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SENATE.]

Discriminating duties with Portugal-Slavery in the District of Columbia.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2.

A message was received from the President of the United States enclosing a communication from the Secretary of State on the subject of the discriminating duties with Portugal; which was ordered to be referred to the Committee on Commerce.

The following is a copy of the message:

WASHINGTON, Feb. 29, 1836. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, communicating an application from the chargé d'affaires of Portugal for the passage by Congress of a special act abolishing discriminating duties upon the cargoes of Portuguese vessels imported into the United States from those parts of the dominions of Portugal in which no discriminating duties are charged upon the vessels of the United States or their cargoes; and providing for a return of the discriminating duties which have been exacted upon the cargoes of Portuguese vessels thus circumstanced, since the 18th of April, 1834. I also transmit a copy of the correspondence which has taken place on the subject between the Department of State and the chargé d'affaires of Portugal.

The whole matter is submitted to the discretion of Congress, with this suggestion, that, if an act should be passed, placing the cargoes of Portuguese vessels coming from certain parts of the territories of Portugal on the footing of those imported in vessels of the United States, or deciding upon the propriety of restoring the duties heretofore levied, and the time to which they shall be restored, regard should be had to the fact that the decree of the 18th of April, 1834, which is made the basis of the present application, took effect in the islands of Madeira and the Azores many months after its promulgation; and to the more important fact that, until the 1st of February instant, an indirect advantage was allowed by Portugal to importations from Great Britain over those from other countries, including the United States.

ANDREW JACKSON.

ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.

The Senate proceeded to consider the petition of the Society of Friends in Pennsylvania, praying for the abo lition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

The question being on the motion of Mr. CALHOUN that the petition be not received,

Mr. BUCHANAN said it was not now his intention to repeat any thing he had said on a former occasion in regard to the abolition of slavery in this District. The remarks which he had then made, after much reflection, still met his entire approbation. He would not now have alluded to them, were it not for the misapprehension which still appeared to prevail upon this floor in regard to the state of northern feeling on this subject. Those remarks had, he believed, been more extensively circulated throughout Pennsylvania than any which he had ever made upon any occasion. If they had been censured any where in that State, by any party, the fact was unknown to him. On the contrary, he had strong reasons to believe they had been received with general approbation.

Mr. B. said he was not in the habit of using private letters to sustain any position which he might take upon this floor or elsewhere. He would say, however, that, since he had presented the memorial now the subject of consideration before the Senate, he had received an other memorial of a similar character from the city of Philadelphia. This memorial had been transmitted to him by two gentlemen whose names and character would be the strongest guarantee for the truth of their asser.

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tions, did he feel himself at liberty to make them known to the Senate. He would not even have alluded to their letter, but it related to a public subject in which the country was deeply interested, and accompanied the memorial which they had requested him to present to the Senate. The following is an extract from this letter:

Although we have not the pleasure of thy acquaintance, permit us on this occasion to express our satisfaction with thy remarks in the Senate some weeks since, in which the opinion was forcibly sustained that no sensible man at the North would advocate the right of Congress to interfere with the subject of slavery in the slave States themselves. We are fully persuaded this is the fact in our neighborhood.

"In a pretty extensive acquaintance with the friends of abolition in this city, we unhesitatingly declare that we have never heard such an opinion advocated, and we defy our opponents to point out a man that has ever circulated any publication calculated to produce discord in the southern States.

"But whilst we fully recognise this view, we are aware that the constitution guaranties to us the right of memorializing Congress on any subject connected with the welfare of the District of Columbia, and we intend ever to exercise it in the spirit of charity and good feel. ing."

Mr. B. believed this statement to be true. Although all the people of Pennsylvania were opposed to slavery in the abstract, yet they would not sanction any attempts to excite the slaves of the southern States to insurrection and bloodshed. Whilst they know their own rights, and would maintain them, they never would invade the rights of others which had been secured by the federal constitution. He was proud to say this had always been the character and the conduct of the State which he had in part the honor to represent in her relations with her sister States.

