law of association, which is known to every savage, and to every clown, in a thousand familiar instances; and with regard to its capacity of useful application, it seems to be admitted, that it has been known and acted upon by parents, pedagogues, priests, and legislators, in all ages of the world, and has even been employed, as an obvious and easy instrument, by such humble judges of intellectual resources as common horse-jockies and beardancers.

the

If this principle, then, was always known, and regularly employed wherever any advantage could be expected from its employment, what reason have we to imagine that any substantial benefit is to be derived from its scientific investigation, or any important uses discovered for it, in consequence merely of investing it with a precise name, and stating, under one general theorem, the common law of its operation? If such persons as grooms and masters of menageries have been guided, by their low intellects and sordid motives, to its skilful application as a means of directing even the lower animals, is it to be believed that there can be many occasions for its employment in the government of the human mind, of which men have never yet had the sense to bethink themselves? Or, can it be seriously maintained, that it is capable of application, as much more extensive and important than those which have been vulgarly made in past ages, as are the uses of Newton's third law of motion, compared with the operation of savage in pushing his canoe from the shore? If Mr. Stewart really entertained any such opinion as this, it was incumbent upon him to have indicated, in a general way, the departments in which he conceived that these great discoveries were to be made, and to have pointed out some, at least, of the new applications, on the assumption of which alone he could justify so ambitious a parallel. Instead of this, however, we do not find that he has contemplated any other spheres for the application of this principle than those which have been so long conceded to it,—the formation of taste, and the conduct of education: and, with regard to the last and most important of these, he has himself recorded an admission, which to us, we will confess, appears a full justification of all that we have now been advancing, and a sufficient answer to the positions we have been endeavouring to combat. In so far," Mr. Stewart observes, " as education is effectual and salutary, it is founded on those principles of our nature which have forced themselves upon general observation, in consequence of the experience of ages." That the principle of association is to be reckoned in the number of these, Mr. Stewart certainly will not deny; and our proposition is, that all the prin-ciples of our nature which are capable of any useful application, have thus forced themselves on general observation many years ago, and can now receive little more than a technical nomenclature and description from the best efforts of philosophy.

The sentiments to which we have ventured to give expression in these and our former hasty observations, were suggested to us, we will confess, in a great degree, by the striking contrast between the wonders which have been wrought by the cultivation of modern physics, and the absolute nothingness of the effects that have hitherto been produced by the labours of the philosophers of mind. We have only to mention the names of Astronomy, Chemistry, Mechanics, Optics, and Navigation; --nay, we have only to look around us, in public or in private,-to cast a glance on the machines and manufactures, the ships, steam engines, and elaboratories, by which perpetually surrounded, or to turn our eyes on the most common

we are

articles of our dress and furniture, -on the mirrors, engravings, books, firearms, watches, barometers, thunder-rods, and opera-glasses, that present themselves in our ordinary dwellings, to feel how vast a progress has been made in exploring and subduing the physical elements of nature, and how stupendous an increase the power of man has received, by the experimental investigation of her laws. Nor is any thing in this astonishing survey more remarkable than the feeling with which it is always accompanied, that what we have hitherto done in any of these departments is but a small part of what we are yet destined to accomplish; and that the enquiries which have led us so far, will infallibly carry us still farther. When we ask, however, for the trophies of the philosophy of mind, or enquire for the vestiges of her progress in the more plastic and susceptible elements of human genius and character, we are answered only by ingenuous silence or vague anticipations, and find nothing but a blank in the record of her achievements. The knowledge and the power of man over inanimate nature has been increased tenfold in the course of the last two centuries: the knowledge and the power of man over the mind of man remains almost exactly where it was at the first development of his faculties. The natural philosophy of antiquity is mere childishness and dotage, and their physical enquirers are mere pigmies and drivellers, compared with their successors in the present age; but their logicians, and metaphysicians, and moralists, and, what is of infinitely more consequence, the practical maxims and the actual effects resulting from their philosophy of mind, are very nearly on a level with the philosophy of the present day. The end and aim of all that philosophy is to make education rational and effective, and to train men to such sagacity and force of judgment, as to induce them to cast off the bondage of prejudices, and to follow happiness and virtue with assured and steady steps. We do not know, however, what modern work contains juster or more profound views on the subject of education than may be collected from the writings of Xenophon and Quintilian, Polybius, Plutarch, and Cicero; and, as to that sagacity and justness of thinking, which, after all, is the fruit by which this tree of knowledge must be ultimately known, we are not aware of many modern performances that exemplify it in a stronger degree, than many parts of the histories of Tacitus and Thucydides, or the Satires and Epistles of Horace. In the conduct of business and affairs, we shall find Pericles, and Cæsar, and Cicero, but little inferior to the philosophical politicians of the present day; and, for lofty and solid principles of practical ethics, we might safely match Epictetus and Antoninus (without mentioning Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, Xenophon, or Polybius), with most of our modern speculators.

