Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being

James Frederick Ferrier

W. Blackwood and sons, 1856 - 543 pàgines

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INTRODUCTION	1

Because of no use as a mental discipline	7

First How is this state to be explained? Secondly How remedied?	13

The old philosophers were right in their problemin their way of work	14

Illustrations of this from language and grammar	19

PROPOSITION II	21

How ill the necessary truths have fared in Germany and in our	24

A remedial system uniting truth and reason not impossible	33

A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious	271

Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element	272

Ambiguities of the old philosophers	273

Comment on first misconception	275

Comment on second misconception	276

Comment on third misconception	277

Key to the Greek philosophy	279

Return to counterproposition It is founded on a confusion of the dis tinction between sense and intellect	281

Why philosophy must be polemical She exists only to correct the inad	39

Its positive object still more distinctly stated Definition of metaphysics	45

General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this	51

Epistemology and ontology the two main divisions of philosophy	56

The necessity of keeping these divisions perfectly distinct	62

PROPOSITION VI	73

Startingpoint must state the essential of knowledge Experience	84

PROPOSITION VIII	85

Application to philosophy Here too first principles come out last	94

Reason for printing itselfinunionwithwhateveritapprehends	98

PROPOSITION III	105

The unit of cognition further explained	112

Further illustration	118

Short statement of what this proposition contends for	119

No opinion offered as to existence	120

PROPOSITION IV	121

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	122

Oversight of self only apparentnot real and total	123

Psychological materialism as founded on the four counterpropositions	124

Fallacy of materialism Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions	125

A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist	126

Its criterion is the law of contradiction	127

How Prop IV decides this preliminary question How Counterpro position IV decides it	128

The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position	129

Different conclusions from the two positions	130

Difference farther explained	131

Another point of difference between this system and psychology	132

Matter per se reduced to the contradictory	134

This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter per se	136

But to matter per se itself	137

Its criterion is not ready acceptance	138

Advantage of this reduction New light on the problem of philosophy	139

Importance of finding the contradictory	140

SECTION I	141

Matter per se is not a nonentity	142

PROPOSITION V	144

Fifth Counterproposition	145

Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter	149

It runs into a contradiction	151

Psychological conception of idealism	152

This refutation if logically conclusive is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted	154

The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be aban doned as useless or worse	155

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN COGNITION	156

DEMONSTRATION	157

Explanation of words	158

Why this proposition is introduced	160

Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing	161

Was made a question of being by the early philosophers Thales	163

It still related to Beingnot to Knowing	164

Indecision of Greek speculation The three crises of philosophy	165

Plato appeared during the second crisis His aim	167

The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved not guessed at	168

His merits The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration	169

A preliminary ambiguity	170

Further statement of ambiguity	171

Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into ele ments or into kinds?	173

Rightly interpreted it is a division into elements	174

It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds	176

Explanation of this charge	177

20	179

This counterproposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers	180

Review of our position	181

Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences	182

Perplexity as to general existences	183

Realism is superseded by Conceptualism	184

Conceptualism is destroyed by Nominalism	185

Evasion by which conceptualism endeavours to recover her ground and to conciliate nominalism Its failure	186

Nominalism	190

Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI	191

The summing up	192

The abstract and the concrete	193

PROPOSITION VII	196

PROPOSITION I	197

The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from	213

explained	219

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	226

Ninth Counterproposition	248

DEMONSTRATION	257

History of distinction between sense	264

ing it and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense	270

The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counterpropo sition effect no subversion of sensualism	282

Kants doctrine impotent against sensualism	283

The statement in par 4 and the charge in par 7 are borne out by the foregoing remarks	286

Kant sometimes nearly right He errs through a neglect of necessary truth	287

The true compromise between Sense and Intellect	288

PROPOSITION XI	290

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	291

Distinction between knowing and thinking	292

This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience	293

First restriction by way of addition Second by way of subtraction	294

The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers Eleventh Counter proposition	295

