Alien Priories were cells of the religious houfes in England which belonged to foreign monalleries: for when manors or tithes were given to foreign convents, the monks, either to increafe their own rule, or rather to have faithful flewards of their revenues, built a fmall convent here for the reception of fuch a number as they thought proper, and conftituted priors over them. Within thefe cells there was the fame diftinction as in thofe priories which were cells fubordinate to fome great abbey; fome of these were conventual, and, having priors of their own chufing, thereby became entire focieties within themfelves, and received the revenues belonging to their feveral houfes for their own ufe and benefit, paying only the ancient apport †, acknowledgment, or obvention, at firft the furplufage to the foreign houfe; but others depended entirely on the foreign houses, who appointed and removed their priors at pleasure. Thefe tranfmitted all their revenues to the foreign head houfes; for which reafon their eftates were generally feized to carry on the wars between England and France, and reftored to them again on return of peace. Thefe Alien Priories were most of them founded by fuch as had foreign abbies founded by themselves or by fome of their family.

The whole number is not exactly afcertained; the Monafticon hath given a lift of 100; Weever (p. 338) fays 110; an account is here given of 146. A few in Normandy, mentioned in Neustria Pia only (whofe lands have not yet been difcovered), are fuppofed to have been founded by fome of the ancient English nobility or their defcendants.

Some of these cells were made indigenous or denizon, or endenized.

The Alien Priories were firft feized by Edward I. 1285, on the breaking out of the war between France and England; and it appears from a roll, that Edward II. alfo feized them, though this is not mentioned by our hiftorians; and to thefe the act of reftitution 1 Ed. III. feems to refer.

In 1337, Edward III. confifcated their eftates, and let out the priories themselves with all their lands and tenements, at his pleafure, for 23 years; at the end of which term peace being concluded between the two nations, he rettored their eftates 1361, as appears by his letters patents to that of Montacute, c. Somerfet, printed at large in Rymer, Vol. VI. p. 311. and tranflated in Weever's Funeral Monuments, p. 339. and in the Appendix to Vol. II. No. VI. At other times he granted their lands, or lay penfions out of them to divers noblemen. They were alfo fequeftered during Richard II.'s reign, and the head monafteries abroad had the King's licence to fell their lands to other religious houfes here, or to any particular perfons who wanted to endow others.

Henry IV. began his reign with fhewing fome favour to the Alien Priories, refioring all the conventual ones, only referving to him in time of war what they paid in time of peace to the foreign abbies.

† Apportus or apportagium (from portare), an acknowledgment, oblation, or obvention to the mother houfe or church. DU CANGE.

. They

They were all diffolved by act of parliament, 2 Henry V, and all their eftates vefted in the crown except fome lands granted to the college of Fotheringhay.

The act of diffolution is not printed in the ftatute books, but is to be found entire in Rymer's Fœdera IX. 283, and in the Parliament Rolls, Vol. IV. p. 22, whence it is copied in the Appendix to Vol. II. No. IX.

In general thefe lands were appropriated to religious ufes.

Henry VI. endowed his foundations at Eton and Cambridge with the lands of the Alien Priories, in purfuance of his father's defign to appropriate them all to a noble college at Oxford.

Others were granted in fee to the prelates, nobility, or private perfons.

• Such as remained in the crown were granted by Henry VI. 1440, to Archbishop Chichley, &c. and they became part of his and the royal foundations.?

The work has every appearance of correctnefs and authenticity; and is ornamented with feveral views of ancient churches and abbeys, neatly engraved.

ART. IV. An Address to Dr. Priestley, upon his Doctrine of Philofophical Neceffity illuftrated. 8vo. 2 S. Cadell. 1780. ART. V. A Letter to Jacob Bryant, Efq; in Defence of Philofophical Neceffity. By Jofeph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 8vo. I S. Johnfon. 1780.

