Hartley and Condillac attempts to reduce them to one,-certainly without success in the present state of knowledge. But if they were reduced to one, that one must be a fact, for the existence of which no proof could be given, and of the nature of which no explanation could be attempted. Whether they were one or a thousand, the controversy between the Dogmatist and the Sceptic would be precisely of the same nature. Universal scepticism involves a contradiction in terms. It is a belief that there can be no belief. It is an attempt of the mind to act without its structure, and by other laws than those to which nature has subjected its operations. No man can be allowed to be an opponent in reasoning who does not admit those principles, without which all reasoning is impossible.* It is indeed a puerile play, to attempt by argument to establish or confute principles, which every step of the argument necessarily presupposes.-He who labours to establish them, must fall into a vicious circle; and he who attempts to impugn them, into irreconcilable contradiction.

The reasonings of the Pyrrhonians and the Dogmatists are balanced in a noble passage of Pascal, whose philosophical genius often shines forth with momentary splendour from the thick clouds which usually darkened his great mind. "L'unique fort des Dogmatistes, c'est qu'en parlant de bonne foi et sincèrement, on ne peut douter des principes naturels."--"Les principes se sentent, les propositions se concluent."-"Il n'y a jamais eu de Pyrrhonien effectif et parfait."- -"La nature soutient la raison im

puissante."

He concludes with an observation so remarkable for range of mind, and weight of authority, that it seems to us to have a higher character of grandeur, than any passage in human composition which has a mere reference to the operations of the understanding,-"La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison les Dogmatistes.'

STEWART'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA. PART I. †

"History," says Lord Bacon, "is Natural, Civil, or Ecclesiastical, or Literary; whereof the three first I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning, to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature, and the state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant, that in divers particular sciences, as of the Jurisconsults, the Mathematicians, the Rhetoricians, the Philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, of authors of books; so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges, and their sects, their inventions,

This is significantly expressed in the quaint title of an old and rare book, “Sciri sive Sceptices et Scepticorum a jure disputationis Exclusio," by Thomas White, a personage of some co sideration in the history of English philosophy.

Dugald Stewart's Introduction to the Encyclopædia, prefixed to the Supplement of the Encyclopædia Britannica.-Vol. xxvii. page 180. September, 1816.

their traditions, their divers administrations and managings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning throughout the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of those who are lovers of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this, in few words, 'that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning.'"*-Advancement of Learning, book ii.

Though there are passages in the writings of Lord Bacon more splendid than the above, few, probably, better display the union of all the qualities which characterized his philosophical genius. He had in general inspired a fervour of admiration which vents itself in indiscriminate praise, and is very adverse to a calm examination of the character of his understanding, which was very peculiar, and on that account described with more than ordinary imperfection, by that unfortunately vague and weak part of language which attempts to distinguish the varieties of mental superiority. To this cause it may be ascribed, that perhaps no great man has been either more ignorantly censured, or more uninstructively commended. It is easy to describe his transcendant merit in general terms of commendation: for some of his great qualities lie on the surface of his writings. But that in which he most excelled all other men, was in the range and compass of his intellectual view-the power of contemplating many and distant objects together, without indistinctness or confusion-which he himself has called the discursive or comprehensive understanding. This wide-ranging Intellect was illuminated by the brightest Fancy that ever contented itself with the office of only ministering to Reason: and from this singular relation of the two grand faculties of man, it has resulted, that his philosophy, though illustrated still more than adorned by the utmost splendour of imagery, continues still subject to the undivided supremacy of intellect. In the midst

* The Latin book De Augmentis, a translation from the published and unpublished English composition of Lord Bacon, made by men of eminent talent, and under his own inspection, may be considered, in respect to the matter, as a second original; but wherever we possess his own diction, we should be unwilling to quote the inadequate expression in which any other man labours to do it justice. In the following instances, however, the Latin version contains passages of which his original English is not preserved:

"Ante omnia autem id agi volumus (quod Civilis Historia decus est et quasi anima) ut cum eventis causæ copulentur, videlicet ut memorentur naturæ regionum et populorum, idolesque apta et habilis, aut inepta et inhabilis ad disciplinas diversas, accidentia temporum, quæ scientiis adversa fuerint aut propitia; zeli et mixturæ religionum, malitiæ et favores legum, virtutes denique insignes et efficacia quorundam virorum ad scientias promovendas,-et similia. At hæc omnia ita tractari præcipimus ut non criticorum more in laude et censurâ tempus teratur, sed plane historicè res ipsæ narrentur, judicium parcius interponatur.