Its invalidity shown	296

Dr Reids mistake in his assault on representationism	297

The truth and the error of representationism	299

PROPOSITION XII	300

Why this proposition is introduced	301

On what condition matter per se might be thought of	302

In attempting to think it we must leave out an element essential to its cognition and therefore it cannot be thought of	303

Illustration	304

Self must be represented just as much as it must be presented	305

PROPOSITION XIII	310

Further explanation of how one self can conceive another self	316

DEMONSTRATION	328

PROPOSITION XVII	335

The exact point in the counterproposition which natural thinking	341

Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned	347

Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes	353

What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma	359

PROPOSITION XIX	367

PROPOSITION XXI	373

A reminder	379

PROPOSITION I	405

PROPOSITION III	412

PROPOSITION IV	417

PROPOSITION VI	428

THE OBJECT OF ALL IGNORANCE	432

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	433

The object of ignorance is neither nothing nor the contradictory	434

It is believed that this doctrine is new	435

What has caused this doctrine to be missed	436

Another circumstance which has caused it to be missed	437

In fixing the object of ignorance this proposition does not deny its mag nitude	438

How far the object of ignorance is definable and how far it is not de finable	439

The advantage of discriminating the necessary from the contingent laws of knowledge	440

This system is more humble in its pretensions than other systems	442

Eighth Counterproposition	443

Illustration of the difference between the speculative and the ordinary view in regard to the object of ignorance	444

The substantial and absolute in ignorance	446

Concluding remark	447

SECTION III	449

PROPOSITION I	451

THE THREE ALTERNATIVES AS TO ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE	453

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	454

The third alternative has to be eliminated	455

First Counterproposition	456

In what respect it is wrong	457

Origin of the mistake in regard to this law	458

The want of a clear doctrine of the contradictory has been the cause of much error in philosophy	459

Distinction between the singly and the doubly contradictory	460

A PREMISS BY WHICH THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE IS ELIMINATED	461

PROPOSITION IV	467

PROPOSITION VII	475

his doctrine of intuitive perception	490

He mistook the vocation of philosophy	496

This misconception has never been guarded against by any philosopher	500

How this system of Institutes avoids these errors	504

Recapitulation of the three sections 1 Epistemology 2 Agnoiology	507

PROPOSITION X	511

This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion	518

How philosophy goes to work Adherence to canonproposition	520

The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects	533

The tenth contradiction which it corrects	534

The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects	535

The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects	536

The derivative contradictions which it corrects	537

The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of Being	538

Exposure and refutation of these contradictions	539

The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects	541

The eleventh contradiction which the ontology corrects	541

As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth	542

Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot

Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being
James Frederick Ferrier
Visualització completa - 1856

Frases i termes més freqüents

Absolute Existence absolutely unknowable absurdity affirm agnoiology answer apprehended called common conception condition constitute contingent contra contradic contradiction contradictory counter-pro counter-proposition declares DEMONSTRATION dictory distinction doctrine elements of cognition epistemology error essential express fixed gible Hegel Hence idealism ignorance inadvertency inconceivable inseparable in cognition intellect intelligence Kant kind knowable laid law of contradiction laws of knowledge laws of thought ledge lutely material things material universe matter per se means ment merely metaphysics mind necessary laws necessary truth nition non-ego object of cognition object of knowledge OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS ontology opinion ordinary thinking ourselves particular perceptions phenomenal philo philosophy Plato popular psychology position possible present primary qualities PROP proposition psychology qualities of matter question regard secondary qualities sensations sense sophy speculation subject and object suppose synthesis ter-proposi thing or thought tion tradiction true truth of reason unit or minimum whole words

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Informació bibliogràfica

Títol	Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being
Autor	James Frederick Ferrier
Editor	W. Blackwood and sons, 1856
Original de	Universitat de Michigan
Digitalitzat el	14 Febr. 2006
Nre. de pàgines	543 pàgines

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