must, therefore, be a verdict for the plaintiff on the second count, for 127.

WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. It appears to me that there is nothing in the 8th section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122 to take the building in question out of the operation of the 143d section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120: the walls called the east and west walls were mere boundary walls, and not external walls of a building. It is said that there does not appear to have been any regular line of building, in the place in question, within the meaning of the 143d section of the Metropolis Local Management Act. That is a question of fact. The "regular line of buildings" mentioned in that section cannot possibly mean a geometrical line; it must mean substantially such a line as shall preserve uniformity of appearance. The arbitrator, as it [*263 seems to me, has disposed of this question, by finding that there is in point of fact a regular line of buildings from No. 1, Priory Terrace, to No. 12, Portland Terrace. Then it is said that the surveyor had no authority to remove the building, because, when the resolution was put to a show of hands at the first vestry meeting, and the numbers were equal, that, according to the true construction of the by-law, disposed of the matter, and there could not legally be a poll. The rule upon this subject is well stated by Sir William Scott, in a case of Anthony v. Seger, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 9, 13,-"Where a poll is demanded, the election commences with it, as being the regular mode of popular elections; the show of hands being only a rude and imperfect declaration of the electors. It often happens, that, on a show of hands, the person has a majority who on a poll is lost in a minority; and, if the parties could afterwards recur to the show of hands, there would be no certainty or regularity in elections. I am of opinion, therefore, that, when a poll is demanded, it is an abandonment of what was done before, and that everything anterior is not of the substance of the election, nor to be so received." It is clear, therefore, that a demand of a poll or division does away with the previous show of hands. That objection cannot be sustained. And this seems to me to dispose of the first count in favour of the defendant. As to the second count, I apprehend that a person is guilty of a conversion, if he takes away the goods of another for the purpose of depriving that other of the use of them and acquiring the use of them himself. It seems to me that that was the defendant's object in removing the building-materials to the stone-yard, to enable him the better to enforce his claim of lien. That clearly was a wrongful deprival of the *plaintiff of the use of his [*264 goods. The circumstance of the materials being taken in order to enforce an unfounded claim of lien, distinguishes the cases from those cited. There will, therefore, be judgment for the defendant upon the first count, and for the plaintiff on the second count, for 127. Judgment accordingly.

JOHN PEACOCK, Appellant; THE QUEEN, Respondent. April 28.

Sunday is to be computed in the three days allowed for an application to justices to state a case for the opinion of one of the superior courts under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, although it be the last day.

THIS was an information preferred by James Bell, inspector of police,

against John Peacock, an alehouse-keeper; for that, "on the 20th of December, 1857, at Sutton Bridge, in the parish of Sutton St. Mary, in the parts of Holland, Lincolnshire, the said John Peacock, being then a beer-house keeper, and duly licensed to sell beer, ale, and porter and excisable liquors by retail to be drunk and consumed in his house and premises there situate, under the provisions of the statutes in that case made and provided, did keep his said house and premises (the said day being Sunday) open for the sale of beer after the hour of eleven o'clock at night, to wit, at thirty-five minutes past eleven o'clock at night of the same day; being in the said parish of Sutton St. Mary, the population of which, according to the last parliamentary census, exceeded two thousand five hundred persons; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

After hearing the parties, and the evidence adduced by them, the magistrates at a petty session held on the 30th of December, 1857, convicted the said John *Peacock, as an alehouse-keeper, of *265] the said offence, under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 118, s. 1, and adjudged him to forfeit and pay the fine or penalty of 58. and costs.

The said John Peacock, being dissatisfied with the said determination as being erroneous in point of law, applied for a case for the opinion of this court pursuant to the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43: whereupon the justices stated the following case:

"The defendant having appeared upon summons before us to answer, to the said information, it was thereupon proved on the part of the said prosecutor, by the evidence of a police constable, that the said John Peacock was keeping and carrying on the business of an alehouse keeper at an inn called The Crown, situate at Sutton Bridge aforesaid; and that, about half past eleven o'clock on the night of Sunday, the 20th of December last, the police on duty, being attracted by a noise inside, entered the said alehouse, and there found four men in a lower room,one of them (one of the strangers after-mentioned) having a glass of rumand-water in his hand at the time, and being drunk and noisy; that three of such four persons were strangers, and the fourth was known to the police to be a resident at Sutton Bridge aforesaid, but not a lodger in the said alehouse kept by the said John Peacock.

