. Pit 3s. 6d. second price 2s. First Gall. 2s. second pr. 13. Upper Gall. Is. second price 6d. 1820. The Theatre closed with the season on Saturday, the 14th of October, with the tragedy of King Lear, and the farce of Fortune's Frolick. It has been computed the house could accommodate near 1800 spectators, viz. boxes 700; pit 350; and remainder in the galleries. In the modern history of this Theatre we have been intentionally brief, and carefully avoided captious records where it was found, like its powerful and gigantic rivals, swelling the indelible archives of the halls of Lincoln's Inn and Westminster. The present Theatre was erected on a new site, at a distance of about six or seven feet from the old foundation. A view is given of the front towards Charles Street. (See p. 201.) It opened July 4, 1821. EU. HOOD. Mr. URBAN, April 23. LIKE the rest of Mr. Malthus's opponents, your Correspondent the " Magistrate" writes as if there was no medium between repressing and encouraging marriage. What Mr. Malthus asks for is merely to have the matter let alone, and to abstain from giving any longer a public guarantee to every improvident person that chooses to marry, without the means of supporting a family. After calling Mr. Malthus's arguments sophistry (on the propriety of which appellation many I conceive will be at issue with him), the Magistrate throws at his followers, the old text "increase and multiply," stripped as usual of the context. To which it may be replied, quarter, that the Puppet Show in the Haymarket is deferred on account of my having been for some time under the operation of liquor, and not attending rehearsals; this is to assure the publick that such report is without the smallest foundation, it being well known that I never touch a drop in the morning, and that the sprain in my ancle was occasioned by treading on a cabbage-leaf before a taylor's door in Suffolk-street, on Friday the 5th instant, at noon. JANE JUNIPER, her mark. Hedge Lane. "William Wadding, taylor. Walter Whisper, prompter to the puppets." "Haymarket, by particular desire. A rehearsal of the Puppet Show will be given at the Theatre in the Haymarket, on Saturday, March the 6th. The doors will be opened at twelve, and the rehearsal commence at one. Places to be taken of Mr. Jewell. No p son can be admitted into the upper gallery." An individual, by hand-bills, having called a public meeting at the Mitre Tavern, Fleet Street, on Sept. 11, 1786, made an abortive attempt to force the late Mr. Colman to accept half-price. 1822.] 66 On early Marriages.-Political Axioms. "by all means." Let any man marry 66 video meliora proboque- is in the case before us completely reversed, and Mr. Malthus's opponents in general deny by their practice the conduct which they are constantly recommending by words and writing. If a young man indulges the natural, and surely most pardonable wish, to marry at eighteen, he is met with,"Marry!—what! are you mad?— what the deuce are you to live upon? do you think that I am to give up my mode of living to suit your whims? why, you will be in gaol in a twelvemonth!-Pooh, pooh, it is not to be thought of!" Such probably would be the language in a great majority of instances, where the question was merely whether the youth should or should not descend a single step on the ladder of society, where he might have firmer hold, feel more at his ease, and be a more useful, and a happier man. But to the crowd which occupy the lowest ground, whence they must inevitably descend into the gulf of pauperism or starvation, the cry is, "Increase and multiply," and think not of conse quences, for the parish shall provide for you. The poison, I think, might be GENT. MAG. May, 1822. 409 Mr. URBAN, May 1. HAVING been favoured with the perusal of a Manuscript amongthe collections of the Rev. T. D. Fosbroke, entitled "Political Axioms," some of them appeared so strikingly to elucidate the history of Buonaparte, that I flatter myself the extracts will prove an instructive and interesting cento. Perhaps I ought to premise, that the matter is strictly of philosophical bearing, as the whole Manuscript is written with the simple intention of discovering, to the permitted extent, the laws of Providence, so far as concerns the consequences of certain actions, and securing successful issues, as well as ascertaining what is likely to ensue from particular characters in peculiar situations. It was the custom of Alexander Severus, to consult all persons, especially those who were well versed in history, in order to know, in doubtful matters, what old Generals and Statesmen had done (Lampridius in vita); and the present essay may show, how very unqualified are men of no historical reading for giving opinions upon political subjects. That Buonaparte was pre-eminent in military talent cannot be disputed, and yet he owed his ruin to error in that very science. His success, so far as it turns upon certain professional merits, has been recently exhibited in the Edinburgh Review. I shall therefore only commence my extracts, with the period when he acquired the supreme power in France. Yours, &c. A FRIEND. 