regem, will enable us to form our mind very to Perfonal views or motives of king James not to be confi- part of the na The rights and daties of the reciprocal. to him and obey his commands. Hiftory tells us, that the whole navy of England were likely to remain ftaunch unto him; nor is there any reafon to imagine, that the army, which was commanded by lord Feversham, would have deferted from him; and it is more than probable, that had king James the Second, even at this time, fhewn the smallest degree of energy, fpirit, or rectitude in governing, he would have prevented the greateft part of the nation from joining with the prince of Orange. No fort of comparison can be drawn beKing and people tween the rights and duties of a fovereign in his political capacity, and those of a subject in the natural capacity of an individual; for, as I have before obferved, the rights of the fovereign are, in fact, the duties of the fubject, and the duties of the fovereign are the rights and liberties of the fubject. Now no one can deny that the community have in themfelves an indefeasible right of preserving their own rights and liberties, and these in our community chiefly confift in the advantages of a limited and efficient monarchy; and if that be by any means done away or abolished, it neceffarily induces an actual diffolution of that government, by which the commu nity had agreed to be governed. Anarchy Anarchy is allowed by all writers to be the greatest political misfortune, which can befal a state, and the first principle of felfpreservation supplies every community with the right and the means of preventing and avoiding it. Attention to this laft principle will at one glance develop the neceffity, and justify the adoption of the revolution; for at that time the nation was in a state of the moft dreadful fermentation, and there could not be a ftronger neceffity for efficient energy in the executive power of government, in order to allay and counteract the ferment, which threatened the very fubverfion of the nation. In this critical pofture of affairs, every action of the fovereign will be perceived to draw with it the most important confequences; nor can we in paffing judgment upon them make any allowances for perfonal prejudice, or want of judgment, knowledge, refolution, or courage. I fhall not resume the queftion, whether England or Scotland expreffed with more propriety the actual ceffation of king James's reign, when the former used the term abdication, and the latter forfeiture of the crown. The actual exercife of the executive powers of the fupreme magiftrate is abfolutely neceffary for the actual fubfiftence of the English diffolution of The ceffation of the excrcife of the executive power an actual monarchy; government. The actions of king James an abfolute aban donment of his fovereignty. monarchy; if, therefore, king James the Second did, as far as he could, annihilate or even fufpend the operation of the fupreme executive powers, it must be allowed that he did all that he could to annihilate, for the time at least, the very existence of the English monarchy. We need therefore only to confider in what ftate this nation would have been, had it been left but for the space of one month in the fituation, in which king James endeavoured to leave it; and we shall from thence be able to form a fatisfactory judgment of the rights, which the nation fo abandoned had in them to fecure their own prefervation. He withdrew, in the person of the king, the whole executive power of government; he called in his writs, which were about to be iffued for convening a parliament; he difmiffed his judges; he threw the great feal of England into the river; he difbanded the army without pay; and let loofe a lawlefs armed force upon the nation. Now if a fupreme executive magiftrate, upon whom all fubordinate magiftrates depend, if the administration of juftice, if armed force on certain occafions be requifite for preferving our present conftitutional form of government, it is felf-evident, that a king who has by overt and unequivocal acts attempted to 8 deprive deprive the community of thefe neceffary means of fupport and preservation, must be allowed to have done whatever he could to diffolve the government, and involve the nation in anarchy and confufion. In this light the warmest devotee to the house of Stuart cannot furely deny, that king James the Second by these acts ceafed, while their effects could laft, to be that fupreme executive power, which our conftitution requires the king to be. The actual duration of thefe effects could not by poffibility be known to the nation; and therefore as a community, upon the common principle of felf-prefervation, they had the indefeafible right of adopting fuch measures, as they thought moft conducive to attain that end. For if a government be actually diffolved for one hour, by the act of the governor, the primeval rights of the governed to chufe, fquare, and model their own government, revive in the fame extent, as they enjoyed them before the formation of the government fo diffolved. And upon these principles we must at this day candidly allow, that our ancestors, in 1688, did actually possess the right to make a new limitation of the crown, and to annex a new condition to the tenure of it. If Right of the nnmodel the go tion to new vernment wholly at the revolution. |