"It was alleged in reply, by the said John Peacock in person, but no proof tendered or given by him, that the three strangers in question were travellers resting there for the night with droves of beast, which they were taking into Norfolk for sale: and it was not disputed by him that the other party was a resident at Sutton Bridge, and not a lodger in his said house; but it was asserted that that party neither was nor had been drinking, and set up that he was there only for the purpose of reading the newspaper and of conversation with the drovers. Peacock

*266] further objected that he was an old *licensed innkeeper, and not

a mere retail beer-house keeper as stated in the information and summons: whereupon we, the undersigned, did adjudge and determine that the said John Peacock was guilty of the offence so charged against him; and that his objection to the character in which he had been summoned, was removed under the provisions of the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 1, by his personal appearance before us and we did convict him accordingly in the mitigated penalty of 58., besides costs, amounting to the sum of 188.

"If the court shall be of opinion that the said John Peacock was duly and properly convicted of the said offence, then the conviction shall be confirmed. But, if the court shall be of a contrary opinion, then the said conviction shall be quashed."

Tompson Chitty appearing to support the appeal,

Beasley, for the respondents, objected that the application to the justices for a case was made too late, the adjudication having taken place on Thursday, the 30th of December, 1857, and a case not having been asked for until Monday, the 3d of January, 1858; whereas, the statute requires it to be done "within three days" after the determina

tion.

Chitty submitted that the objection was waived by the appearance of the respondents.

CROWDER, J.-I think we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The 2d section of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, provides, that, after the hearing and determination by a justice or justices of the peace of any information or complaint which he or they have power to determine in a summary way, by any law now in force *or hereafter to be made, either party to the proceeding before the said justice or justices

[*267

may, if dissatisfied with the said determination, as being erroneous in point of law, apply in writing within three days after the same to the said justice or justices to state and sign a case, &c. Unless that condition has been complied with, we have no power to entertain the matter.(a) The statute giving that number of days, and saying nothing about Sunday being excluded from the computation, as in some of the rules of court, (b) it must be reckoned as one of the three days. The appellant ought, therefore, to have applied to the justices on the Saturday.

WILLES, J.-The case of Rowberry v. Morgan, 9 Exch. 730,† is precisely in point. The 27th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, empowers a plaintiff, in case of nonappearance by the defendant, where the writ of summons is endorsed in the special form given by the act, on filing an affidavit of personal service, &c., at once to sign judgment: "and the plaintiff may, upon such judgment, issue execution at the expiration of eight days from the last day for appearance:" and it was held in that case, that, where *Sunday is the last of such eight days, it is to be reckoned in the [*268 computation as one of those days, and consequently that an execution issued on the Monday was regular. In the course of the argument there, Martin, B., referred to a case of The Queen v. The Justices of Middlesex, 7 Jurist 396, where one of the questions turned upon the 4 G. 4, c. 95, s. 87, the turnpike act, which requires the notice of appeal to be served within six days after the cause of complaint; and it was held, that, the conviction being on the 2d of May, service

(a) See Norton, app., The Town Clerk of Salisbury, resp., 4 C. B. 32 (E. C. L. R. vol. 56), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 538; Pring, app., Estcourt, resp., 4 C. B. 73, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 543; Clarke, app., Beaton, resp., 4 C. B. 76.

(b) See the 174th rule of Hilary Term, 1853 (13 C. B., p. 40) (E. C. L. R. vol. 76), which provides, that, "in all cases in which any particular number of days, not expressed to be clear days, is prescribed by the rules or practice of the courts, the same shall be reckoned exclusively of the first day, and inclusively of the last day, unless the last day shall happen to fall on a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or a day appointed for a public fast or thanksgiving, in which case the time shall be reckoned exclusively of that day also."

of the notice of appeal upon the 9th, the 8th being Sunday, was not in time.(a)

BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. Sunday, at common law, is just like any other day. By the 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 6, Trinity Term was made to commence on the 22d of May, and "the first essoign or general return day" was "the fourth day before the day of the commencement of the term, both days being included in the computation." Where the 22d of May happened to be a Sunday, for the purpose of casting essoigns, it was still considered the first day of the term.

Beasley, for the respondents, asked for costs, referring to the 6th section of the statute, which places the costs at the discretion of the

court.

WILLES, J.-That only applies where the court has jurisdiction. Here, we dismiss the appeal because we have no jurisdiction.

Appeal dismissed.

(a) And see The Queen v. The Justices of Middlesex, 17 Law J., M. C. 111. By the 4th section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, notice of an appeal against an order of affiliation is

*269] required to be given "within twenty-four hours after the adjudication." It was held, that,

in computing the twenty-four hours for that purpose, Sunday is to be excluded; and, consequently, where the order was made on Saturday, a notice of appeal given on Monday was held sufficient. In Rawlins, app., The Overseers of West Derby, resp., 2 C. B. 72 (E. C. L. R. vol. 52), the last day for giving notices of claims under the Registration of Voters Act, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, falling on a Sunday, a notice of claim served upon the overseer on that day was held good.

In re ROBERT STIRLING NEWALL, and GEORGE ELLIOT and RICHARD ATTWOOD GLASS. April 30.