1. His Audacity. Secundarum ambiguarumque sciens eòque interritus. [Being well acquainted with prosperous and dubious events, he was therefore unintimidated.] Tacit. Ann. i. 64. 2. His dissolution of the Republick by violent means. The Cupido domi nandi 410 Political Axioms elucidating the History of Buonaparte. [May, nandi is stronger than any other passion. Tacit. Ann. xv. 53. When men desire the supreme government, there is no moderation or medium in their measures, between the attainment of their object, or ruin. Id. ii. 74. Speed in taking possession of a throne may allure the dubious and confirm the prompt. Id. vi. 44. 3. Causes of his success. When parties are divided, and authority is destroyed by contention and distrust, a popular character may step in and draw all to himself. Tacit. Hist. iv. 11. Men formed for success in troublesome times must be extremely artful and extremely brave. Goldsmith's Lett. on Engl. Hist. Lett. 23. Civil discords loosen the fidelity of the Soldiery, and create danger from individual commanders. Tacit. Hist. ii. 75. The affections of the Soldiers are seldom gained by honourable means or virtues. Id. iii. 86. Soldiers, if inured to plunder, become faithful followers of their leader. ii. 15. Id. The boldness of individuals prevails much in civil discords, for it may draw off a whole army, because in this state of things, the commanders are not commonly firm in their allegiance, nor resolved to be traitorous. Id. Ann. iii. 57. The minds of soldiers once imbued with hatred [as of the Bourbons] cannot be restrained. Capitolinus in Maxim. et Balbino. Though the first hopes of success may be but faint; when the Usurper has made his first footing, affection and followers soon attend him. Tacit. Annal. iv. 7. When extremities are feared, the first dislikes are disregarded. Id. xii. 67. Whoever is feared, has sufficient qualifications in the mind of him who fears him. Even hatred of the predecessor may give the successor sufficient character. Id. Hist. ii. 76. Generals, if successful and popular with their soldiers, are respected even by the people, provided their punishments and severities are confined to the military. Id. Hist. iv. 39. 4. His Despotism. A King of great glory, is on that account more domineering and intolerant towards his subjects. Ta it. Ann. xi. 10. 5. His Controul of the Press. When aUsurpe r is successful, the utmost care is taken to suppress the harsh speeches made against him. Tacit. Hist. i. 47. 6. His Ambition. The desire of power, incident to man, always increases with the augmentation of means. Moderation is only contentedly borne in low circumstances. Tacit. Hist.ii.37. The virtue of Chosroes was that of a conqueror, who, in the measures of Peace and War, is excited by ambition and restrained by prudence; who confounds the greatness with the happiness of a nation, and calmly devotes the lives of thousands to the fame, or even the amusement of a single man. Gibbon, c. 42. vii. 300. 7. His desire of universal conquest. The passions of soldiers victorious in foreign wars are always insatiable. Tacit. Hist. iv. 38. 8. Hatred of him. Even the greatest honours and soundest titles become matters of additional odium, when the possessor is evidently influenced by furious ambition. Liv. L. vii. c. 20. 9. His Bulletins. Dioclesian displayed with ostentation the consequences of victories. Gibbon, c. 13. î. 131. His espionage. Spies, agents, and informers are persons enlisted to secure the repose of one man, and disturb that of millions. Id. c. 22. 10. His breaking the centre. Annibal, by knowing this favourite manœuvre of the Romans, tricked them into the defeat of Cannæ. Buonaparte seems to have borrowed the measure from Marlborough, especially from his tacticks at the battle of Ra millies. 