Besides, what is the propriety of the statement that human nature was not annihilated by the loss of those superior principles, if he only employed them to denote actions? if he neither believed-nor regarded himself as having conveyed an impression to his readers-that their loss had produced any change whatever in that nature? Or what, unless they were regarded as physical attributes, is the propriety of their being represented as implanted in man, as truly as were those which are inferior; and as constituting "the dignity, life, happiness, and glory" of his "nature ?"

But that by those superior principles he meant physical attributes solely, and not mental operations, is demonstrated by his employing the loss of those principles to account for the fact, that man continued to sin after the fall, instead of yielding obedience as at first; which were supremely illogical, had he used the term to denote actions, instead of constitutional attributes. It were to make the loss of his holy actions-holy of course as they were exercised antecedently to the fall—the cause of his ceasing to exercise holiness, and yielding to the "predominance" of unholy actionsif the "inferior principles" mean such as they must by the same rule of interpretation. The loss of his holy actions-that is, his ceasing to exercise holiness, the cause of his ceasing to exercise holiness! What is this but the grossest nonsense? To verify this representation, the reader is desired to substitute actions in place of principles in the quotation, and he will perceive the absurdity such an interpretation involves. But is this the manner in which the mind of Edwards considered an easy and satisfactory explanation as made out, of the rebellion of mankind? No one can for a moment imagine that such was his meaning. And if it was not, he must of course have employed the terms to denote physical attributes: as beside its operations, nothing but its physical properties belongs to the mind.

2d. The theory exhibits the presence of those principles

in the constitution of man, as necessary in order to his being capable of exercising holiness, and consequently represents their extinction, as rendering him physically incapable of obedience. This is seen from the description of them. They are represented as far more excellent in their nature, and destined to a much more exalted office than those of the inferior class, as constituting "the spiritual image of God" in the soul, and "the glory of man's nature," and as “given to possess the throne and maintain absolute dominion in the heart;" whilst the others were greatly inferior in their nature, and formed for a totally inferior office; "to be wholly subordinate and subservient." But what propriety is there in a delineation that throws their nature and destiny so wide asunder, if after all the inferior class approaches so near to the superior, that no physical obstacle hinders its ascending from its appropriate sphere, and performing the service for which the superior class was designed?

But all doubt that President Edwards regarded them as necessary, in order to render the constitution physically competent to act in conformity to the divine will, must be removed by the circumstance that he represents the loss of those superior principles, as the sole cause of the subsequent disobedience of mankind; a representation without propriety, unless their removal from the constitution was considered as having left it absolutely incapable of obedience. For if the surviving portion of nature were still physically adequate to obedience; if the inferior principles after fulfilling their own proper office, were competent to discharge the functions also of the higher class, it does not follow that the extinction of that higher class must infallibly have caused an universal violation of the divine requirements; nor that it actually did. If nature is still left as truly capable of yielding obedience as it was before, nothing surely so far as that only is concerned, is seen but that it as certainly will yield it. The certainty of its disobedience must be constituted by something external to itself;

namely, those objects which are to exert on it the influence under which it is to exercise its various capacities for action; or rather the moral influence itself under which it is to exert those capacities, and which are to determine the manner in which it acts.

Where then, to place the subject beyond controversy, did President Edwards regard the certainty, that man would sin, as lying? in the nature of the constitution with which he was left after the fall, or out of it? namely, in the moral influence, which was to be brought to bear on that nature, and under which it was to act? Indubitably in that nature, and solely within it. This is demonstrated indeed by his assigning the state in which it was left by the fall, as the cause of the universal rebellion of men. But beyond this, it was the avowed and sole design of his treatise on original sin, to establish that position. His language is," All mankind are in such a state . . . that they universally run themselves. . . . into eternal perdition, ... from which I infer that the natural state of the mind of man is attended with a propensity of nature which is prevalent and effectual to such an issue." And "this tendency does not consist in any particular external circumstances, . . . . but is inherent, and is seated in that nature which is common to mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go." Accordingly he devoted the whole work to the proof and vindication of that doctrine.

It was his belief, therefore, that it is the nature of man solely that is the cause of his sinning, and that constitutes the certainty that he will continue to sin. But as that cannot be inferred, unless it is assumed-virtually at leastthat his nature is physically incapable of obedience, for if it is actually capable of it, it does not itself constitute a certainty that it will not obey; it presents no certainty that it will not exert that capacity ;—it is the representation of his theory, that such a physical incapacity pertains to the constitution of man.

It appears then, according to this theory, that an important portion of the powers with which man was originally endowed, was stricken from his constitution at the fall; that in consequence of their eradication his nature was left physically incapable of acting in conformity to the divine will; and that it is this inability of nature to yield obedience; or in other words its total adaptation and tendency to sin, that constitutes that " sinful depravity" and "great corruption of nature" with which "man comes into the world."-p. 163, 164.

But this depravity is more commonly represented as consisting in a disposition, taste, relish, or propensity implanted in the soul, which is the cause of its liking or disliking the moral objects presented to its view; and the nature of which is such, that sin is supremely agreeable, and holiness supremely disagreeable to it; such, that all the moral influence of what kind or degree soever brought to bear on the mind, is rendered an excitement to sin; that which naturally tempts to evil by the gratification it affords; and that which is adapted to prompt to holiness by the aversion which it excites. A specimen of the manner in which this disposition is described is presented in the following quotations :

"Human nature must be created with some dispositions, or disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeble; otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will. It must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of those things that were most excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things that were most worthy of it, then

his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be decent and excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium between these." -Edwards' Works, vol. 6. p. 267, 268.

"If you mean by disposition, a taste or principle that is the foundation of exercises,”—and it is that use of the term to which this discussion relates," then it is evident that an object to be beloved must be adapted to the existing disposition. Of course it had no influence to produce it. If you admit the existence of a taste or principle, and call the object the motive which moves the heart to action, you will readily allow that the object must be accommodated to the taste before it can become a motive; that is, before it can be beloved. It must find the disposition prepared to enter tain it before it can move the heart. A hated object can never be a motive to love; and a beloved object finds the taste already in its favour. The power of the object to become a motive presupposes a disposition in the heart to love it. Of course it did not produce that disposition even as a second cause.... The word of God is in no sense instrumental in changing the disposition. It is enough to ask how can the motives of religion be the instruments of producing a new disposition, when that disposition must exist before the motives can take hold of the heart?"-ParkStreet Lectures, p. 153, 154. 157.

But is this disposition a physical property? What else can it be? It is not a volition. It is not a feeling or exercise. It is not any mental operation whatever, nor an effect, nor in any manner a consequence of any such operation; for it exists, and must according to the representation, before any moral feeling or volition can take place in the mind; is the foundation of all such exercises, and determines their moral