Where, then, it may be asked, are the performances of this philosophy which makes such large promises? or, what are the grounds upon which we should expect to see so much accomplished, by an instrument which has hitherto effected so little? It is in vain for Mr. Stewart to say, that the science is yet but in its infancy, and that it will bear its fruit in due season The truth is, that it has, of necessity, been more constantly and diligently cultivated than any other. It has always been the first object with men talent and good affection to influence and to form the minds of others, and to train their own to the highest pitch of vigour and perfection; and, accor dingly, it is admitted by Mr. Stewart, that the most important principles of this philosophy have been long ago forced upon general observation, by the feelings and experience of past ages. Independently, however, of this, the

years that have passed since Mr. Locke drew the attention of Europe to this study, and the very extraordinary genius and talents of those who have since addicted themselves to it, are far more than enough to have brought it, if not to perfection, at least to such a degree of excellence as no longer to leave it a matter of dispute, whether it was really destined to add to our knowledge and our power, or to produce any sensible effects upon the happiness and condition of mankind. That society has made great advances in comfort and intelligence during that period, is indisputable; but we do not find that Mr. Stewart himself imputes any great part of this improvement to our increased knowledge of our mental constitution; and indeed it is quite obvious, that it is an effect resulting from the increase of political freedom, -the influences of reformed Christianity,-the invention of printing, and that improvement and multiplication of the mechanical arts, that have rendered the body of the people far more busy, wealthy, inventive, and independent, than they ever were in any former period of society.

To us, therefore, it certainly does appear, that the lofty estimate which Mr. Stewart has again made of the practical importance of his favourite studies, is one of those splendid visions by which men of great genius have been so often misled, in the enthusiastic pursuit of science and of virtue. That these studies are of a very dignified and interesting nature, we admit most cheerfully; that they exercise and delight the understanding, by reasonings and enquiries, at once subtle, cautious, and profound, and either gratify or exalt a keen and aspiring curiosity, must be acknowledged by all who have been initiated into their elements. Those who have had the good fortune to be so initiated by the writings of Mr. Stewart, will be delighted to add, that they are blended with so many lessons of gentle and of ennobling virtue,-so many striking precepts and bright examples of liberality, high-mindedness, and pure taste,-as to be calculated, in an eminent degree, to make men love goodness and aspire to elegance, and to improve at once the understanding, the imagination, and the heart. This, however, must be the limit of our praise; and therefore, while we admire the eloquence and are warmed with the spirit of the following noble passage, in which Mr. Stewart winds up the praises of his favoured studies, we cannot help regarding it as a piece of splendid declamation on the merits of a subject that required no such recommendation.

"I have only to repeat once more," says Mr. Stewart, "before the close of this Dissertation, that the correction of one single prejudice has often been attended with consequences more important and extensive than could be produced by any positive accession to the stock of our scientific information. Such is the condition of man, that a great part of a philosopher's life must necessarily be spent, not in enlarging the circle of his knowledge, but in unlearning the errors of the crowd, and the pretended wisdom of the schools; and that the most substantial benefit he can bestow on his fellow-creatures, as well as the noblest species of power to which he can aspire, is to impart to others the lights he has struck out by his meditations, and to encourage human reason, by his example, to assert its liberty. To what did the discoveries made by Luther amount, but to a detection of the impostures of the Romish church, and of absurdities sanctioned by the authority of Aristotle? Yet, how vast the space which is filled by his name in the subsequent history of Europe! and how proud his rank among the benefactors of mankind! I am doubtful if Bacon himself did so much by the logical rules he gave for guiding the enquiries of his followers, as by the resolution with which he inspired them to abandon the beaten path of their predecessors, and to make excursions Auto regions untrodden before; or if any of his suggestions concerning the plan of experimenting, can be compared in value to his classification and illustration of the various prejudices or idols which mislead us from the pure worship of Truth. If the ambition of Aristotle has been compared, in the vastness of its aim, and the plenitude of its success (and who can say that it has been compared unjustly?) to that of his royal pupil who conquered the world; why undervalue the efforts of those who first raised the standard of revolt against his universal and undisputed despotism? Speedily after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian empire was dismembered among his principal officers. The empire founded by the philosopher continued one and undivided for the period of two thousand years; and, even at this day, fallen as it is from its former grandeur, a few faithful

and devoted veterans, shut up in its remaining fortresses, still bid proud defiance, in their master's name, to all the arrayed strength of human reason. In consequence of this slow and gradual emancipation of the mind, the means by which the final result has been accomplished attract the notice only of the reflecting enquirer; resembling, in their silent, but irresistible operation, the latent and imperceptible influence of the roots, which, by insinuating themselves into the crevices of an ancient edifice, prepare its infallible ruin, ages before its fall; or that of the apparently inert moisture, which is concealed in the fissures of a rock, when enabled, by the expansive force of congelation, to rend asunder its mass, or to heave it from its basis.

"As it is seldom, in such instances, easy to trace to particular individuals what has resulted from their exertions, with the same precision with which, in physics or mechanics, we refer to their respective inventors the steam-engine or the thunder rod, it is not surprising, that the attention of the multitude should be so little attracted to the intellectual dominion of superior minds over the moral world: but the observer must be blind, indeed, who does not perceive the vastness of the scale on which speculative principles, both right and wrong, have operated on the present condition of mankind; or who does not now feel and acknowledge, how deeply the morals and the happiness of private live, as well as the order of political society, are involved in the final issue of the contest between true and false philosophy."-Prel. Diss. Ixxi.-lxxiv.

