one, the imperative by the other. Art is a practical result of science; it is a principle embodied in an act; it is a theory made vital and carried to a definite result." The reasons of a maxim of policy, or of any other rule of art, can be no other than the theorems of the corresponding science"; and in conformity with this rule, practical "ethics or morality is properly a portion of the art corresponding to the sciences of human nature and society." What, then, is the Logic of art as distinguished from that of science? The answer is, that the rules of art should be constantly referred to the laws of the science of which it is the practical result, and not to principles, or prescriptions, or usages of its own. The complete art of any matter includes a selection of such a portion from the (corresponding) science as is necessary to show on what conditions the effects, which the art aims at producing, depend. This is a rule of signal significance. amidst professional conventionalities, connoisseurship, the cant of criticism, and slavery to merely practical maxims. Hence arises again the necessity of an intermediate set of principles (axiomata media, spoken of above), which, being derived from the more general truths of the affiliated science, may serve as the working formula, so to speak, in the various arts. The art of navigation, in its present state, may well illustrate these views of art.*

In applying this Logic of art to that part of practice which is called morality, it is to be kept in mind that there are two distinct classes of cases to be considered. One is that which includes all those cases in which an implicit obedience to a prescribed rule is an imperative duty; the other is that where we are left to ascertain our duties for ourselves, and on our own responsibility. In regard to the former, the rules should be simple, intelligible, easily called to mind, determinate, and fixed; as, for example, the rule of veracity. In all such instances of practical ethics, the method should be entirely ratiocinative, or a regular process of interpreting the general rule; and this, too, whencesoever it may be derived, whether from a philosophic estimate of tendencies, or from intuition, or from direct revelation.

The proposed work of M. Compte, referred to by Mr. Mill in a note, "On the General Means which Man possesses of acting upon Nature" (including, of course, the framing of the "intermediate principles" above mentioned), must make an era in the science of art.

In the only other class of cases remaining, namely, those in which the agent is left at liberty to ascertain for himself what his duty is, the method of ethics is the same as in all other methods of practice. We are to select some general rule, and then deduce from it those minor and specific rules of conduct for ourselves, which the conditions of the question require.

We cannot dismiss this work without adverting to the style in which it is written. This is one of its distinctive and notable excellencies. It is free, simple, exact, manly, idiomatic, and forcible. The author seems, without an effort, to choose the "ipsissima verba" to express his meaning; so that he achieves the last grace of mere style, that of presenting his thought not only with crystal clearness, but with an illumination borrowed from the medium through which it is presented, without calling attention, in the slightest degree, to the medium itself. There is no tremulous confusion or darkness thrown upon his meaning from indistinctness of thought, or from the shade or glimmer of inappropriate terms. There is no affectation, no straining after effect, no artistical manufacture of sentences; and while he seems to hold all mere ornament in sovereign disregard, he does not allow a rapt and pleased attention to flag for a moment. His diction is not so bold and literal as that of Locke and Reid; it has none of the labored elegance and classic finish of Dugald Stewart; it possesses not the crisp sententiousness, pointed epithets, and balanced antitheses of Whately; it is as far removed as possible from the exuberant efflorescence of Brown; and yet it is to be preferred before them all, even in point of attractiveness, on account of its fitness, transparency, point, and ever-onward movement of thought. If this high praise is to be at all chastened, it must be for an occasional prolixity, which, however, obviously arises from a desire to be perspicuous above all things.

We have now completed the task first proposed, that of giving such an account as our limits would allow of the work before us. We have thought it due equally to the eminent author, to the intrinsic value of his labors, and to the edification of our readers, to present the results of his inquiries, rather than to offer any speculations of our own. Our estimate of the volumes, if it be thought of any importance, is sufficiently intimated by the running commentary which al

