combination will and does in all cases turn; whether, for example, it be proposed to take up a certain strategical position at a certain fixed time, in order to intercept the union of the enemy's columns at their point of concentration, and defeat them in detail; or to be on the enemy's communications, one's own remaining covered; or at one extremity of the enemy's strategical front, along which it is proposed to pass the mass of the army; or in any case whatever. It being decided, then, that the combination will always turn on this, the general is now to be supposed to have decided that, if at a certain fixed time he can be in a certain strategical position, he will be in a position, relatively to the enemy, such that he will be either already reaping or in train to reap great advantages. The consideration of the rapidity of marches, and the circumstances affecting their rapidity, has already entered the combination before the strategical position and the fixed time are decided on as being the right thing, if attainable; because the general, before suggesting to himself a certain strategical position, at a certain fixed time, must at least have promenaded his compass open at a distance of say twenty miles, (which, supposing him to measure in straight lines along the general direction of the roads, would in general for every twenty miles of the straight line give twenty-four of road, taking turns and twists into account,) and become pretty well acquainted with the prominent distances on the map, the size of the theatre of war generally, and uniting this roughly with the strategical power of his army, and the estimated strategical power of the enemy, have roughly ascertained whether it is possible to attain the certain strategical position at the certain fixed time, and whether the enemy can be, and is likely to be, in the corresponding position he has attributed to him. The consideration of marches having, then, thus far entered the combination before the strategical position at the fixed time is suggested, the position at the fixed time being suggested, the consideration of the rapidity, and circumstances affecting the rapidity, of marches, again enters into the mental discussion of the combination by the general, and he has to decide

1. (1) By a consideration of distances, configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and strategical power of his army, as to the actual amount of probability that he can at the fixed time be in the fixed position; (2) and at what time each of his bodies must start in order that the different bodies may arrive simultaneously, each in its allotted position.

2. By a consideration of distances, configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and estimated Strategical Power of the enemy; whether it is possible or impossible for the enemy to execute any decisive manoeuvre which will overthrow the combination, and turn the strategical advantages of position in his favour.

This, then, is the general problem of marches; and having thus introduced and stated it, the discussion of the solution may be proceeded with.

The Problem has been divided into two parts. The discussion of the second part is no other than the discussion from more imperfect and less reliable data of the first of the two divisions of part 1; for the general has, in order ́to solve the second part, only to make the same calculation with respect to the supposed position of the enemy, the distances on the map, the configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and the strategical power of the enemy, and any position into which he sees that if the enemy could place himself it would interfere with the success of his plan, which he makes in solving the first division of part 1, with his own known position, the distances on the map, the nature and configuration of the theatre of war, and the strategical power of his army, in order to see if he is able to be in the fixed position he wishes his army to be in at the fixed time. Hence the discussion of part 1 will alone be entered on; more would be recapitulatory.

The first thing, then, manifestly to be done in the solution of the problem, is to determine the time which each of the separate bodies—the army being supposed disseminated, to give all possible generality-will require to march from the position it occupies, to the strategical position it is to have at the fixed time. To show how this is to be done for one corps, is to show how it is to be done for all.

First, then, to state the different things which have to be taken into consideration in determining the time which an army, or column of an army, will require to move from one given point to another given point.

1. The distance between the two points, or the distance between the points estimated in marches.

2. The ordinary general rate at which the army marches; or, to explain better, the marching power of the army; because marches may be forced, and so the expression, "ordinary general rate," becomes inadequate.

3. The size and character of the road, or roads, which are chosen for the strategical line of the column; the nature of the country, more or less difficult; the resources of the country.

4. The Parks, more or less considerable, which are to accompany the column.

5. The greater or less importance that the march of the column should be concealed, and the consequent necessity of precautions which occasion delay,

6. The information received as to the obstacles which the enemy has thrown or is likely to throw in the way of the march of the column.

Then, by an exercise of judgment, the general determines the shortest time in which the march can be done. If he be able to give the columu more time than the shortest possible, he gives it, if he pleases, by starting the column

sooner.

It is to be remarked that, when time presses, and a march has to be performed in the shortest possible time, or thereabouts, the security the general has that he will have the column at the end of its march, in the place fixed, at the hour fixed, lies in a general knowledge and conviction throughout the whole army, and which ought to be most sedulously inculcated into all ranks, that the Safety and Honour of the whole army, and of every column of it, depend on the exact execution of every march which may be ordered, more than on anything else. If unexpected difficulties arise, so must unexpected efforts: brave men are made to surmount difficulties, not to be beaten by them. Let that of

the Principles, too, be remembered which states, "That an army passes everywhere, and at all seasons, where two men can stand abreast;" nor should Hannibal's passage of the Marshes of Clusium, deemed impracticable by the Romans,-Napoleon's passage of the Alps, with its difficulties augmented by the Fort of Bard,-the retreat of the 10,000,-the passage of the Beresina,-or Charles the Twelfth's march into Russia,-be forgotten.

As a matter of course, the security the general has for an exact execution of a march,—however unexampled, and whatever its unexpected difficulties,-depends on everything on which the success of every one of the operations of an army depends; but the inculcation of the knowledge and conviction spoken of above, in all ranks, seems to deserve especial attention, for many weighty reasons. It is, then, the military excellence of every kind-of the soldiers forming a column, and of the officer commanding it, and the general determination of all ranks to be at the appointed place at the appointed time, if it even involve apparent impossibilities-that can alone ensure the exact execution of the general's strategical plans, and with them the Safety and Honour of the army.

We have, then, now arrived at the part of the discussion where we suppose the general to have determined the shortest length of time required for each of the columns to march from its present position to the appointed one.

To illustrate the question thus far, let the day on which the general is making his combination be supposed to be Sept. 1st; let the army be divided into four bodies-A, B, C, D; stationed at four different places-p, q, r, s: let the fixed time at which they are to have their new strategical position be Sept. 12th; and let P, Q, R, S, be the new positions of the four bodies, respectively.

Let the general have decided that the least time in which A can march from p to P is 8 days; B from q to Q, 7 days; and similarly for c and D, 6 days and 3 days, respectively.

Then the combination is possible if an order can be carried from the place at which the general is, to p in 3 days, to q in 4 days, to r in 5 days, and to 8 in 8 days.

The combination being found possible, the general gives each of the columns as much time as he thinks fit, compatibly with time allowed to each of the columns to accomplish its march. Then the general, having decided at what time any one of the columns is to march, sends an order to the officer commanding it, stating the time of starting, the place he is to go to, and the time he is to be there. The order is accompanied by a document containing in general,

1. A condensation of the most important information of all kinds respecting the stategical line which the column is to take.

2. Positive orders for the particular emergencies which it is possible may arrive.

3. Instructions as to the conduct of the march, to be observed at discretion.

4. Bodies on the right and left with which he may have to cooperate, and as much of the general plan as it is necessary for the officer to know.

5. Anything important respecting the enemy which is known. Instructions, to be followed at discretion, and information are alone sent to the officer charged with the march of a column. Orders which require positive execution may be found inexecutable and absurd, and will only embarrass. The column must be at the appointed place at the appointed time; this is the only absolute order given, and the officer in command must give a very good reason indeed for failure in its execution,-his military reputation is embodied with the success of the march. The officer then ought to be left free and unembarrassed in his movements: assist him all that is possible by the best information which can be obtained, lucidly and clearly given, and by instructions as to the conduct of the march, all of which he may find it highly expedient to follow, and be very grateful for; but by none of which should he be bound for a moment as if it were an order.

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