11. His march to the enemy's metropolis. Cæsar used to reckon, that the capture of the principal town would cause the whole province to yield. Bell. Gall. L. vii. 12. His security on the Throne. The power of the sword is more sensibly felt in an extensive monarchy, than in a small community. It has been calculated by the ablest politicians, that no state, without being soon exhausted, can maintain above the hundredth part of its members in arms and idleness. But although this relative proportion may be uniform, the influence of the army over the rest of the society will vary according to the degree of its positive strength. The advantages of military science and discipline cannot be exerted, unless a proper number of soldiers are united into one body, and actuated 1892.] Political Axioms elucidating the History of Buonaparte. actuated by one soul. With a handful of men, such a union would be ineffectual; with an unwieldy host it would be impracticable; and the powers of the machine would be alike destroyed by the extreme minuteness or the excessive weight of its spring. To illustrate this observation, we need only reflect, that there is no inferiority of natural strength, artificial weapons, or acquired skill, which could enable one man to keep in constant subjection one hundred of his fellow-creatures. The tyrant of a small town or single district would soon discover, that a hundred armed followers were a weak defence against ten thousand peasants or citizens; but a hundred thousand well-disciplined soldiers will command with despotic sway ten millions of subjects; and a body of ten or fifteen thousand guards will strike terror into the most numerous populace, that ever crouded the streets of an immense capital. Gibbon, c. v. p. 128. Ed. 8vo. 13. Confederation of the Rhine. The powerful men of every place should, after conquest, be wooed into friendship. Plutarch, § Precept. Politic. The signal victory of Vouti over the Huns, preceded and followed by many bloody engagements, contributed much less to the destruction of the power of the Huns, than the effectual policy which was employed to detach the tributary nations from their obedience. Intimidated by the arms, or allured by the promises of Vouti and his successors, the most considerable tribes both of the East and West, disclaimed the authority of the Tanjour. Gibbon, c. 26, p. 365. Each independent chieftain hastened to obtain a separate treaty, from the apprehension that an obstinate delay might expose him, alone and unprotected, to the revenge or justice of the Conqueror. Gibbon, c. 26, p. 434. The Romans generally permitted tributary princes to possess barrier countries between them and dangerous enemies, in order to remove the burden of defence from themselves as much as possible. Gibbon, c. 13, ii. 155. The Romans refused to assist nations against their enemies, if such nations had not before rendered aid to them. Tacit. Ann. ii. 46. 14. His marriage with Maria Louisa. All usurpers strengthen their ill-gotten power by foreign alliances. Goldsmith's Lett. on Engl. Hist. l. 26. 411 15. Aggrandizement of his family. The ascent to greatness, however steep and dangerous, may entertain an active spirit with the consciousness and exercise of its own powers; but the possession of a throne could never yet afford a lasting satisfaction to an ambitious mind. All the prospects of Severus's life were closed; and the desire of perpetuating the greatness of his family was the only remaining wish of his ambition. Gibbon, c. v. p. 155. So far Napoleon might have triumphantly exclaimed, Quisque sue fortunæ arbiter;" for "Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia." His misfortunes commenced with his dereliction of the first principle of a General; viz. CAUTION. An incautious General is as great an absurdity as an insolvent banker. 15. Russian Expedition. Caution and vigilance are the two most important lessons of the art of war. Gibbon, c. 19, p. 219. The army took the field under the command of Prosper Colouna, the most eminent of the Italian Generals, whose extreme caution, the effect of long experience in the art of war, was opposed with great propriety to the impetuosity of the French. Robertson's Ch. V. anno 1521. Various motives might have operated in instigating Buonaparte to this fatal deviation from the first principle of his office, as a commander; viz. Caution. Guiccardini furnishes the most probable. The first is, in the words of the old English translation, "This was the glorious humor of Ferdiand [King of Naples], bringing forthe in publicke many brags, touching his owne power, and to the contempt and lessening of the forces and meanes of his adversaries. These be properties, oftentimes familiar with Princes, to whom there cannot be a more sensible and apparent token of their adversitie or ruine, than when they esteeme themselves more then they are, and make their enemies lesse than they finde them." L. i. Ignorance of the climate, and former failures, cannot be ascribed to Napoleon, nor could he anticipate the conflagration of Moscow. He