call him out. "I cannot," said he, say for certain beforehand. Were the Christian at home, he certainly would not go; but, if the challenger only found Natzmer at home, he might then.. .but I shall not say what would be the consequence." We imagine that "the Christian" was not at home when Michaelis wrote the passages which we have extracted. Indeed some things in the Commentaries lead us to suspect that his moral feeling was not very refined. We confess that we were a little surprised to find him, in one of the passages which we have quoted, talking coolly of the necessity of plying some persons with drink, if we wish to make an impression upon them. We will grant this learned instructor all reasonable allowances; we admit that, as a public lecturer, who frequently took occasion to lay before his hearers speculations which no sober man could receive, he might find it expedient to "ply them with drink;' but we cannot admit that it was proper. Again, his idea of an honourable man rather surprised us. He states, (ii. 370,)" Hunger or appetite often hurries a man, of the most honourable principles, to devour grapes and other eatables that are not watched." But we will add no more; we think our readers will allow that we have substantiated our charge-and that, if the book really contains what we have transcribed, it cannot (whatever else it may contain) be considered as "a valuable accession to Biblical literature” or even a book to be tolerated in Christian society. BROWN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. ART. XIV. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. By the late Thomas Brown, M. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. In Four volumes, 8vo. Edinburgh, 1820. It has been sometimes lamented that there is no royal road to metaphysics-no short and easy method of mastering the philosophy of intellect without the toil of deep reflection and patient observation. The other sciences are not liable to the same objection, and have therefore, for the most part, obtained a lasting popularity. But this branch of knowledge has other pe culiar disadvantages. It requires the most severe labour, and yet promises no result which can attract notice from the great body, of mankind, no discovery to interest the vulgar, no tangible benefit to command the thanks and praises of the world. He must be, indeed, a vain enthusiast who can fancy that any thing which has been done, or ever can be done in metaphysics, will affect the course of affairs in the world, or change the general system of human conduct. The extensive diffusion of knowledge among all classes of society, which is so remarkable in modern times, has made the improvements in science intelligible and interesting to the bulk of mankind. As this has excited the ambition, and gratified the vanity of the learned, it has encouraged them to proceed with greater ardour. But it is only of the experimental sciences that the knowledge has been thus generally imparted., The abstract and speculative branches of philosophy are still as much as ever unknown and uninteresting to the vulgar; and they must, be studied without any hope that the utmost progress in them is to be encouraged by the public sympathy, or cheered by the public applause. We need not, therefore, wonder that the taste for metaphysics has greatly declined among the learned, since it is a science in which the extent of their proficiency can never be generally understood, and in which, indeed, there is nothing to attract the popular attention. When Lord Monboddo, a man who with all his eccentricities was a very profound scholar, published an elaborate treatise,, which he entitled "Antient Metaphysics," he guessed, very accurately, that the name would be considered uncouth and inattractive. Accordingly, he says in his preface, "The reader cannot blame the author for a deceit, common enough at pre-.. sent, of imposing upon him by a specious title. I have chosen one which, so far from alluring readers, will frighten many from opening the book; nor do I believe that there is a bookseller in Great Britain who, upon the credit of my title page, would offer me a shilling for my copy, if I had a mind to sell it. Indeed the subject is altogether unfashionable, not only among the vulgar, who ridicule it under the name of metaphysic, but even among the philosophers of the present age." To the common sort of men the devotion to metaphysical studies seems a harmless infatuation: and yet, as they have engaged the attention of men of the most amiable temper, the highest attainments, and the most brilliant genius,and as works have been produced in this department of philosophy which are the most splendid ornaments to the literature of the country, there is enough to be said for it, one would think, to redeem it from absolute neglect. He must be a scholar of little intel lectual zeal, who could give up to vulgar obloquy those studie on which Mr. Locke bestowed the strongest efforts of his powerful mind. Our countrymen, however, have always been disposed to rest satisfied with the labours of Mr. Locke, and in this they have, perhaps, done wisely. The success of those among them who have attempted to proceed farther, has not been such as to induce a persuasion that much could be gained by the pursuit." But while these studies were so much abandoned in England, they were vigorously prosecuted in Scotland and in Germany. So many new systems and theories have been in their turn constructed and overthrown, old errors have been revived and refuted so often, that the actual amount of what has been added to the stock of intellectual knowledge, beyond the correction of some errors (which were certainly very important in their con sequences), and some reform in the mode of conducting the discussions, is by no means adequate to the labour and assiduity" which has produced it. The works of Dr. Reid certainly effected a very salutary reform in this branch of philosophy, which, at the time in which he wrote, had become involved in ab surdity and error. It has been very truly said of his writings, by one who was singularly well qualified to judge of their merit, that they rescued the philosophy of the human mind from a state that rendered it unworthy of the name of science, and a reproach to the human understanding; an object of contempt to the wise, of detestation to the good, and of well-merited' reproach, even to the vulgar. errors The imperfection of our faculties