"De modo hujusmodi historiæ conficiendæ, monemus ut per singulas annorum centurias libri præcipui qui per ea temporis spatia conscripti sunt in consilium adhibeantur, ut ex eorum non perlectione (id enim infinitum esset) sed degustatione, et observatione argumenti, styli, methodi, genius, illius temporis literarius, velut incantatione quadam, a mortuis evocetur.

mus,

"Quod ad usum attinet, hæc eo spectant non ut honor literarum et pompa per tot circumfusas imagines celebretur, nec quia, pro flagrantissimo quo literas prosequimur amore, omnia quæ ad earum statum quoque modo pertinent usque ad curiositatem inquirere et scire et conservare avesed ob causam magis seriam et gravem, ea est (ut verbo dicamus) quoniam per talem, qualem descripsimus narrationem, ad virorum doctorum, in doctrinæ usu et administratione prudentiam et solertiam maximam accessionem fieri posse existimamus, et rerum intellectualium, non minus quam civilium, motus et perturbationes, vitiaque et virtutes notari posse, et regimen inde optimum educi et institui."-De Augmentis Scientiarum, Lib. II. c. 4.

We have ventured on this long quotation, not only for the valuable additions to the English text which it contains, but for the very striking proof which a comparison of the English and Latin text will afford, of the inferiority of the version in the passages where we have the good fortune to possess the original. Yet we know that Hobbes, one of the best of our writers, was Bacon's favourite translator. III. Aubrey, 602.

of all the prodigality of an imagination which, had it been independent, would have been poetical, his opinions remained severely rational.

It is not so easy to conceive, or at least to describe, other equally essential elements of his greatness, and conditions of his success. He is probably a single instance of a mind which, in philosophising, always reaches the point of elevation whence the whole prospect is commanded, without ever rising to such a distance as to lose a distinct perception of every part of it.* It is perhaps not less singular, that his philosophy should be founded at once on disregard for the authority of men, and on reverence for the boundaries prescribed by nature to human enquiry; that he who thought so little of what man had done, hoped so highly of what he could do; that so daring an innovator in science should be so wholly exempt from the love of singularity or paradox; that the same man who renounced imaginary provinces in the empire of science, and withdrew its landmarks within the limits of experience, should also exhort posterity to push their conquests to its utmost verge, with a boldness which will be fully justified only by the discoveries of ages from which we are yet far distant.

No man ever united a more poetical style to a less poetical philosophy. One great end of his discipline is to prevent mysticism and fanaticism from obstructing the pursuit of truth. With a less brilliant fancy, he would have had a mind less qualified for philosophical enquiry. His fancy gave him that power of illustrative metaphor, by which he seemed to have invented again the part of language which respects philosophy; and it rendered new truths more distinctly visible even to his own eye, in their bright clothing of imagery. Without it, he must, like others, have been driven to the fabrication of uncouth technical terms, which repel the mind, either by vulgarity or pedantry, instead of gently leading it to novelties in science, through agreeable analogies with objects already familiar. A considerable portion doubtless of the courage with which he undertook the reformation of philosophy, was caught from the general spirit of his extraordinary age, when the mind of Europe was yet agitated by the joy and pride of emancipation from long bondage. The beautiful mythology and poetical history of the ancient world, not yet become trivial or pedantic, appeared before his eyes in all their freshness and lustre. To the general reader they were then a discovery as recent as the world disclosed by Columbus. The ancient literature, on which his imagination looked back for illustration, had then as much the charm of novelty as that rising philosophy through which his reason dared to look onward to some of the last periods in its unceasing and resistless course.

In order to form a just estimate of this wonderful person, it is essential to fix steadily in our minds, what he was not, what he did not do, and what he professed neither to be nor to do. He was not what is called a metaphysician. His plans for the improvement of science were not inferred by abstract reasoning from any of those primary principles to which the philosophers of Greece stuggled to fasten their systems. Hence he has been treated as empirical and superficial by those who take to themselves the exclusive name

* He himself, who alone was qualified, has described the genius of his philosophy both in respect to the degree and manner in which he rose from particulars to generals. "Axiomata infima noa multum ab experientiâ nudâ discrepant. Suprema vero illa et generalissima (quæ habentur) potionalia sunt et abstracta et nil habent solidi. At media sunt axiomata illa vera, et solida et viva in quibus humanæ res et fortunæ sitæ sunt, et supra hæc quoque, tandem ipsa illa generalissima. talia scilicet quæ non abstracta sint, sed per hæc media vere limitantur."- Nov. Org. Liber 1. Aphoris. 104.

of profound speculators. He was not, on the other hand, a mathematician, an astronomer, a physiologist, a chemist. He was not eminently conversant with the particular truths of any of those sciences which existed in his time. For this reason, he was underrated by men of the highest merit, who had acquired the most just reputation, by adding new facts to the stock of certain knowledge. It is not therefore very surprising to find, that Harvey, though the friend as well as physician of Bacon,*though he esteemed him much for his wit and style, would not allow him to be a great philosopher;" but said to Aubrey, "He writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor," -“ in derision,”-as the honest biographer thinks fit expressely to add. On the same ground, though in a manner not so agreeable to the nature of his own claims on reputation, Mr. Hume has decided, that Bacon was not so great a man as Galileo, because he was not so great an astronomer. The same sort of injustice to his memory has been more often committed than avowed, by professors of the exact and the experimental sciences, who are accustomed to regard, as the sole test of service to knowledge, a palpable addition to its store. It is very true that he made no discoveries: but his life was employed in teaching the method by which discoveries are made. This distinction was early observed by that ingenious poet and amiable man, on whom we, by our unmerited neglect, have taken too severe a revenge, for the exaggerated praise bestowed on him by our ancestors.