DR

R. Prieftley answers his opponents fo quickly, that he feldom allows us flow-paced Reviewers any interval bétween the attack and the defence. Accordingly we have more than once already coupled them together, as we now do, in our Journal. We fcarce remember, however, to have seen an inftance of two champions in the fields of controversy, each of them perfons of great eminence in the republic of letters, fo unequally matched, as the prefent opponent and his answerer :a dwarf-[we mean, quoad hoc only] affaulting a giant!

6

Whatever celebrity Mr. Bryant-for he is the Author of the Addrefs-may have juftly acquired by his former writings, particularly his New System of Ancient Mythology, he will by no means add to it by having entered into a controverfy, with the fubject of which he plainly appears to be very little acquainted: and yet he tells us, that it is a fubject which he had much confidered; and had indeed long fince, for his private fatisfaction, written down his thoughts upon it;' and further, that, on the present occafion, he formed a refolution not to be too hafty in his conclufions: but to read the Treatife on Neceffity over with that attention and care, which every thing deferves that proceeds from a perfon fo juftly celebrated as Dr. Prieftley.'

That

That Mr. Bryant does not fully poffefs the ground of the controversy in which he has thought proper to engage, is evi dent from his very outfet. He thinks that he is oppofing Dr. Priestley, and convicting him of inconfiftency and paradox, when he reprefents him as maintaining the doctrine of philofophical neceffity, and yet at the fame time allowing that men have the power of doing whatever they will or pleafe.' Dr. Priestley certainly not only acknowledges, but maintains that a man can do what he pleafes or wills: but he has likewise repeatedly added to this pofition another, which is—that a man wills after a certain and definite manner, in definite circumstances:or, that the will itself is previously and neceffarily determined by fome caufe external to itself, or by the strongest motive.

Thus the very foundation of the doctrine of philosophical neceffity is evidently not understood by Mr. Bryant, after all the confideration which he has bestowed on the fubject. He fometimes fpeaks the language of the Neceffarian, in the same paragraph where he is fupporting the oppofite doctrine of philofophical liberty. No wonder, then, that we often find him hefitating and lofing himfelf.- Permit me here, fays he, when treating on this very fubject, to make a fhort paufe, and confider what has been faid; for, being rather fhort-fighted, I am apt to overlook the clue, which should lead me, and am foon loft in a maze."

In fact, Mr. Bryant has not caught hold of the principal link in the chain of Dr. Prieftley's argument; nor does he appear to have availed himfelf, in the leaft degree, of the lights which he might have derived from a perufal of the writings of Dr. Priestley's preceding opponents on this fubject. We know not whether we fhall throw any new light on this branch of the argument by juft obferving, that the defenders of the doctrine of philofophical liberty confider the will as an uncontrolled agent, and as the beginner of motion: whereas the will, at the fame time that it is active with refpect to the exertions of the mind and body, is, according to the Neceffarian doctrine, paffive with regard to the motives that determine it; the ftrongeft of which does, and must prevail. Though it has been faid, that activity and paffiveness are incompatible in the fame subject; yet there appears to us no contradiction in conceiving a thing as an agent, or as acting upon one substance, in one particular manner, while itself is acted upon by another fubftance, in another manner :-in the fame way as the heart is an agent, in propelling the blood through the arterial fyftem; and accordingly is popularly confidered as the original caufe of all the vital motions: while, at the fame time, it is paffive in obeying the nervous influence, from which, in fact, it derives its activity.

The

The Reader perhaps will be better enabled to judge of Mr Bryant's fitnefs to enter the lifts, on this particular queflion, against so formidable an opponent; and of Dr. Priestley's manner of repelling the feeble attack, with a pufh of his little finger; if we tranfcribe two or three paffages noticed by Dr. Priestley, which occur towards the beginning of Mr. Bryant's Addrefs, and annex the Doctor's obfervations on them.

Mr. Bryant fays, that upon the most diligent inquiry, he is perfuaded that mankind have a felf-determining power; and that, upon mature deliberation, and juft reafoning, they can make a free and proper election, and can not only chufe, but reject, as fhall feem beft to their own judgment."