Mr. B. said he felt himself justified in declaring that Pennsylvania was perfectly sound upon this question. Abolitionists there may be in Pennsylvania, but it had never been his fate to meet a single one. If we have a man amongst us who desires, by the circulation of incendiary publications and pictures throughout the slaveholding States, to produce a servile insurrection, and thus to abolish slavery, he knew him not. In the language of the letter he had just read, whatever might be the case further north, he might defy any gentleman to point out a man in Pennsylvania who has ever circulated any publication calculated to produce discord in the southern States. He had heard within the last few days that emissaries were now travelling throughout Pennsylvania for the purpose of propagating the doctrine of immediate abolition. He thought he might venture to predict that they would fail in their attempts.

Although he did not mean at present to discuss the general question, yet the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. PRESTON] must permit him to say that, in his remarks of yesterday, he had done much to dignify the cause of abolition, and to give its supporters a character which they did not deserve.

Mr. B. was not so well able to judge what effect those remarks might produce on the South; but he protested against the accuracy of the statements which that gentleman had made in regard to the condition of northern feeling on this subject. His information had been incorrect. If the gloomy coloring of the picture which he had presented could be considered any thing but a fancy sketch, the South might believe that the time had arrived when it would be their duty to decide whether it was not necessary to dissolve this Union, for the protection of their rights. Mr. B. thought far otherwise. This crisis has not arrived, and, he trusted, never would

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arrive. The force of public opinion will prostrate this fanatical and dangerous spirit. He must say, however, that the enemies of the cause of abolition at the North had a right to expect that gentlemen from the South would not adopt a course which might tend to increase our difficulties. They ought to permit us to judge for ourselves in this matter, and to throw no obstacles in our way which the nature of the subject does not necessarily present.

Let it once be understood that the sacred right of petition and the cause of the abolitionists must rise or must fall together, and the consequences may be fatal. I would, therefore, warn southern gentlemen to reflect seriously in what situation they place their friends to the North, by insisting that this petition shall not be received. We have just as little right to interfere with slavery in the South as we have to touch the right of petition. Whence is this right derived? Can a republican Government exist without it? Man might as well attempt to exist without breathing the vital air. No Government possessing any of the elements of liberty has ever existed, or can ever exist, unless its citizens or subjects enjoy this right. From the very structure of your Governmen', from the very establishment of a Senate and House of Representatives, the right of petition naturally and necessarily resulted. A representative republic, established by the people, without the people having a right to make their wants and their wishes known to their servants, would be the most palpable absurdity. This right, even if it were not expressly sanctioned by the Constitution, would result from its very nature. It could not be controlled by any action of Congress, or either branch of it. If the constitution had been silent upon the subject, the only consequence would be, that it would stand in the very front rank of those rights of the people which are expressly guarantied to them by the ninth article of the amendments to that instrument, inserted from abundant but necessary caution. I shall read this article. It declares that "the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." It would, without any express provision, have stood in the same rank with the liberty of speech and of the press, and have been entirely beyond the control of the Government. It is a right which could not have been infringed without extinguishing the vital spirit of our institutions. If any had been so bold as to attempt to violate it, it would have been a conclusive argument to say to them that the constitution has given you no power over the right of petition, and you dare not touch it.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] has justly denominated the amendments to the constitution as our bill of rights. The jealousy which the States entertained of federal power brought these amendments into existence. They supposed that, in future times, Congress might desire to extend the powers of this Gov. ernment, and usurp rights which were not granted them by the people of the States. From a provident caution, they have, in express terms, denied to Congress every sort of control over religion, over the freedom of speech and of the press, and over the right of petition. The first article of the amendments declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Now, sir, what is the first position taken by the Senator from South Carolina against receiving this memorial? I desire to quote him with perfect accuracy. He says that the constitution prohibits Congress from passing any law to abridge the right of petition; that to refuse to receive this petition would not be to pass any such law, and that,

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therefore, the constitution would not be violated by such a refusal.