might have supported his rashness upon the following grounds: Soldiers will better endure danger than delay, because there is hope from temerity. Tacit. Hist. iii. 26. "All 412 Political Axioms elucidating the History of Buonaparte. [May, "All worldly actions are exposed to many perils, but wise men know, that all the evils which may happen, do not always come to pass; for by the benefit of fortune many dangers are dissolved, and many avoided with industry and prudence; and therefore men ought not to confound fear with discretion, nor repute those wise, who, making certain all perils that are doubt ful, and therefore fearing all, do rule their deliberation as if they should all happen; seeing that in no maner can merite the name of wise or discreete such men as feare things more then they ought. That this title and this praise was far more convenient for men valiant and courageous; for that looking into the state and nature of dangers; and, in that regard, different from the rash sort (in whom is no impression of sense or judgment of perils) they do notwithstanding discover, how often men, sometime by adventure and sometime by vertue [valour] are delilivered from many difficulties. Those men then, that in deliberating call into councell, as well hope as feare, and do not judge for certaine the events that are uncertaine, do not so easily as others reject occasions profitable or honourable." Guiccardini, l. i. Experience has shewn, that the success of an invader most commonly depends on the vigour and celerity of his operations. Gibbon, vi. 202, c. 36. Hope, which tells a flattering tale, might suggest these prospects, but he ought to have known, that It is a gross error to breed a storm, and leave the defence to doubtful possibilities. It is too dangerous to broach a vessel of poison, and have the virtue of the antidote uncertain. Guiccardini, L. i. 16. Failure of the Expedition. "He esteemed it also of great im-, portance for the substance of the warre, that the Frenchmen should be surprized with the winter in Lombardie, wherein, having great experience in the warres of Italy (whose armies attending the riping of grasse and forage for the feeding of horses, were not wont to take the field afore the end of Aprill), he judged, that to eschue the sharpnesse of winter, they would be constrained to stay in a country of their friends till spring-time; in which intermission and respite of time, he hoped that some occasion for his benefite might happen." Guiccardini, L. i. Campaign of 1814. "It was the custom of the wars of Italy, to fight one squadron against another, and in place of him that was weary and began to retire, to supply the fight with a fresh, making in the end but one great squadron of many squadrons, insoniuch as for the most part the skirmish or trial of armes, wherein commonly died but a very few people, endured almost a whole day, and oftentimes the sudden coming of the night was the cause that they brake off without victory certaine on either part." Guiccardini, L. ii. Upon this principle of tacticks, the allies conducted their operations; and Napoleon by fighting, neglected the only measures prudent under invasion, though successfully practised by Fabius and other Cunctutores, as Suetonius Paulinus, &c. his predecessors on the French throne, and Dumourier and Wellington in his own age. An enemy with immense force, and short of provisions [a speedy consequence of immense force] should not be brought to action. Plutarch in Lucullus. Francis fixed upon the only effectual plan for defeating the invasion of a powerful enemy. He determined to remain altogether upon the defensive; never to hazard a battle, or even a great skirmish, without certainty of success; to fortify his camps in a regular manner, to throw garrisons only into towns of great strength, to deprive the enemy of subsistence, by laying waste the country before them; and to save the whole kingdom by sacrificing one of its provinces. Rabertson's Ch. V. anno 1536. The Duke of Alva, sensible of all the advantages of standing on the defensive, before an invading enemy, declined an engagement, and kept within his entrenchments; and adhering to his plan with the steadiness of a Castilian, eluded with great address all the Duke of Guise's stratagems to draw him into action. By this time sickness began to waste the French army, &c. Id. anno 1557. During the long wars between the two nations, the French had discovered the proper method of defending their country against the English. They had been taught by their misfortunes to avoid a pitched battle with the utmost care, and to endeavour by throwing garrisons into every place, capable |