accounts for the slow progress which has been made in this department of philosophy; and as it includes nothing which can be considered as the object of strict discovery, such progress as is really made can be less distinctly observed. Dr. Priestley, a man of considerable talent, but of extraordinary presumption, among his manifold and extravagancies, betook himself to the making of discoveries in metaphysics; but D'Alembert, who had accurate views of the boundaries of human knowledge, struck with the absurdity of pretending to make discoveries of this kind, expressed his feelings upon it forcibly enough to one of his friends who having mentioned the name of Priestley to him, added "C'est un homme qui a fait des grandes decouvertes dans la physique et dans la metaphysique. D'ALEMBERT" Decouvertes dans la metaphysique! Diable! The truth is, that discovery, which may be considered as one of the proper objects of physical science, is altogether beyond the province of that knowledge which relates to the nature and faculties of the human mind. "Il n'y a proprement que trois genres, de connoissances ou les de-1 couvertes faits ne se devinent a pro as lieu; erudition, parceque les, se trouvent au et ne s' dedans de nous mesmes; la theologie parceque le depôt de la Foi est The true objects of metaphysical knowledge are, to become acquainted with the nature of our mental faculties, and to ascer tain what are the subjects on which it is, or is not, fit that these faculties should be employed. It was with these views that Mr. Locke undertook the studies which produced his Essay on the Human Understanding; and he has, with an interesting sime plicity, informed us in what manner his attention was first drawn to the subject. He tells us, that five or six friends meeting at his chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from metas physics, found found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties which rose on every side. After having puzzled themselves,> without coming any nearer to a resolution of the doubtsw which perplexed them, he says, it came into his thoughts that they took a wrong course, and that, before setting themselves upon inquiries of that nature, they should examine their owne abilities, and see what objects the human understanding was, or was not, fitted to deal with.' 1 Unfortunately for the advancement of knowledge, those who followed Mr. Locke have not always pursued these studies with the same design. And whoever considers the present state of intellectual science will have too much occasion to observe, that most of the errors and heresies from which it has been freed, and many of those which still infest it, have originated in mistaken views as to its proper object. This observation occurs to: us very forcibly, from the perusal of the lectures of Doctor Brown, which embrace a sweeping and ambitious view of the whole Philosophy of the Human Mind, and aspire to introduced into it some principles so extraordinary, as to demand a very r serious examination. Doctor Thomas Brown, the author of these lectures, was reputed a very excellent metaphysician, in a country where the knowledge of the human mind has been long cultivated with assiduity and success. This reputation he enjoyed among the most distinguished philosophers of the north, and it raised him, at a very early age, to the professorship of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, as the colleague and successor of Mr. Dugald Stewart. His death, which happened lately, while he was yet in the most vigorous period of life, and in the ardent pursuit of those studies to which he was so much devoted, was lamented among his friends as a heavy loss to the interests of science, and as cutting off those bright hopes which had been entertained of lasting and extensive benefits from the matured labours of a mind so richly gifted. These circumstances impart a considerable degree of interest to the volumes before us, as they are a posthumous publication, and contain the substance of those lectures which the author delivered as the course of instruction for the students of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The chief merit of the work is the amiable and temperate disposition which pervades every part of it. It breathes throughout a pure and refined spirit of philosophy, which must win the approbation of those who are hostile to the new doctrines which it contains. The prevailing error seems to be, that the author has aspired too much to explore new paths, and has fallen somewhat into the mistake of Priestley, by expecting to make discoveries. This disposition he has indulged, by applying to the operations of pure intellect those rules and modes of reasoning which properly belong to the material world. He has even adopted the language and expressions hitherto used only in physical or mechanical philosophy. By following this course he has fallen into many strange mistakes: and, although he had proceeded so far as to have constructed a new system founded on these principles, we cannot but think that further study and experience would have made him abandon the errors into which he was thus betrayed. He would (we think), in the end, have ascertained that some of his predecessors had proceeded on principles more just, on a knowledge of the human mind more extensive and profound than that which he had at first observed in their works. Without aiming at that vast revolution in the philosophy of the human mind which he endeavoured to achieve, he would still have been able to increase the sum of our knowledge,-to resolve many of the doubts and difficulties by which researches into the operations of intellect have been obscured, and to infuse a spirit less speculative and more practical into the study of metaphysics. The most aspiring philosopher need not have sought for any higher praise. More than half the number of Doctor Brown's lectures is devoted to an investigation of the faculties of the human mind; afterwards they treat of the passions and emotions; and the latter part contains a series of disquisitions purely ethical, or what may be called his system of Moral Philosophy. Thus, he leads us over the whole range of that almost undefined science which is called the philosophy of the human mind. It is on the first part, or that which relates to the nature of mind, that the author expatiates most fully; and in it he advances those new doctrines by which he sought to change the |