Does not the Senator perceive that, if this doctrine can be maintained, the right of petition is gone for ever? It is a mere empty name. The Senate would possess the power of controlling it at their will and pleasure. No matter what may be the prayer of any petition, no matter how just may be the grievances of the people demanding redress, we may refuse to hear their complaints, and inform them that this is one of our preroga tives; because, to refuse to receive their petition is not the passage of a law abridging their right to petition. How can the gentleman escape from this consequence? Is the Senate to be the arbiter? Are we to decide what the people may petition for, and what they shall not bring before us? Is the servant to dictate to the master? Such a construction can never be the true one.

The most striking feature of this argument is, that the very article of the constitution which was intended to guard the right of petition with the most jealous care is thus perverted from its original intention, and made the instrument of destroying this very right. What we cannot do by law, what is beyond the power of both Houses of Congress and the President, according to the gentleman's argument, the Senate can of itself accomplish. The Senate alone, if his argument be correct, may abridge the right of petition, acting in its separate capaci ty, though it could not, as one branch of the Legisla ture, consent to any law which would confer upon itself this power.

What is the true history and character of this article of the constitution? In the thirteenth year of the reign of that "royal scoundrel," Charles II, as the Senator from Virginia [Mr. LEIGH] has justly denominated him, an act of Parliament was passed abridging the right of petition. It declared that "no petition to the King or either House of Parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury in the county; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council; nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time." Each Senator will readily perceive that the right of petition was thus laid almost entirely prostrate at the feet of the Sovereign. The justices of the peace, and the sheriff's who selected the grand juries, were his creatures, appointed and removed at his pleasure. Out of the city of London, without their consent, no petition for an alteration in church or state could be signed by more than twenty individuals. At the revolution of 1688, the bill of rights guarantied to English subjects the right of petitioning the King, but the courts of justice decided that it did not repeal the statute of the second Charles. ute still remained in force at the adoption of the federal constitution. Such was the state of the law in that country, from which we have derived most of our institutions, when this amendment to the constitution was adopted.

This stat

Although the constitution, as it came from the hands of its framers, gave to Congress no power to touch the right of petition, yet some of the States to whom it was submitted for ratification, apprehending that the time might arrive when Congress would be disposed to act like the British Parliament, expressly withdrew the subject from our control. Not satisfied with the fact that no power over it had been granted by the constitution, they determined to prohibit us, in express terms, from ever exercising such a power. This is the true history of the first article of our bill of rights.

Let me put another case to the Senator from South Carolina. Some years since, as a manager on the part of the House of Representatives, I had the honor to ap

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pear before this body, then sitting as a high court of impeachment. In that case, the accused, when sitting as a district judge of the United States, had brought an attorney of his court before him by an attachment for contempt, and, without any trial by jury, had convicted him of a libel, and sentenced him to imprisonment. The judge was acquitted; and at the moment I thought this decision had placed the freedom of the press in danger. If the sedition law were clearly unconstitutional, and nobody now doubts it; if Congress could not confer upon the courts of the United States, by express enactment, any power over the question of libel, I thought it monstrous that a judge, without the intervention of a jury, under highly excited feelings, should be permitted to try and to punish libels committed against himself according to his will and pleasure. My apprehensions were of but short duration. A few days after the acquittal of this judge, the Senate, without one dis. senting voice, passed a bill, not to create a new law, but declaratory of what the old law, or rather what the constitution was, under which no federal judge will ever again dare to punish a libel as a contempt. The constitutional provision in favor of the liberty of the press was thus redeemed from judicial construction.

Now, sir, we must all admit that libels of the grossest character are daily published against the Senate and its individual members. Suppose an attempt should be made to bring one of these libellers before us, and to punish him for a contempt, would the gentleman from South Carolina contend that we might do so without violating the constitution, and that we might convict him and sentence him to imprisonment, because such a conviction and sentence would not be the passage of a law abridging the freedom of the press? The gentleman's excited feelings upon the subject of abolition have led his judgment astray. No construction can be correct which would lead to such palpable absurdities.

