them afloat, even after their quality may be suspected. This defect in the law should, undoubtedly, be amended, by obliging all banks that issue notes to pay them indifferently at any of their offices. But we incline to think that parliament might go further than this; and that it should enact that no branch be established, whether for the issue of notes or otherwise, beyond a certain distance (say fifty miles) from the head office.

"Several of the points recapitulated by the committee, as to which the law is silent, respect the rights and interests of the partners in joint-stock banks, in relation to each other, and not as between them and the public. But it is always a very difficult matter to interfere to dictate the footing on which parties in any undertaking should stand among themselves. Much should, in such cases, be left to the judgment of the parties; and public regulations, if enforced at all, should only go to prevent obvious and acknowledged abuse; the parties may, in most cases, be safely left to take care of themselves. The protection of the public interest is the paramount consideration; and we do not well know what can be done to effect this, in the case at least of such banks as do not issue notes, other than the making known who their partners are.

"The joint-stock banks formed in the city of London offer a fair rate of interest for deposits; and if they go on successfully in doing this, they will confer no slight advantage on the community, and will become, as it were, so many savings banks for the middle classes, and for the rich as well as the poor. But the responsibilities this system will bring along with it are neither few nor small. A bank with a numerous body of partners of undoubted wealth and integrity that should give 2 per cent, interest on all deposits of 101. and upwards, how short soever the period for which the deposit might remain in the bank, would, there is little doubt, speedily have ample funds at its disposal. In quiet and prosperous times, the system would work exceedingly well; and the bank and the public would be vastly well pleased with each other. But when the cycle of prosperity has gone by, and the cycle of adversity has begun; when the waters are out and the winds begin to blow, it is doubtful whether either the bank or its depositors may feel quite at ease. The former will probably raise the rate of interest; but it is doubtful whether that will have the wished-for effect. Should the exchange set against us, and the Bank of England be forced to narrow her issues, and should bankruptcy and a feeling of insecurity begin to prevail, as they have done hitherto on all similar occasions, a run for deposits may, and most probably will, be made upon the bank; and in such a case her situation, however well she may have been managed, will be most critical. She will be compelled to dispose of or pledge securities in a market where they may be all but unsaleable; and it will be impossible for her suddenly to pull up in discounting, without exposing herself to the imminent danger of extra loss, by bringing on the stoppage of those who have been accustomed to trust to her for loans.

"It will be said, perhaps, that this is all imaginary, and that nothing of the sort ever occurs in Scotland! But it would really be about as much to the purpose to say that nothing of the sort ever occurs in Japan. London is the pivot on which the foreign exchanges turn, and when they become depressed many of the London depositors will do what the Scotch depositors never so much as dreamed of; that is, they will demand their deposits, convert them into gold, and either send this gold abroad, or get a profit from those who will. From this source of annoyance and loss the Scotch banks are perfectly free; and this, by exhausting the resources of the London banks, and subjecting the weaker ones to difficulties, occasions discredit, and, in the end, runs or panics. Nothing, therefore, can be more perfectly futile than to contend that because this system has proved profitable for the Scotch banks, it will also be profitable for the London banks We do not presume to affirm that such will not, and we hope that it may, be the case. But it would be rather illogical to affirm, because wheat succeeds remarkably well in the vale of Gloucester, that it will succeed equally well on the Welsh mountains.

"The joint-stock banks may, if they do not already, endeavour to obviate some of the difficulties now stated, by declining to pay interest on deposits unless they lie for a certain time, or by stipulating for a certain notice before they are paid. But either the one condition or the other is subversive of what is meant by granting interest on deposits, and goes far to make the announcements to that effect little better than a hoax upon the public. All, or nearly all, the existing banks are banks of deposit in this sense of the word; that is, they give interest on deposits of a certain amount, provided they be not called for till after the lapse of an agreed-on period, and that the depositors give them no farther trouble. But it is doubtful whether money deposited at 2 per cent. under such conditions, and still more under an engagement to give notice of demand, be as well laid out as if it were deposited with the Bank of England, or any other bank of undoubted solidity, at no interest, but payable on demand. Most men of business would, undoubtedly, prefer the latter. Nobody, indeed, not wishing to get into difficulties, would be disposed to deal with any bank that required notice of demand; and it is questionable whether any such stipulation should be sanctioned by law.

