and unity of purpose between France and Sardinia. The discourteous reception of Baron Hubner, the Austrian minister, by the Emperor at the beginning of the year-the family alliance concluded by the somewhat hasty marriage of Prince Napoleon with the Princess Clothilde the visit of Count Cavour to Paris, and his subsequent tone of defiance-all these, coupled with the unusual amount of military preparation, and other symptoms, show very clearly that the contracting parties had determined that the present year should be made memorable by an Italian campaign. Whether the confederacy is as yet confined to these two powers, or includes another whose appearance in the field would make confusion worse confounded, is as yet unknown.

Assuming, then, the fact of concert and preparation, what possibly could be the motive of France and Sardinia except the hope of territorial aggrandisement by means of conquest? Nations are usually selfish in their undertakings, and unwilling to go to war when their personal interests are not directly involved. That has always been the case; but in modern times the aversion to anything resembling Quixotic enterprise is much stronger than it was before. All men know that a nation involved in war must sustain great injury as regards its commerce and industrial products. Taxation is increased, loans are contracted which become a perpetual burden, and the strength of the population is impaired by the constant demand for soldiery to fill up the losses occasioned by battle and disease. In proportion to the prosperity of a nation is its real aversion to war. Substantial interests are identified with the maintenance of peace; and governments are popular or otherwise according as they exert themselves to preserve it. There are instances, no doubt, of interference by a great nation on behalf of an oppressed people struggling for their liberties; but these are few in number, and remote in point of time. The States of Holland were left almost without aid to fight their own battle against the ruling Spaniard and the Inquisition; and what assistance was

vouchsafed them from France, we granted only on the condition the the crown of the Netherlands shezli be settled on the Duke of Anjou. The dismemberment of Poland was permitted without any interference on the part either of England or France and though much sympathy was excited throughout Europe by the he roic efforts of the Poles, in 1831, te emancipate themselves from the yoke of Russia, not a finger was raised in their behalf. Moreover, it must be remembered that in no case can active interference be justified, unless the quarrel between rulers and the rul has taken the decided form of an ap peal to arms. There may be discotent and dissatisfaction in a country without an actual revolt. There may be revolts so ill-planned and poorly supported that they are at once suppressed with very little exertion. But these do not call for foreign interference or interposition-indeed, interference in such cases would be a gross violation of the law of nations Were it otherwise, peace could net be maintained in Europe for a single year, because, unfortunately, there is no lack of malcontents in every courtry. If the voice of the discontented is to be taken as a sufficient voucher for the tyranny of a government, ever Britain might be made liable to admonitory remarks or threatened interference from abroad. Not many years have elapsed since the Chartists in England clamorously demanded a new constitution; and a numerous section of the Irish people declared that nothing would content them save emancipation from the Saxon rule, and, so late as 1848, sent deputies to the revolutionary government of France to request the favour of an invasion! So stringent is the rule which limits foreign interference, and which is founded on wise considerations both of right and expediency, that even the tyrannical proceedings of the King of Naples with regard to his subjects, which were universally felt as an outrage on humanity, did not provoke us to an armed demonstration.

Such being the law of nations, what justification, we ask, can France and Sardinia plead for appearing against Austria in arms? There is no revolt

vehement protestations. It is a generous fault, if it be one, and certainly is preferable to the Machiavellian method of considering every man a rogue until he has proved himself to be otherwise. But we must not suffer ourselves to be hoodwinked, or allow our confidence to be abused. We have seen enough of Louis Napoleon to be aware that he cannot be trusted. His career has been tortuous and crooked, he is a practised and profound dissembler, and he has, in the Idees Napoleoniennes, written in 1839, long before he had a chance of empire, developed an aggressive policy for the guidance of France which ought surely to put us upon our guard. We have also had ample experience of the machinations of Russia, of her secresy in forming plans, her obstinacy in adhering to them, and her ingenuity in carrying them out. A separate alliance therefore between France and Russia, the two great intriguing powers of Europe, of whatever nature it may be, must necessarily cause anxiety both in Britain and in Germany. France and Russia combined would be in a position to assert, though they might not be able to achieve, both maritime and military supremacy; and we must not forget that such a combination is not a new thing. It has happened more than once already.