But pray, good Sir,' fays Dr. P. in anfwer, did any Neceffarian ever deny this? If he did, he must have been fuch a defender of neceffity, as you are of liberty. A Neceffarian is fo far from denying this, that his principles abfolutely require it. For, according to them, fomething that may be called judgment neceffarily precedes volition, and the volition is always directed by that judgment, being determined by what to it appears preferable at the time.'

Again, who ever afferted,' fays Mr. B. that the mind was hever under any influence, and that the will was not determined by motives?What,' anfwers Dr. P. could any Neceffarian fay more to his own purpofe? For my own part, I cannot exprefs my own principles in more proper, or more decifive language.'

The great queftion, Mr. B. afterwards adds, is, whether thefe motives are coercive: whether this influence be irresistible; fo that the mind has no power of election, and cannot by any means reject.-You will tell me, that this is owing to a ftronger motive, which overcomes the weaker. This I fhall not controvert.-Then, fays Dr. Priestley, let me tell you, Sir, there is nothing in the whole bufines that you can controvert, that will be to any purpofe.'

Mr. B. immediately fubjoins- All I know is, that whatever influences there may be, we are bleffed with reafon, to confider and to judge; and with a power to reject and to chuse.'

But does any Neceffarian, Dr. Priestley replies, deny that man is endued with reafon? So far is he from denying that confideration and judgment precede volition, and direct it, that this is the very cacumftance that his fcheme requires, in order to exclude felf-determination, which it effectually does. Indeed, Sir, here you are got upon clear Neceffarian ground; though, being unfortunately bewildered, as you truly fay of yourself, you know not where you are.'

Towards the end of his Addrefs, Mr. Bryant, after relating the opinion of Cicero with refpect to the controversy between Chryfippus

Chryfippus and his opponents, fubjoins fo that, contrary to your (Dr. P.'s) notion, a thing which at any time happened, might have happened otherwife, if we had chofen it.'- Now, this alfo, fays Dr. P. is fo far from being contrary to my notion, as you call it, that it is perfectly agreeable to my notion. For it implies, that, to have happened otherwife, a different choice must have been made; and you are as far as I can be from fuppofing that choice is not determined by motives.'

Thefe fhort extracts fufficiently fhew how unprepared Mr. Bryant was to engage in this controverfy. We fhall, however, tranfcribe a longer extract from his performance; as a fpecimen of one of the Author's arguments, or rather of his oratory, in favour of the felf-determining power afcribed to man, by the advocates for liberty. Before our philofophical Readers have got to the end of it, they will wonder that the Author fhould have overlooked the extenfive influence of the principle of affociation; noticed fo long ago by Locke, and fince fo extenfively and fuccefsfully employed, in inveftigating the theory of the human mind, by many metaphyfical writers, and particularly by Hartley.

Addreffing himself to Dr. Prieftley, Mr. Bryant fays- You indeed tell me, Sir, that every thought is predetermined: and in every act of volition I am forcibly impelled: fo that I could not in any inftance have made my election otherwise than I have done. Every movement of the mind, you fay [Locke had faid this, not Dr. P.], arifes from a preffing uneafiness. This theory may appear fpecious; but it feems to run counter to all experience and the contrary, if I mistake not, is felf-evident. I fit at this inftant at my cafe, in a calm and dispaffionate state of mind; as you are pleafed, Sir, to recommend. I perceive myself at full liberty, and know not of any external impulfe to determine me either in my thoughts or actions. I purpose to move: but antecedently examine, whether I am under any bias, or neceffity: or directed by any foreign power. I find none. In the vaft feries of caufes, fo often mentioned, I do not perceive one, that will have any fhare in the effect which I am about to produce. The whole originates in myself, whether I move my body; or my arm; or am content with extending a finger. The like appears with respect to my thoughts. I am here equally free; and among the various objects which are ready at my call, I arbitrarily chufe thofe to which my fancy leads.me. You tell me, that every thought is an effect; and that it is connected with a rrior idea, by which it was produced. I cannot fee any fuch uniform affinity or correfpondence: and to give a proof of my liberty and independence, I will for once expatiate freely, and produce a feries of unconnected ideas from my own imagination. I accordingly, without any preffing un

eafinefs,