ART. II. Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Twenty-eighth Congress, December 3, 1844. Washington: Printed by Gales & Seaton. 1844. pp. 702.

WE would again, at the risk of being read by only a few of those who look over this Journal, solicit the attention of the public to some of the military concerns of the nation. The many-paged document, the title of which is placed at the head of this article, is not likely to be read by any; parts of it will be glanced at by a few. And yet its contents are highly important. They contain much information which should be generally known. And those who submit to the task of rendering that information sufficiently attractive to be noticed may be said to perform a beneficial service to the public. In most cases, samples may be hung out, which will give a tolerable idea of the bales within; and many will cast an eye upon the former who would not think of examining the latter. We will not attempt to answer the often propounded question, whether these public documents could not be made more brief, convenient, and popular, in other words, more useful. As they now come forth, they are almost wholly useless. They are not generally even laid aside, uncut, for the contingent benefit of future reference; but fall into the receptacles of waste paper, like the newspaper of yesterday. It is half amusing and half deplorable to witness the residuary documents which are found lumbering, for a short time, the rooms of an ex-member of congress. A retired stationer, who has not yet sold off the remnants of his stock, is not in a more littered and encumbered condition.

The document before us has more than seven hundred pages, besides unpaged matter, such as returns, printed out in all their length and breadth. There is much of this with which we have nothing to do. The reports which accompany the report of the secretary of war form, however, more than five hundred and fifty of these pages. But we may deduct from these more than two hundred pages which belong to the Indian department; with these we have no concern; and we may hazard the remark, that the public, in

general, has as little. It may well be asked, why such a mass of unimportant details should be printed each year at the public expense. The "one hundred " reports relating to the Indian department, filling nearly two hundred pages, might as well have remained in the pigeon-holes of the Indian commissioner. They show the manner in which a great variety of small agencies, in every nook and corner of the frontier, have discharged a benevolent trust, and that the Indians-those quasi wards of the government—are under a careful guardianship. But if each bureau were to swell its communications to its proper chief after a similar fashion, were to dilate, or dilute, its matter after this manner, congressional printers would have as much presswork as they could do, and the public mails more documents than they could carry. If there be no process of distillation at the bureaux, to extract the spirit, leaving the crude matter behind, we might expect a more sharpsighted discrimination in congress, which professes to sift all matters submitted to it. But it is probable that whatever leaves the bureaux passes, like a sealed package, through all its stages of transmission, unread and unseen, until it reaches the printer's hands, where there is no motive to curtail, nor power to do so, even if the motive arose.

We turn over all the pages of this document until we come to the report of the secretary of war. Our war secretaries have latterly had but little time to learn the duties. of their station. During the last four or five years, they have shifted as often as the almanac. Occasionally, they have not even outlived the annuals. Under such variable circumstances, experience has not been looked for, being a plant of somewhat slow growth. Fortunately, the welfare. of the army does not depend for its stability upon this high functionary. He may go out and come in with each season; he may be as deciduous as the leaves; and yet the military establishment, and the national defence, so far as it relies on that establishment, remain the same. There is a permanency in the command of the army, and in all the subordinate departments connected with its administration, that makes it nearly independent of these fluctuations. would suggest a change in the present subordination of the military bureaux at Washington. Having been established, we believe, at a time when there was no commander-in-chief

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there, nor, indeed, anywhere, they were all placed, of course, in immediate communication with the war department,- that is, in direct communication with the executive. There is a want of symmetry and congruity in this plan. All these departments (excepting, perhaps, the engineer and ordnance departments) should be concentrated under one head. The commander-in-chief is now that head. He is the proper channel from the army to the cabinet, and from the cabinet to the army. Any other arrangement divides and diminishes responsibility, produces awkwardness and embarrassment, and is a departure from military and efficient organization. We do not apprehend that any bureau entertains objections to such a change. There is a routine that seldom deviates; there are regulations which prevail under all circunstances. It is satisfactory to contemplate the well ordered and fixed character of one of our institutions, where the benefits intended to result to the public depend so much, not to say entirely, upon such a character.

