consciousness, for these two kinds of sin; for the one of which we feel guilty, and are conscious of deserving blame and punishment, but for the other of which we feel no guilt, since in it we have had no active concern.

Then the theory here examined makes God the responsi ble author of sin, at least of that sin which attaches to our nature, and is the source and fountain of all the rest. If God is not its responsible author, who is? Certainly we have had no active concern in its origination. It was born with us; it attaches to the very constitution of our souls; and must be charged, for aught we see, upon the great author of our being.

Also the theory under consideration divests us entirely and confessedly of every kind of ability to do our duty. We are utterly disabled. Until our natures are changed, and in this change of nature we are entirely passive, we can no more perform a good action than we can fly without wings, or work miracles.

Hence, the Bible, on this ground, is utterly in fault, in requiring sinners to do their duty, and in threatening them so severely in case they refuse to comply. It is in fault, too, in using motives with sinners to induce them to do what they have no ability of any kind to perform.

On this ground, ministers have little or nothing to do for the sinner, unless it be to condole with him, pray for him, and commend him to the mercy of God, who, peradventure, may have mercy upon him. Certainly, ministers can give no directions to the sinner, according to this theory, except that he use means with such a nature as he has, and wait and pray for God to change it.

It is further objected to the theory in question, that it is inconsistent with facts recorded in the scriptures. This theory accounts for all sin, by referring it to a sinful nature, and denies that actual sin can be conceived of as possible, on any other supposition. How, then, are we to account for the first sin of the rebel angels; and for that of our first parents? Did their first sin arise from a sinful nature? And if so, how was this sinful nature acquired?

But it is needless to pursue this theory of depravity further. It is a theory, not of the Bible, but of the schools. It is a philosophical theory, or rather a very unphilosopical one, of stating and defending some of the doctrines of the gospel. It is believed that the Hopkinsian view of sin and depravity, as before explained, runs clear of all the above objections, and is in strict accordance with the Bible, with sound philosophy, and with common sense.

NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY AND INABILITY.

Another peculiarity of the Hopkinsians consists in their cognizance and use of the very important distinction. between natural and moral ability and inability. They cannot be said to have originated this distinction, because it is as old, probably, as the use of words. We find it in

all languages, ancient and modern. We find it in all books, and in reference to all sorts of subjects; so that those who are inclined to repudiate it, find it next to impossible to succeed. The μn Súvapai of the Greek, the non possum of the Latin, the ne puis pas of the French, the little cannot of the English, are continually used in two different senses; the one expressing what is called a moral, the other a natu ral inability; the one a mere inability of disposition and will, the other an inability extraneous to the will, and over which the will has no power. We ask a pious friend to lift for us a thousand pounds. He replies: "I cannot do it.” We ask him to go to some place of amusement on the Sabbath; he replies again: "I cannot do it." In both cases he pleads, and pleads properly (as terms are used) an inability. But who does not see that here are two kinds of inability? Our friend has no natural power to lift a thousand pounds. He could not do it, if he would. He has the natural power to comply with the other request, and only lacks the willing mind.

We ask a companion who is walking with us in the field to leap to the top of a precipice fifty feet high. He says "I cannot." But having clambered to the top, we ask him to leap down; he says again "I cannot." In both cases,

his answer is the same in terms. He is unable either to leap up, or to leap down. But clearly, the inability in the two cases is not of the same nature. Our friend could not leap up the precipice, if he would; but he could break his neck by leaping down, if he was so inclined.

The distinction here illustrated is that between natural and moral ability and inability. It is a distinction, as we said, which runs through all languages and all books. It recurs continually in common conversation. Not one of us passes a single day, unless we pass it in utter solitude, without respeatedly using the words can and cannot in the two senses above indicated.

This distinction shows itself very often in the Bible, and that, too, in reference to a great variety of subjects. In the following passages, the inability spoken of is natural: "When Eli was laid down in his place, and his eyes began to wax dim that he could not see" (1 Sam. iii. 2). "The magicians did so with their enchantments to bring forth lice, but they could not" (Ex. viii. 18). The men in the ship with Jonah, "rowed hard to bring it to the land but they could not" (John. i. 13).