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[MARCH 2, 1836.

tional lawyers; but they feel oppression, and know when they are aggrieved. They present their complaints to us in the form of a petition. I ask, by what authority can we refuse to receive it? They have a right to spread their wishes and their wants before us, and to ask for redress. We are bound respectfully to consider their request; and the best answer which we can give them is, that they have not conferred upon us the power, under the constitution of the United States, to grant them the relief which they desire. On any other principle we may first decide that we have no power over a particular subject, and then refuse to hear the peti tions of the people in relation to it. We would thus place the constitutional right of our constituents to petition at the mercy of our own discretion.

Again, sir, we possess the power of originating amendments to the constitution. Although, therefore, we may not be able to grant the petitioners relief, such a petition may induce us to exercise this power, and to ask for a new grant of authority from the States.

The gentleman's third proposition was, that we are not bound to receive this petition, because it is no griev. ance to the citizens of any of the States that slavery exists in this District. But who are to be the judges, in the first instance, whether the people are aggrieved or not? Is it those who suffer, or fancy they suffer, or the Senate? If we are to decide when they ought to feel aggrieved, and when they ought to be satisfied, if the tribunal to whom their petitions are addressed may refuse to receive them, because, in their opinion, there was no just cause of complaint, the right of petition is destroyed. It would be but a poor answer to their pe titions to tell them they ought not to have felt aggriev ed, that they are mistaken, and that, therefore, their complaints would not be received by their servants.

I may be asked, (said Mr. B.,) is there no case in which I would be willing to refuse to receive a petition? The very language of this amendment itself contains I answer that it must be a very strong one indeed to. the strongest recognition of the right of petition. In justify such a refusal. There is one exception, howthe clearest terms, it presupposes its existence. How ever, which results from the very nature of the right itcan you abridge a right which had no previous exist- self. Neither the body addressed nor any of its memence? On this question I deem the argument of my bers must be insulted, under the pretext of exercising friend from Georgia [Mr. KING] conclusive. The this right. It must not be perverted from its purpose, amendment assumes that the people have the right to and be made the instrument of degrading the body to petition for the redress of grievances, and places it be- which the petition is addressed. Such a petition wouldyond the power of Congress to touch this sacred right. be in fraud of the right itself, and the necessary power The truth is, that the authors of the amendment be- of self-protection and self-preservation inherent in every lieved this to be a Government of such tremendous pow-legislative body confers upon it the authority of defender, that it was necessary, in express terms, to withdrawing itself against direct insults presented in this or any from its grasp their most essential rights. The right of other form. Beyond this exception I would not go every citizen to worship his God according to the dic- and it is solely for the purpose of self-protection, in my tates of his own conscience, his right freely to speak opinion, that the rules of the Senate enable any of its and freely to print and publish his thoughts to the world, members to raise the question whether a petition shall and his right to petition the Government for a redress be received or not. If the rule has any other object in of grievances, are placed entirely beyond the control of view, it is a violation of the constitution. the Congress of the United States, or either of its branches. There may they ever remain! These fundamental principles of liberty are companions. They rest upon the same foundation. They must stand or must fall together. They will be maintained so long as American liberty shall endure.

The next argument advanced by the gentleman is, that we are not bound to receive this petition, because to grant its prayer would be unconstitutional? In this argument I shall not touch the question, whether Congress possess the power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia or not. Suppose they do not, can the gentleman maintain the position that we are authorized by the constitution to refuse to receive a petition from the people, because we may deem the object of it unconstitutional. Whence is any such restriction of the right of petition derived? Who gave it to us? Is it to be found in the constitution? The people are not constitu

I would confine this exception within the narrowest limits. The acts of the body addressed may be freely canvassed by the people, and they may be shown to be unjust or unconstitutional. These may be the very reasons why the petition is presented. To speak his mind is every freeman's right." They may and they ought to express themselves with that manly independ ence which belongs to American citizens. To exclude their petition, it must appear palpable that an insult to the body was intended, and not a redress of grievances.