66

'Bacon, like Moses, led us forth at last,

The barren wilderness he past,

Did on the very border stand

Of the blest promised land;

And from the mountain top of his exalted wit,
Saw it himself, and showed us it."

Cowley's Ode to the Royal Society.

The writings of Bacon do not even abound with remarks so capable of being separated from the mass of previous knowledge and reflection, that they can be called new. This at least is very far from their greatest distinction and where such remarks occur, they are presented more often as examples of his general method, than as important on their own separate account. In physics, which presented the principal field for discovery, and which owe all that they are, or can be, to his method and spirit, the expriments and observations which he either made or registered, from the least valuable part of his writings, and have furnished some cultivators of that science with an opportunity for an ungrateful triumph over his mistakes. The scattered remarks, on the other hand, of a moral nature, where absolute novelty is precluded by the nature of the subject, manifest most strongly both the superior force and the original bent of his understanding. We more properly constrast than compare the experiments in the Natural History," with the moral and political observations which enrich the "Advancement of Learning," 'the Speeches, the Letters, the History of Henry VII.; and, above all, "the Essays, a book which, though it has been praised with equal fervour by Voltaire, Johnson, and Burke, has never been characterised with such exact justice, and such exquisite felicity of expression, as in the Discourse before us. † It will serve still more distinctly to

* III. Aubrey, 381. The very curious literary anecdotes of Aubrey, are so much the most important part of the publication in which they have lately appeared (Letters by eminent Persons from public Libraries at Oxford, 3 vol. London, 1813), that it ought, in all reason, to receive its title from them. An Appendix is a station of quite sufficient honour for the other materials.

Under the same head of Ethics, may be mentioned the small volume to which he has given the title of Essays; the best known and most popular of all his works. It is also one of those

mark the natural tendency of his mind, to observe that his moral and political reflections relate to these practical subjects, considered in their most practical point of view; and that he has seldom or never attempted to reduce to theory the infinite particulars of that" civil knowledge," which, as he himself tells us, is, "of all others, most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom."

His mind, indeed, was formed and exercised in the affairs of the world. His genius was eminently civil. His understanding was peculiarly fitted for questions of legislation and of policy,-though his character was not an instrument well qualified to execute the dictates of his reason. The same civil wisdom which distinguishes his judgments on human affairs, may also be traced through his reformation of philosophy. It is a practical judgment applied to science. What he effected was a reform in the maxims of state, before unsuccessfully pursued in the Republic of Letters. It is not derived from metaphysical reasoning, nor from scientific detail, but from a species of intellcetual prudence, which, on the practical ground of failure and disappointment in the prevalent modes of pursuing knowledge, builds the necessity of alteration, and inculcates the advantage of administering the sciences on other principles. It is an error to represent him either as imputing fallacy to the syllogistic method, or as professing his principle of induction to be a discovery. The rules and forms of argument will always form an important part of the art of logic; and the method of induction, which is the art of discovery, was so far from being unknown to Aristotle, that it was often faithfully pursued by that great observer. What Bacon aimed at, he accomplished; which was, not to discover new principles, but to excite a new spirit and to render observation and experiment the predominant character of philosophy. It is for this reason that Bacon could not have been the author of a system or the founder of a sect. He did not deliver opinions-he taught modes of philosophising. His early immersion in civil affairs fitted him for this species of scientific reformation. His political course, though in itself unhappy, probably conduced to the success, and certainly influenced the character of the comtemplative part of his life. Had it not been for his active. habits, it is likely that the pedantry and quaintness of his age would have still more deeply tainted his significant and majestic style. The force of the illustrations which he takes from his experience of ordinary life, is often as remarkable as the beauty of those which he so happily borrows from his study of antiquity. But if we have caught the leading principle of his intellectual character, we must attribute effects still deeper and more extensive to his familiarity with the active world. It guarded him against vain subtlety, and against all speculation that was either visionary or fruitless. It preserved him from the reigning prejudices of contemplative men and from undue preference to particular parts of knowledge. If he had been exclusively bred in the cloister or the shools, he might not have had courage enough to reform their abuses. It seems necessary that he should have been so placed as to look on science in the free spirit of an intelligent spectator. Without the pride of Professors, or the bigotry of their followers, he surveyed from the world the studies which reigned in the schools; and, trying

where the superiority of his genius appears to the greatest advantage; the novelty and depth of his reflections often receiving a strong relief from the triteness of the subject. It may be read from beginning to end in a few hours; and yet, after the twentieth perusal, one seldom fails to remark in it something unobserved before. This, indeed, is a characteristic of all Bacon's writings, and is only to be accounted for by the inexhaustible aliment they furnish to our own thoughts, and the sympathetic activity they impart to our torpid faculties.” Disc. 54.