It is, however, by no means certain that Russia has engaged herself to France so deeply, for it is questionable whether her doing so would be a wise political step. We believe that she was deeply offended by the conduct of Austria, in not giving her active assistance during the Turkish war, an assistance which she considered herself well entitled to expect, in return for the services rendered in 1849. But great states are rarely revengeful, at least as individuals are. Accommodation is better than rupture; and there is that community of interest, of sentiment, and of political theory between the governments of Russia and Austria, which must render a permanent misunderstanding a serious calamity to both. An alliance of Russia with France, so intimate that the military force of the former should be stationed on

the frontiers of Austria for the ere dent purpose of favouring the des of the latter, could not be otherva interpreted, both here and in Ge many, than as the token of a dee laid conspiracy, and from that b we might abandon all hope of escap ing from a general conflict. For cannot imagine such an active ance except for aggressive purposes neither can we suppose that Rus would interfere without being temp ed by the prospect of some speca advantage to herself. We shed then be forced to conclude that Ru sia was about to recommence her st tempt on Turkey under cover of the war in Italy, and that her military demonstration on the Austrian fromtier was intended to prolong the war, and indirectly to aid the French arms by distracting the attention of their antagonists. It is quite pos sible that some such game may e played, or at least be in contemplstion; and we must keep that contingency in view. In the councils of Europe at this moment there is so much moral obliquity, that we do not know in whom we can repose confidence, to whose honesty we may trust. The greed of empire, so long restrained, is now manifested and almost openly avowed by states of magnitude and power. Nation is arrayed against nation, and kingdon against kingdom, not, as of yore, for the sake of vindicating religious freedom, or of asserting claims of here ditary succession, but for a trial of brute strength, robbery being the object of one party, and dogged resis tance the determination of the other.

It is of great consequence that we should not allow ourselves, through vague sympathies for what are called oppressed nationalities, or aspirations after freedom which are too often utopian in their character, to take a false view of the real position of affairs on the Continent, and the animus of the different parties. Let it be conceded that the rule of Austria is despotic-so, it may be said, is that of almost every other country Our own tree of liberty was of slow growth. It did not start up suddenly in full luxuriance, like the gourd of Jonah-had it done so, we may fairly conclude that it soon

would have withered away. Constitutions conjured up for the nonce, like those of the Abbé Sièyes, have no real vitality. They are raised in the morning, and ere sundown they have wholly perished. So has it I been with the many constitutions which distracted France has known. None of them have proved permanent; none of them have been destined to endure. Like trees which have been hastily cut down, transported to another place, and stuck in to the earth without roots, to serve as a temporary avenue for some pageant or procession, they have drooped and died, and become firewood; and now, in their place, we behold indeed a tree, but it is the rooted upas of absolutism. Some of us in this country are far too apt to take for granted that constitutional freedom is a necessary consequence of successful revolt. Alas! experience has shown us but too plainly that in the majority of cases the actual result is anarchy, and the establishment of a mob despotism infinitely more dangerous and destructive than that of a single man. These are things, however, which our enthusiasts are slow to perceive, or perceiving will not allow. They sympathise with every revolt, without inquiring whether or not the revolt has been justified by oppression on the part of the Government; and they express their abstract detestation of despotism, without reflecting that despotism is the stock best adapted to receive the graft of constitutional liberty. And never yet did the nation fit for freedom fail to attain to it, not by violent spasmodic efforts, but by that gradual spread of intelligence and irresistible power of opinion which even sceptres cannot control, and which, while it renders the freeman capable of using rightly his great privilege, inculcates that respect for law and order without which liberty is nothing but a

name.

Some of us may think it a hard thing and unjust that Austria should have rule over any part of Italy, and may find fault with the political arrangements which gave her the command of Lombardy. That point, were we to take it up, would open to us a very wide field for discussion.