Extreme cases have been put by the Senator from South Carolina. Ridiculous or extravagant petitions may be presented; though I should think that scarcely a sane man could be found in this country who would ask Congress to abolish slavery in the State of Georgis. In such a case I would receive the petition, and consign it at once to that merited contempt which it would deserve. The constitution secures the right of being

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heard by petition to every citizen; and I would not abridge it because he happened to be a fool.

The proposition is almost too plain for argument, that if the people have a constitutional right to petition, a corresponding duty is imposed upon us to receive their petitions. From the very nature of things, rights and duties are reciprocal. The human mind cannot conceive of the one without the other. They are relative terms. If the people have a right to command, it is the duty of their servants to obey. If I have a right to a sum of money, it is the duty of my debtor to pay it to me. If the people have a right to petition their representatives, it is our duty to receive their petition.

This question was solemnly determined by the Senate more than thirty years ago. Neither before nor since that time, so far as I can learn, has the general right of petition ever been called in question, until the motion now under consideration was made by the Senator from South Carolina. Of course I do not speak of cases embraced within the exception which I have just stated. No Senator has ever contended that this is one of them. To prove my position, I shall read an extract from our journals. On Monday, the 21st January, 1805, "Mr. Logan presented a petition, signed Thomas Morris, clerk, in behalf of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race; and on the question, "Shall this petition be received?" it passed in the affirmative: yeas 19, nay's 9.

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na urge the motion which he has made? I wish I could persuade him to withdraw it. We of the North honestly believe, and I feel confident he will not doubt our sincerity, that we cannot vote for his motion without violating our duty to God and to the country--without disregarding the oath which we have sworn to support the constitution. This is not the condition of those who advocate his motion. It is not pretended that the constitution imposes any obligation upon them to vote for this motion. With them it is a question of mere expediency; with us, one of constitutional duty. I ask gentlemen of the South, for their own sake, as well as for that of their friends in the North, to vote against this motion. It will place us all in a false position, where neither their sentiments nor ours will be properly understood.

The people of the North are justly jealous of their rights and liberties. Among these, they hold the right of petition to be one of the most sacred character. I would say to the gentlemen of the South, why, then, will you array yourselves, without any necessity, against this right? You believe that we are much divided on the question of abolition; why, then, will you introduce another element of discord amongst us, which may do your cause much harm, and which cannot possibly do it any good? When you possess an impregnable fortress, if you will defend it, why take shelter in an outwork, where defeat is certain? Why select the very weakest position, one on which you will yourselves present a divided front to the enemy, when it is in your power to choose one on which you and us can all unite? You will thus afford an opportunity to the abolitionists at the North to form a false issue with your friends. You place us in such a condition that we cannot defend you, without in"Those who voted in the affirmative are, fringing the sacred right of petition. Do you not per"Messrs. Adams, Massachusetts; Alcott, New Hamp-ceive that the question of abolition may thus be indissoshire; Bayard, Delaware; Brown, Kentucky; Condict, New Jersey; Franklin, North Carolina; Hillhouse, Connecticut; Howland, Rhode Island; Logan, Pennsylvania; Maclay, Pennsylvania; Mitchell, New York; Pickering, Massachusetts; Plumer, New Hampshire; Smith, Ohio; Smith, Vermont; Stone, North Carolina; Sumpter, South Carolina; White, Delaware; Worthington, Ohio. "And those who voted in the negative are, "Messrs. Anderson, Tennessee; Baldwin, Georgia; Bradley, Vermont; Cocke, Tennessee; Jackson, Georgia; Moore, Virginia; Smith, Maryland; Smith, New York; Wright, Maryland.

"The yeas and nays being required by one fifth of the Senators present

"So the petition was read."

