| 1848 - 590 pàgines
...the statement so openly as I now do : and I consider that some justification of it is necessary. ' By degree of probability we really mean, or ought...probability into ideal and objective, and that we must do so, in order to represent common language. It is perfectly correct to say, " It is much more... | |
| William Stanley Jevons - 1874 - 978 pàgines
...accordingly have asserted that probability is concerned with degree or quantity of belief. De Morgan says,b ' By degree of probability we really mean or ought to mean degree of belief.' The late Professor Donkin expressed the meaning of probability as 'quantity of belief;' but I have... | |
| James MacKaye - 1906 - 578 pàgines
...magnitude like length, or weight, or surface, for expectation is thus obviously variable. Again he says " By degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree of belief." And Huxley says " To have an expectation of a given event and to believe that it will happen are only... | |
| Frederic William Westaway - 1912 - 474 pàgines
...Theory of Probability deals with Quantity of Knowledge Jevons disagrees with De Morgan, who says that " by degree of probability we really mean or ought to mean degree of belief"; and with Donkin's opinion that probability is "quantity of belief"; for, says Jevons, " the nature... | |
| Paul Carus - 1921 - 636 pàgines
...becomes the degree of intensity of a belief. De Morgan states this position in its most radical form. "By degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree of belief," he says. "I throw away objective probability altogether and consider the word as meaning the state... | |
| Broemeling - 1984 - 480 pàgines
...DeMorgan (1847) advance the idea of subjective probability in an informal way. For instance DeMorgan says "By degree of probability we really mean , or ought to mean , degree of belief. . . . Probability then, refers to and implies belief, more or less, and belief is but another name... | |
| Vic Barnett - 1999 - 418 pàgines
...prevailing circumstances. Another early formulation was provided (somewhat obscurely) by de Morgan in 1847. By degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree of belief — Probability then, refers to and implies belief, more or less, and belief is but another name for... | |
| Justus Buchler - 2000 - 300 pàgines
...assertion, a coming event, or any other matter on which absolute knowledge does not exist".1 On this view, "by degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree of belief",2 and, in development of the classical conception, the probability of each of a pair of exhaustive... | |
| New Zealand Institute - 1875 - 714 pàgines
...amount of belief given to that proposition. Thus Professor De Morgan says (Formal Logic, chap. 9): " By degree of probability we really mean, or ought...probability into ideal and objective, and that we must do so, in order to represent common language." And he adds : " I throw away objective probability... | |
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