In the following passages, an entirely different kind of inability is spoken of. Joseph's brethren "hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him" (Gen. xxxvii. 4). "We cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard " (Acts iv. 20). I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come" (Luke xiv. 20). In each of these cases there is obviously no lack of capacity, of natural power. The inability is wholly of a moral nature, the inability of will.

In establishing the fact of the distinction in question, we have indicated, to some extent, the nature and grounds of it. Natural ability has respect to the natural capacity or faculties of an individual. Moral ability has respect to the disposition, the concurrent will, or (which is the same) to the predominant motive, with which the will always coincides. We have the natural ability to do whatever is within the reach of our natural capacity, faculties, or powers those with which the God of nature has endowed us. We have moral ability to

do whatever, under the influence of the predominant motive, we are inclined, disposed, or willing to perform.

Calvinists of the old school deny the natural ability of the sinner to turn to God, and do his duty. He is utterly incapacitated for the performance of right actions. His very nature is sinful, and must be changed, before he can do any thing that God shall approve.

From views such as these, Hopkinsian writers dissent. They assert, as strongly as any others, the entire sinfulness of the natural man; but his sinfulness does not destroy the faculties of moral agency, but rather implies them. He is still a free, moral, responsible agent, and as such is naturally capable of doing his duty. His inability to perform it is wholly of the moral kind - the same which Joseph's brethren felt when "they hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him;" the same which Peter and John were under, when they "could not but speak the things which they they had seen and heard."

It is objected to what we have called natural ability that, if possessed at all, it must be a useless, worthless endowment; since, unless united with moral ability, or a moving, concurrent will, it accomplishes nothing in a way of action. It is admitted that mere natural ability, or faculties alone, accomplish nothing. Still it does not follow that this kind. of ability is of no importance. Are not our faculties of body and mind important to us? What could we do, or how subsist as moral beings, without them? If mere natural ability accomplishes nothing, in a way of action, it is certain that nothing can be accomplished without it.

Besides, this kind of ability constitutes the ground and the measure of our moral obligation. We are morally bound to do, and God justly holds us responsible for doing, all the good which he has given us the natural ability, the capacity, to accomplish. We may not do this, or any part of it; but our neglect does not release us from the bonds of obligation. As God has given us our faculties, he may justly require us to exercise them all in his service. And this is all that he can justly require. Should he command us to exert powers

which he had not given us; should he command us to love him with more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, the requisition would be unreasonable.

It may be further remarked, that natural ability is essential to free-agency, and is the ground of it. We must have the power to choose and refuse, to turn this way, that, or the other, to act differently from what we do, or how can we be said to act freely?

There are others who would exclude moral ability and inability, at least from the nomenclature of theology. If the moral cannot is no other than a will not, then why not drop it altogether, and use will not in its stead?

To this we answer, first of all, that the moral cannot is found in all parts of the Bible; so that without recognizing the distinction between natural and moral inability, the Bible cannot be rightly interpreted or understood.

Nor is this phraseology peculiar to the Bible. It is found, as we have said, in all languages and in all books. It occurs continually in common conversation, and in reference to all subjects. Hence, to exclude it altogether from theology, would be to render the language of theology entirely different, in this respect, from any other language.

Besides, there is a propriety in this peculiar phraseology. This is evident from the general currency which it has obtained. It is also evident from the facts of the case. A moral inability is a real inability; very different in its nature from a natural inability, but not the less real. In every case of moral inability, though there may be the requisite faculties, there is wanting the predominant motive and the concurrent will, without which no action will be performed.

It should be further remarked, that the moral cannot is not altogether synonymous with will not. It expresses indisposition, aversion, unwillingness, with much greater emphasis and strength. It is sometimes said of sinners that they will not come to Christ; but when their criminal aversion to him is to be set forth in all its energy, the moral cannot is used: "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." It would but feebly set forth the moral