The Senate will perceive that I have added to the names of the members of the Senate that of the States which they each represented. The Senator from South Carolina will see that, among those who, upon this occasion, sustained the right of petition, there is found the name of General Sumpter, his distinguished predecesBor. I wish him, also, to observe that but seven Sena. tors from the slaveholding States voted against receiving the petition; although it was of a character well calcu-lated to excite their hostile and jealous feelings.

The present, sir, is a real controversy between liberty and power. In my humble judgment, it is far the most important question which has been before the Senate since I have had the honor of occupying a seat in this body. It is a contest between those, however unintentionally, who desire to abridge the right of the people, in asking their servants for a redress of grievances, and those who desire to leave it, as the constitution left it, free as the air. Petitions ought ever to find their way into the Senate without impediment; and I trust that the decision upon this question will result in the establishment of one of the dearest rights which a free people can enjoy.

Now, sir, why should the Senator from South Caroli

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lubly connected, in public estimation, with a cause which we can never abandon. If the abolitionists themselves had been consulted, I will venture to assert, they ought to have advised the very course which has been adopted by their greatest enemies.

The vote upon this unfortunate motion may do almost equal harm in the South. It may produce an impression there, that we who will vote against the motion are not friendly to the protection of their constitutional rights. It may arouse jealousy and suspicion, where none ought to exist; and may thus magnify a danger which has already been greatly exaggerated. In defending any great cause, it is always disastrous to take a position which cannot be maintained. Your forces thus become scattered and inefficient, and the enemy may obtain possession of the citadel whilst you are vainly attempting to defend an outpost. I am sorry, indeed, that this motion has been made.

I shall now proceed to defend my own motion from the attacks which have been made upon it. It has been equally opposed by both extremes. I have not found, upon the present occasion, the maxim to be true, that "in medio tutissimus ibis." The Senator from Louisiana, [Mr. PORTER,] and the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] Seem both to believe that little, if any, difference exists between the refusal to receive a petition, and the rejection of its prayer after it has been received. Indeed, the gentleman from Louisiana, whom I am happy to call my friend, says he can see no difference at all between these motions. At the moment I heard this remark, I was inclined to believe that it proceeded from that confusion of ideas which sometimes exists in the clearest heads of that country from which he derives his origin, and from which I am myself proud to be descended. What, sir, no difference between refusing to receive a request at all, and actually receiving it and considering it respectfully, and afterwards deciding,

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without delay, that it is not in your power to grant it! There is no man in the country, acquainted with the meaning of the plainest words in the English language, who will not recognise the distinction in a moment.

If a constituent of that gentleman should present to him a written request, and he should tell him to go about his business, and take his paper with him, that he would not have any thing to do with him or it: this would be to refuse to receive the petition.

On the other hand, if the gentleman should receive this written request of his constituent, read it over carefully and respectfully, and file it away among his papers, but, finding it was of an unreasonable or dangerous character, he should inform him, without taking further time to reflect upon it, that the case was a plain one, and that he could not, consistently with what he believed to be his duty, grant the request: this would be to reject the prayer of the petition.

There is as much difference between the two cases, as there would be between kicking a man down stairs who attempted to enter your house, and receiving him politely, examining his request, and then refusing to comply with it.

It has been suggested that the most proper course would be to refer this petition to a committee. What possible good can result from referring it? Is there a Senator on this floor who has not long since determined whether he will vote to abolish slavery in this District or not? Does any gentleman require the report of a committee, in order to enable him to decide this question? Not one.

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without any delay. This is always done in a plain case, by a competent judge. And yet, who ever heard that this was treating the petitioner with disrespect? In order to be respectful to these memorialists, must we go through the unmeaning form, in this case, of referring the memorial to a committee, and pretending to deliberate, when we are now all fully prepared to decide?