The office of the provisional specification, under the 6th section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, is only to describe generally and fairly the nature of the invention, and not to enter into all the minute details as to the manner in which the invention is to be carried out, as in the complete specification under s. 9.

A. was the inventor of "improvements in apparatus employed in laying down submarine electric telegraph wires." In the provisional specification filed pursuant to the 6th section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, the invention was thus described,-"The cable or rope containing the insulated wire or wires is passed round a cone, so that the cable in being drawn off the coil is prevented from kinking by means of the cone, and there is a cylinder on the outside which prevents the coil from shifting in its place." In the complete specification, after describing the invention in the same terms, the inventor proceeded to say,-"When the wire or cable is to be laid down, I place over the cone an apex or top which is conoidal or conical, and around this I suspend several rings of iron or other metal by means of cords, so as to admit of adjustment at various heights over the cone. The use of these rings is, to prevent the bight of the rope from flying out when going at a rapid speed, and the combination of these parts of the apparatus prevents the wire or cable from running into kinks:" and the claim at the end was thus,"What I claim as my invention is,-first, coiling the wire or cable round a cone,-second, the supports placed cylindrically outside the coil round the cone,-third, the use of rings in combination with the cone as described:"-Held, that the validity of the patent was not affected by the omission of all mention of the metal rings in the provisional specification. And held, that the substitution by B. of a cylinder having a domed or hemispherical top, for the cone or the cone with the conoidal apex in A.'s apparatus,-A.'s apparatus and B.'s being used for the same purpose, and in nearly the same manner, was evidence, and strong evidence, of infringement.

A necessary and unavoidable disclosure of the invention to others, if made in the course of mere experiments, is not such a publication as will avoid the subsequent grant of a patent,-though the same disclosure, if made in the course of a profitable use of an invention previously ascertained to be useful, would be a publication: but an experiment performed in the presence of

others, which not only turns out to be successful, but actually beneficial in the particular instance, is not necessarily a publication, so as to constitute a gift of the invention to the world.

A. had invented an improved apparatus for laying down submarine telegraph wires; and, after some unsatisfactory and indecisive experiments at the works on shore, having entered into a contract with government for laying down a telegraphic cable in the Black Sea (the mode of doing it being left to his discretion), fitted a vessel with his improved apparatus, and used it successfully on that occasion, and immediately afterwards took out a patent for the invention: -Held, that what was done in the Black Sea, having been done merely by way of experiment, though productive of profit to A., did not amount to a publication, so as to preclude him from afterwards obtaining the protection of a patent for his invention.

By a memorandum of agreement made and entered into the 9th of July, 1856, between Robert Stirling Newall, of Gateshead-on-Tyne, wire-rope and submarine telegraph manufacturer and contractor, of the one *part, and George Elliot, and Richard Attwood Glass, of

East Greenwich, in the county of Kent, wire-rope and sub- [*270

marine telegraph manufacturers and contractors, of the other part,— reciting that "whereas, on the 14th of May, 1855, the said R. S. Newall obtained letters patent of that date to be granted to him for an invention under the title of improvements in apparatus employed in laying down submarine electric telegraph wires,' and such letters patent were duly scaled on the 3d of August, 1855, the said invention being protected by a provisional specification left by the said R. S. Newall at the office of the commissioners of patents, with his petition, on the said 14th of May, 1855, and a specification thereof was duly filed on the 14th of November, 1855, pursuant to the proviso for that purpose contained in the said letters patent: And whereas the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass have lately shipped on board the ship Propontis a certain apparatus to be employed in laying down submarine electric telegraph wires between Newfoundland and the opposite coast of North America, which is alleged by the said R. S. Newall to be an infringement of the said letters patent, but which is denied by the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass; and the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass allege that the said letters patent are illegal and void: And whereas the said R. S. Newall having filed a bill in the Court of Chancery with a view to an injunction being obtained, proceedings in the said suit were abandoned only upon the said G. [*271 *Elliot and R. A. Glass agreeing to refer the whole matter to arbitration, as after provided:" It was witnessed, "that, in pursuance of the said agreement, the said R. S. Newall did thereby, for himself, his executors and administrators, promise and agree with and to the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass, their executors and administrators, and the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass did, and each of them did thereby, for himself and their and his executors and administrators, promise and agree to and with the said R. S. Newall, his executors and admiinstrators, in manner following, that is to say, that he the said R. S. Newall, his executors and administrators, and they the said G. Elliot and R. A. Glass, their executors and administrators, should and would on his and their respective parts, save as thereinafter appeared, abide by and well and truly observe and keep the award, order, arbitrament, and determination of T. W., Esq., barrister-at-law, of and concerning the matters aforesaid, so that the said arbitrator, &c., &c.: And it was agreed, that, in case the arbitrator should be of opinion that there had been an infringement of the patent by the said G. Elliot and R. A.