The report of the secretary of war, which appears in this document, compares advantageously with many that have preceded it. When a secretary comes into office, and is called upon for a report such as this, before he has had time to become familiar with its details, he may well be at a loss for materials to give it the customary length. In such a case, if he were to make a brief report, and refer to subordinate reports, which are made under all the advantages of long experience, he would probably lose no credit with the public; and he would certainly set an example of brevity, which is much needed in these days, when prolixity is so fashionable. But unfortunately, the importance of these reports is measured like a road or canal; it is the length, and not the area, that is calculated. The immediate predecessor of Mr. Wilkins, in a like strait as to familiarity with his charge, adopted a new, if not clever, expedient to eke out his report, and give it due elongation. The returns of the adjutant-general of the army, which were presented to him in figures, he rendered into plain prose. Many, who were desirous of knowing the position and composition of our various garrisons, were pleased to find all these details put into a shape that gave them entrance into any newspaper. The adjutant-general's returns come in such a shape as excludes them from these ordinary avenues to the public eye.

They have too much length and breadth, too much superficies, to find accommodation anywhere but in such a "Document" as is now before us, which can hardly be said to meet the public eye.

It may be difficult for a secretary, with all the helps of the largest experience, to determine what limits he should impose on himself. He is the lens to collect into one focus the lights thrown in by ten distinct offices or bureaux. If he transmit them without such concentration, he becomes almost a useless medium. A piece of tape, sufficient to stitch the various reports together, would perform the office nearly as well. How much to admit, how much to reject, may be hard to determine. The report before us is most respectable in its character. It is well written, and marked by liberality of opinion throughout. It is not a mere echo. While the secretary indorses all the suggestions of the subordinate bureaux which have his approbation, he hazards several somewhat new suggestions, which were not acted upon by the last Congress, and which it may be well to examine in anticipation of another session. The secretary says,

"Efficiency and military spirit are much improved by keeping troops in mass. Central depots, on healthy sites, whether forts or not, so that they are readily accessible from all points where the service of a regiment might be required, are the best locations for the barracks for troops. In several of the seacoast fortifications, the plan of defence has excluded, as barracks and quarters for the garrison, separate and exposed buildings, but providing instead thereof, and in the body of the rampart, bomb-proof accommodations, designed to avail for the comfort, health, and safety of the troops, as well as for the proper defence of the works, under the circumstances of actual warfare and of sieges. Proper and well designed as the casemates no doubt are for these objects, I have nevertheless formed the opinion, from my limited personal observation, that it is advisable, in time of peace, to afford the assembled troops and the hospitals barrack establishments, on airy and spacious sites, separate from the forts. With this impression upon my mind (an impression which seems to prevail throughout the army), I would be remiss in my duty, did I not express the hope that Congress may authorize and appropriate funds for the erection of barracks at the necessary points on the seaboard, care being taken that by their location and construction they shall not interfere with the proper purpose and action of the fortifications."

The plan here suggested of collecting troops into large bodies has often been formed, and occasionally carried partially into effect. No military man has ever doubted the advantages of such concentrations. There are certain modes of discipline which can never otherwise be introduced. Still, admitting all this, paramount considerations may forbid them. Every captain of a company naturally desires that the men under his command may be brought together, that he may instruct them fully in all their appropriate duties. Every colonel has the same desire with respect to his regiment; and the brigadier-general and the major-general entertain similar ambitious and commendable anxieties about

their respective commands. The opinions that govern them all are praiseworthy. A division of troops, with all its appurtenances, forms a perfect military body, and can be instructed to the full scope of discipline. Much larger concentrations are made in the older countries, where the character of the government, and the extent of the military establishments, render them unobjectionable and convenient. The question is, Can such concentrations, even in a subordinate degree, be unobjectionable and convenient here?

In the first place, our country is uncommonly large, and our army uncommonly small. We have a very great extent of frontier to guard. Fortifications have been erected, and posts have been established, at suitable distances, along this whole extent. It is intended that these fortifications and posts shall be occupied. The army is kept up for that purpose. In time of peace, it may be said, it is kept up for that purpose alone. alone. If the troops be dispersed among these defences in a proper manner, there is no surplus for the concentrations recommended by the secretary. Then the determination must be, that such concentrations, beyond a very limited degree, cannot properly be made.

What is the consequence of this determination? It may be frankly admitted, that our troops have no chance, under ordinary circumstances, to become acquainted, practically, with the higher evolutions of the line. The brigadier-general and the major-general have no opportunity to exercise themselves in these evolutions. Their duties become, for the time being, supervisory and conservative. A regiment is occasionally embodied; battalions, often; and thus a measure of military proficiency is preserved, which answers