I repeat, too, that I intended to make as strong a mo tion in this case as the circumstances would justify. It is necessary that we should use every constitutional effort to suppress the agitation which now disturbs the land. This is necessary, as much for the happiness and future prospects of the slave as for the security of the master. Before this storm began to rage, the laws in regard to slaves had been greatly ameliorated by the slaveholding States; they enjoyed many privileges which were unknown in former times. In some of the slave States prospective and gradual emancipation was publicly and seriously discussed. But now, thanks to the efforts of the abolitionists, the slaves have been deprived of these privileges; and, whilst the integrity of the Union is endangered, their prospect of final emancipation is delayed to an indefinite period. To leave this question where the constitution has left it, to the slaveholding States themselves, is equally dictated by a hu mane regard for the slaves as well as for their masters. There are other objections to the reference of this memorial to a committee, which must, I think, be conclusive. I ask the Senate, after witnessing the debate upon the present question, to what conclusion could By granting the prayer of this memorial, as I observed this committee arrive? If they attempted to assert any on a former occasion, you would establish a magazine of principle beyond the naked proposition before us, that gunpowder here, from which trains might be laid into the prayer of the memorialists ought not to be granted, the surrounding States which would produce fearful ex- we would be cast into a labyrinth of difficulties. It plosions. In the very heart of the slaveholding States would be confusion worse confounded. If we wish to themselves you would erect an impregnable citadel from obtain a strong vote, and thus at the same time tranquilwhence the abolitionists might securely spread through-lize the South and the North upon this exciting topic, out these States, by circulating their incendiary pamph- the reference of it to a committee would be the most lets and pictures, the seeds of disunion, insurrection, unfortunate course which we could adopt. Senators are and servile war. You would thus take advantage of divided into four classes upon this question. The first the generous confidence of Virginia and Maryland in believe that to abolish slavery in this District would be ceding to you this District, without expressly forbidding a violation of the constitution of the United States. Congress to abolish slavery here whilst it exists within Should the committee recommend any proposition of a their limits. No man can, for one moment, suppose that less decided character, these Senators would feel it to they would have made this cession upon any other terms, be their duty to attempt to amend it, by asserting this had they imagined that a necessity could ever exist for principle; and thus we should excite another dangerous such a restriction. Whatever may be my opinion of the and unprofitable debate. The second class, although power of Congress, under the constitution, to interfere they may not believe that the subject is constitutionally with this question, about which at present I say nothing, beyond the control of Congress, yet they think that the I shall as steadily and as sternly oppose its exercise as if acts of cession from Maryland and Virginia to the United I believed no such power to exist. States forbid us to act upon the subject. These gentlemen would insist upon the affirmance of this proposi tion. The third class would not go as far as either of the former. They do not believe that the subject is placed beyond the power of Congress, either by the constitution or by the compacts of cession, yet they are as firmly opposed to granting the prayer of the petition, whilst slavery continues to exist in Maryland and Vir

In making the motion now before the Senate, I intended to adopt as strong a measure as I could, consistently with the right of petition and a proper respect for the petitioners. I am the last man in the world who would, intentionally, treat these respectable constituents of my own with disrespect. I know them well, and prize them highly. On a former occasion I did ample justice to their character. I deny that they are aboli-ginia, as if they held both these opinions. They know tionists. I cannot, however, conceive how any person could have supposed that it was disrespectful to them to refuse to grant their prayer in the first instance, and not disrespectful to refuse to grant it after their memorial had been referred to a committee. In the first case their memorial will be received by the Senate, and will be filed among the records of the country. That it has already been the subject of sufficient deliberation and debate, that it has already occupied a due portion of the time of the Senate, cannot be doubted or denied. Every one acquainted with the proceedings of courts of justice must know that often, very often, when petitions are presented to them, the request is refused

that these States never would have ceded this territory of ten miles square to the United States upon any other condition, if it had entered into their conception that Congress would make an attempt sooner to convert it into a free District. Besides, they are convinced that to exercise this power at an earlier period would seriously endanger not only the peace and harmony of the Union, but its very existence. This class of Senators, whilst they entertain these opinions, which ought to be entire ly satisfactory to the South, could never consent to vote for a resolution declaring that to act upon the subject would be a violation of the constitution or of the compacts. The fourth class, and probably not the least

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