"The committee on joint-stock banks omitted all reference to what is by far the most prominent evil in our banking system-we mean the power conceded to all private and joint-stock banks and companies, whether with or without property or character, to issue paper money or notes payable on demand, without let or hindrance of any sort. This abuse should certainly be put down;" and we have already seen that this power can now be but little abused.

"Responsibility ought not, in any case, to be limited. We protest against the proposal for allowing the partners in banks not issuing notes to limit their responsibility. Such a measure would be good for nothing, except to serve as a premium on every species of fraud. What check would there be, under such a system, to hinder the partners of a bank going on for a series of years dividing large profits, when perhaps they were really incurring a loss, until every farthing of its capital and deposits was absorbed? To talk of subjecting such persons to punishment as fraudulent bankrupts, on evidence derived from their books, is absurd; for, supposing that it was the intention of the parties to defraud, they might easily keep their books so that they could afford no information that was not false or misleading. The annexed list of joint-stock banking companies shows that there is no disinclination on the part of individuals to engage in such concerns, even with the present unlimited responsibility. And the way in which some of them are conducted proves sufficiently, if such proof were wanted, that the serious liabilities incurred by the partners are not more than enough for the protection of the public. To lessen them would be an act of gratuitous folly. If we are to interfere, let them be increased, not diminished. But in the case of banks not issuing notes, enough is done if measures be taken to prevent deception, by letting the public know the partners in them, and making sure that they shall have no means of evading the responsibility attaching to their engagements. The first object may be secured by compelling all banking associations whatever to publish annually a list of the names and addresses of their partners, with the amount of their paid-up capital; and to accomplish the latter object, we have merely to abstain from interference, and to let the law take its natural course."

The existing Regulations in regard to private and joint-stock Bankers in England and Wales are embodied in clauses 11-26 of the stat. 7 & 8 Vict c. 32., of which we have given a very full abstract. (See antè, p. 84.)

Drawing on London. - The act 3 and 4 Will. 4. c. 83. repeals the regulation in the 7 Geo. 4. c. 46., prohibiting banks with more than 6 partners from drawing on London on demand, or otherwise, for sums of less than 50l. —§ 2.

An Account of the Number of Private and Joint Stock Banks registered in each Year, from 1820 to 1842, both inclusive. -- (Pari. Paper No. 85. Session 1843.)

A List of the Joint Stock Banking Companies existing in England and Wales in 1846; specifying the Dates of their Establishment, the Number of their Partners, the Amount of their paid-up Capital, the Situation of their head Offices, and of their Branches, when they have any, with the fixed Issue of those authorised to issue Notes.*

We are indebted for this table to a valuable publication, the Banker's Almanack for 1847: we have also derived much useful information from the Banker's Magazine, by the intelligent author of the almanac.

37,500
36,000

Barnsley

Notes. 9,563

30,375 69,075 200,000 90,000

Wolverhampton

Head Office, Birmingham; Branch,

Dudley.
Birmingham

Amount of
Issue.

No issue.

No issue.

10,215 Bk. of Eng. Notes.

Bk. of Eng.
Notes.

Bk. of Eng.
Notes.

35,813

442,371

B. of Eng. Notes. 84,130

Bk. of Eng.
Notes.
Bk. of Eng.
Notes.

26,401

84,356

Bk of Eng.
Notes.

63, 951

63,939

29,177

59,300

Bk. of Eng.

Notes.

18,744

Bk. of Eng.

Notes

8,122

52,496

35,843

56,830

8,290

9,714

356,976

Bk. of Eng. Notes. 54,372

No issue.

Bt. of Eng. Note 34,029

7,475

14,604

31,916

76,162

6,848 35,378

122,532

94,695

71,240

3,418,277