together; much lefs, refolve how to vote, till they hear the reasons on both fides. The electors must neceffarily be in the fame ignorance; and the law which should oblige them to give particular orders to their knights and burgeffes, in relation to every vote, would make the decifion of the most important affairs to depend upon the judgment of those, who know nothing of the matters in queftion, and by that means caft the nation into the utmoft danger of the most inextricable confufion. This can never be the intention of that law, which is "fanctio "recta," and feeks only the good of thofe that live under it. The forefight therefore of fuch a mischief can never impair the liberties of the nation, but establish them.

SECT. XLV.

The legislative power is always arbitrary, and not to be trufted in the hands of any who are not bound to obey the laws they make.

IF it be objected, that I am a defender of arbitrary powers, I confefs I cannot comprehend how any fociety can be established or fubfift without them; for the establishment of government is an arbitrary act, wholly depending upon the will of men. The particular forms and conftitutions, the whole feries of the magiftracy, together with the measure of power given to every one, and the rules by which they are to exercise their charge, are fo alfo. Magna Charta, which comprehends our ancient

laws,

laws, and all the subsequent statutes, were not sent from heaven, but made according to the will of men. If no men could have a power of making laws, none could ever have been made; for all that are or have been in the world, except thofe given by God to the Ifraelites, were made by them; that is, they have exercised an arbitrary power in making that to be law which was not, or annulling that which was. The various laws and governments, that are or have been in feveral ages and places, are the product of various opinions in those who had the power of making them. This muft neceffarily be, unless a general rule be fet to all; for the judgments. of men will vary, if they are left to their liberty; and the variety that is found among them, fhews they are fubject to no rule but that of their own reafon, by which they fee what is fit to be embraced or avoided, according to the feveral circumftances under which they live. The authority that judges of thefe circumstances is arbitrary, and the legislators fhew themselves to be more or lefs wife and good, as they do rightly, or not rightly, exercise this power. The difference therefore between good and ill governments is not, that those of one fort have an atbitrary power which the others have not; for they all have it; but that thofe which are well conftituted, place this power fo as it may be beneficial to the people, and fet fuch rules as are hardly to be tranfgreffed; whilft thofe of the other fort fail in one or both these points, Some alfo through want of courage, fortune, or ftrength, may have been oppreffed by the violence of ftrangers, or fuffered a corrupt party to rife up within themselves, and

by

by force or fraud to ufurp a power of impofing what they pleased. Others, being fottish, cowardly, and bafe, have fo far erred in the foundations, as to give up themselves.

the will of one or few men, who, turning all to their own profit or pleafure, have been juft in nothing but in afing fuch a people like beafts. Some have placed weak defences against the lufts of those they have advanced to the highest places, and given them opportunities of arrogating more power to themselves than the law allows. Where any of these errors are committed, the government may be cafy for a while, or at least tolerable, whilst it continues uncorrupted; but it cannot be lasting. When the law may be eafily or fafely overthrown, it will be attempted. Whatever virtue may be in the firs magiftrates, many years will not pafs before they come to be corrupted; and their fucceffors, deflecting from their integrity, will feize upon the ill-guarded prey. They will then not only govern by will, but by that irregular will, which turns the law, that was made for the public good, to the private advantage of one or few men. It is not my intention to enumerate the feveral ways that have been taken to effect this; or to fhew what governments have deficcted from the right, and how far. But I think I may juftly fay, that an arbitrary power was never well placed in any men, and their fucceffors, who were not obliged to obey the laws they thould make. This was well understood by our Saxon ancestors: they made laws in their affemblies and councils of the nation, but all those who propofed or affented to those laws, as foon as the affemblies was diffolved, were comprehended under

the

the power of them, as well as other men. They could do nothing to the prejudice of the nation, that would not be as hurtful to thofe who were present, and their pos terity, as to thofe who by many accidents might be ab-fent. The Normans entered into, and continued in the fame path. Our parliaments at this day are in the fame condition. They may make prejudicial wars, ignominious treaties, and unjust laws: yet when the feffion is ended, they must bear the burden as much as others; and, when they die, the teeth of their children will be fet on edge with the four grapes they have caten. But it is hard to delude or corrupt fo many: men do not in matters of the highest importance yield to flight temptations. No man ferves the devil for nothing: fmall wages will not content those who expofe themselves to perpetual infamy, and the hatred of a nation for betraying their country. Our kings had not wherewithal to corrupt many till these laft twenty years, and the treachery of a few was not enough to pafs a law. The union of many was not eafily wrought, and there was nothing to tempt them to endeavour it; for they could make little advantage during the feffion, and were to be loft in the mafs of the people, and prejudiced by their own laws, as foon as it was ended. They could not in a fhort time reconcile their various interefts or paffions, fo as to combine together against the public; and the former kings never went about it. We are beholden to Hyde, Clifford and Danby, for all that has been done of that kind. They found a parliament full of lewd young men chofen by à furious people in fpite to the puritans, whofe severity had

diftafted

diftafted them.

The weakest of all minifters had wit enough to understand, that such as these might be easily deluded, corrupted, or bribed. Some were fond of their seats in parliament, and delighted to domineer over their neighbours by continuing in them: others preferred the cajoleries of the court before the honour of performing their duty to the country that employed them. Some fought to relieve their ruined fortunes, and were most forward to give the king a vast revenue, that from thence they might receive penfions: others were glad of a temporary protection against their creditors. Many knew not what they did when they annulled the triennial act; voted the militia to be in the king; gave him the excife, cuftoms, and chimney-money; made the act for corporations, by which the greatest part of the nation was brought under the power of the worst men in it; drunk or fober paffed the five-mile act, and that for uniformity in the church. This emboldened the court to think of making parliaments to be the inftruments of our flavery, which had in all ages paft been the firmeft pillars of our liberty. There might have been perhaps a possibility of preventing this pernicious mifchief in the conftitution of our government. But our brave ancestors could never think their posterity would degenerate into fuch baseness to fell themselves, and their country: but how great foever the danger may be, it is lefs than to put all into the hands of one man, and his minifters: the hazard of being ruined by thofe who muft perifh with us, is not fo much to be feared, as by one who may enrich and Strengthen himself by our deftruction. It is better to

depend