We have not kept our word very faithfully with our readers; and have been insensibly betrayed into a much longer discussion than we had anticipated. We shall endeavour to make amends, however, by giving them a very brief abstract of the pure metaphysics that ensue.*

ALISON'S THEORY OF TASTE.+

We look upon this as, on the whole, the best and most pleasing work which has yet been produced on the subjects of Taste and Beauty. Less ornate and adventurous than Burke, and less lively and miscellaneous than Price or Knight, the author, we think, has gone deeper into his subject than any of those writers; at the same time that he has been more copious (perhaps too copious) in his examples and illustrations, and more constantly awake (perhaps to an excess here also) to those feelings of enthusiastic delight which the contemplation of such subjects is apt to excite in the minds best qualified to discuss them. His analysis, therefore, though very patient and comprehensive, has no feature of the chilling metaphysics of the schools; and, while the love of his subject has led him into great fulness of detail, and the sensibility of his heart lent a glow of warm colouring to every part of his composition, the reader need be under no fear of encountering either the refinements of ingenious dogmatism, or the ravings of sentimental folly. The book, perhaps, is a little too long, and the style a little too verbose; nor are the argumentative and theoretical parts kept sufficiently distinct from the illustrative and ornamental but the whole is, in no ordinary degree, both beautiful and instructive, and seems excellently adapted to promote both the love and the knowledge of the curious speculations on which it is employed. Of its beauty, we are afraid we shall be able to give our readers but a very inadequate impression: but, of its information, we may hope to present them with a tolerably intelligible abstract.

In all disquisitions on the subject of Taste, there are evidently two separate objects of enquiry,-the first relating to the nature of the Faculty:

The remainder of this admirable Essay is devoted to an abstract of the topics embraced in Mr. Stewart's works, intermingled with many eloquent and flattering observatious on the genius learning, and principles of the Author.

Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste. By Archibald Alison, LL.B.F.R.S.. Prebendary of Sarum, &c. &c. &c. 2 Vols. 8vo. p. 830. Edinburgh, 1811.-Vol. xviii. page 1 May, 1811.

the other to the nature of its Objects. At one time we endeavour to ascertain what it is that constitutes Taste,-at another, what it is that constitutes Beauty; and are always necessarily engaged in determining, either what is the state of our minds, when we are conscious of the peculiar emotions excited by the perception of sublimity or beauty, or what are the qualities in objects which have the power of exciting these emotions. It is the more necessary, too, to attend to this distinction, and to keep clearly in view the indispensable importance of both branches of the enquiry; because most of the theories that have hitherto been proposed upon the subject, appear to us to proceed upon a partial forgetfulness of one or other of them, and are calculated to afford an answer to one only of the two questions which we have announced as involved in the discussion. Those who have contended that beauty consists in curve lines,-in smoothness, smallness, or fragility,—in regularity; or moderate variety, or in any other fixed or physical property, -have, for the most part, neglected altogether to explain how these properties should affect the mind with a sense of sublimity or beauty, or to determine the precise nature of the emotions which they excited; while those, on the other hand, who maintain that these emotions consist merely in the perception of utility, or of relation, or of what is ordinary and true, seem some times to forget that every theory, even as to the nature of our emotions, must be ultimately verified by a careful examination of the objects that are found to produce them, and by a large induction as to the whole accompanying phenomena.

But though it be thus radically necessary to remember that there are two subjects of enquiry, it is, if possible, still more essential to recollect that they must be discussed together; that we can never ascertain what is beauty, without having clear notions of the state of mind which it produces, and in its power of producing which its essence consists; and that it is utterly impossible to ascertain what is the nature of the effect produced by beauty on the mind, till we can decide what are the common properties that are found in all the objects which produce it. All investigations, therefore, into the principles of Taste, and into the elements of Beauty, ought obviously to go together; and as the evidence must always be one and the same, by which the truth of our conjectures as to the nature of either can be determined, nothing can be more injudicious or unsatisfactory than any attempt to separate them in the discussion. Mr. Alison is not deserving of praise for any thing more than for his constant and invariable attention to this important consideration.

It is the opinion of this excellent writer, to express it in one sentence, that the emotions which we experience from the contemplation of sublimity or beauty, are not produced by any physical or intrinsic quality in the objects which we contemplate; but by the recollection or conception of other objects which are associated in our imaginations with those before us, and consequently suggested by their appearance, and which are interesting or affecting, on the common and familiar principle of being the natural objects of love, or of pity, or of fear or veneration, or some other common and lively sensation of the mind. This is the first and most important proposition in his theory,-of which, accordingly, it may be stated as the fundamental principle, that all objects are beautiful or sublime, which signify or suggest to us some simple emotion of love, pity, terror, or any other social or selfish affection of our nature; and that the beauty or sublimity which we ascribe to them, consists entirely in the power which they have