most unconsciously has accompanied our analysis. We could not, indeed, even if it were thought worth while, here enter into a careful and minute detail on this subject. There are some important positions which we are not at all prepared to admit; such, for example, as that our idea of the uniformity of nature is an induction from experience, that a body can act where it is not, and others of less importance. But as a whole, we take leave of the work with the confident prediction, that all who are competent to judge of the subject will allow it to be a most original, comprehensive, and thoroughly considered exposition of the subject of which it treats, and one which will bear a favorable comparison with any similar product of the English mind, in any age. None who wish to see a chart of the whole range of human knowledge, with its lines drawn by a skilled and firm hand, and with its depths and shallows accurately defined, together with an accurate determination of the true processes of human thought in the pursuit of truth, can wisely forego the thorough study of these volumes. Possessing such high claims to notice, we have been surprised at the small impression which the work seems to have made abroad. Neither of the leading Quarterly Reviews, we believe, has noticed it; while works on kindred subjects, which are not to be named in connection with it, have received elaborate attention. We sincerely hope that it will meet with a better recognition in our own land. Certain it is, that no people need such solid and profound researches more than we do; since superficialness, in all departments of study, is the crying sin of our country and age. The idolatry of wealth, and the engrossing and often unscrupulous pursuit of it; the importunate calls of active and professional life; the torrents of silliness, under the form of light reading, with which the American mind is deluged; the heat and savagery of the poor and wicked game of politics; the exclusive devotion of selfcomplacently called "practical" men to "practical" pursuits, so called, - leave little time and less desire for earnest and persevering labor of the mind. We hope there are some signs that better thinkers are arising amongst us. We trust that the ingenuous youth of our country, who are pressing forward to take its destinies in hand, will feel themselves charged with the large and noble mission of extending the range of lettered acquisition, and of promoting better habits

of research. It is quite time we had outgrown the superficial modes of instruction and attainment, through which, in our national pupilage, we have been passing. It is quite time to put away," among "childish things," those compends and abridgments, those short cuts and railway passages in the vast domains of literature and science, which are intended to supersede the necessity of mental labor, and to relieve inquirers from the "insupportable fatigue of thought." To all who are sick of such miserable pretences and labor-saving desires we confidently recommend the volumes before us, as a manly and inspiring model of a better intellectual culture, and a signally important means of carrying forward this culture to the best results.

W. B. O. Prabody;

ART. IV. Lives of Men of Letters and Science, who flourished in the Time of George the Third. By HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM. Philadelphia Carey & Hart. 1845. 12mo. pp. 295.

THERE can be no doubt that Lord Brougham, however he may be estimated in future times as a statesman, will figure as one of the most remarkable men of the age in which he lives. He is chiefly distinguished for his restless, impatient, feverish activity of mind, a trait not common among the sons of men, few of whom have any quick spring of action within to drive them to incessant exertion, but generally require external inducements of interest or passion to bring forth all their powers. As an orator, he has appeared preeminent among the great, exerting a mighty influence in favor of some essential reforms in the government of his country, which, mainly because they were so necessary, were fiercely and bitterly resisted. As a lawyer, he has been popular and successful, though generally allowed to be unsuited to the high judicial station for which he was thought the very man till he had reached it. As a lover of his race, he is ever ready to exert himself in the cause of humanity, and not more savage, perhaps, than is common with the philanthropists of the day. As a man, giving no single impression of his own character, but hurrying on through perpetual changes, where neither

praise nor censure can steadily follow, he has been a willing slave to impulses of any kind, and particularly sensitive to slights and irritations; jealous of his own standing, and needlessly overbearing in defence of it; so insolent and vindictive in his usual tone, that self seems always to enter into his assertion of the right or condemnation of the wrong. It is only by an average of merits and failings that one can arrive at any consistent and satisfactory idea of this great and active, but not amiable man, who will hereafter be remembered with wonder certainly, but, if his latter days shall be cast in resemblance of the former, never with admiration or love.

It is well that he has thus put ashore from the troubled sea of politics, to walk on the quiet sands, and gather a few pearls from the beach. For it is clear that he does not require the stimulus of external excitement to bring his mental energies into efficient action. By a necessity of his nature, he must work in one way or another; and indolence and stagnation being thus out of the question, he might have done as much for the cause of reform and humanity by passionless literary labors, as by those fierce declamations in parliament in which he seems full as intent on scalping his enemies as on defending the great rights of man. No one has a broader discernment of the merits of moral and intellectual questions; no one is more fearless in battling prejudice or correcting established errors. In these biographical sketches, he states his opinions in a tone more respectful and conciliatory than ever before; and the reader feels, what indeed is everywhere true, that kindness of manner is an essential grace to open the path to conviction. But how far he might be able to lay permanently aside his former tastes and habits of thought and feeling, how successfully, after riding the whirlwind and being himself the storm, he might subside into the of an autumn day, how the fierce leader of the opporepose sition would reconcile himself to the patient investigation, unexciting interest, and calm expression which beseem the literary life, it is not easy to foretell. Little was indicated by his Lives of Statesmen, which were nothing more than the history of his battles, with reminiscences of his comrades and foes. Neither are the present sketches sufficiently labored and extended to be the test of success. Proceeding from such a hand, they must of course bear marks of great ability; but they do not show that any great expense