In the first place, we should have to consider whether by natural law or the ordinances of God it is permissible that two or more nations of distinct origin and with different languages should be subject to the sway of one ruler. Surely it is too late to agitate such a question as that, more especially as the British empire affords us many instances of a similar union. In the second place, we should have to enter thoroughly into the examination of title, which might require the production of a treatise as lengthy and intricate as Mr Carlyle's dissertation on the rise of the House of Brandenburg. We venture to think that there is no necessity whatever for going beyond the fact that Austria is in prescriptive possession of Lombardy. She received it, with the consent of all the European powers, more than forty years ago, and has since held it undisturbed, save by the treacherous attempt of the King of Sardinia subsequent to 1848. No better title could be given; and if this be admitted, and we do not see how it can be denied, surely it is great folly in any of us to call in question her rights. If a general congress cannot settle boundaries, and give a valid title to the possession of provinces, what can it effect? What is the purport of its meeting, or the use of its deliberations? Without such a solemn settlement, bearing the character of a general European compact, there would be a perpetual contest for dominion, and the sword would never be sheathed. Do not let us undervalue or contemn these treaties, for they have been productive of vast benefits to us. They have preserved us from wholesale war for more than forty years, within which space of time more progress has been made in the arts and sciences, and more social improvements planned and executed, than men of the last generation could have imagined in their wildest dreams. They have served, at all events, to curb ambition, if they have not wholly restrained it; and even now they furnish us with a clear means of ascertaining who are the aggressors in this fresh international quarrel.

There is, we observe, a tone of poco

curantism assumed of late by some influential journals of the Liberal sort, upon which, as it is calculated to mislead, we must necessarily offer a remark. They maintain that, under no conceivable circumstances, will it be necessary for Britain to take part in the conflict-that this is merely a struggle between tyrants, which they must be left to fight out by themselves that while they exhaust themselves by war, we shall rapidly become more prosperous by peace and that we have no interest whatever in opposing any kind of change in the balance of power on the continent of Europe.

That is, no doubt, a comfortable creed; but, like most creeds composed entirely on the soothing principle of embodying our hopes and wishes only, we apprehend that it is fallacious. Nations cannot be indifferent to what is going on around them. War, like the flames on an Indian prairie, or a conflagration in a crowded city, has a tendency to spread

"Et tua res agitur, paries cum proximus

ardet."

Therefore we must take good heed lest the fire should extend beyond certain limits. So long as it is confined to one locality which is strongly fenced without, there is hope that it may exhaust its fury there without injury to the neighbouring tenements; and so long as Italy remains the sole seat of war, and no other belligerents declare themselves, this country is under no obligation to declare itself on either side. Our Ministers discharged one part of their duty, and a most important one, though it was not crowned with success, by making every effort to prevent the outbreak: another part yet remains, and that is, to use every means of persuasion and remonstrance with the undeclared powers, in order to restrain them from rushing into the fray. Blind indeed must the man be who has no perception of the danger which threatens the whole of Europe, and which can only be averted, under God's grace, by extreme caution and forbearance. There is danger in more quarters than one. The appearance of Russia acting in concert with

France, even though her operation were confined merely to march troops to the Gallician frontier, wo add greatly to the ferment in Ge many, and possibly compel Prus who has hitherto done good serve by restraining the more fiery and patient section of the Germanic Cafederation, to assume an offensive attitude, or at least to give her conser hitherto withheld, to the stationing d a federal army of observation on the Rhine, which certainly would be fo lowed by a similar movement on the part of France. The policy annon ced by Prussia is shortly this:-Sh declines to interfere on behalf of the Austrian non-federal dominions. Ste will not take the initiative, by mak ing a demonstration on the Rhenist frontier; but at the same time, she declares, without hesitation or restraint that she will take the field in case the territory of the Confederation should be menaced on any side whatever. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of this cautious though rese lute policy on the part of Prussia at the present crisis; for the war party! in Germany is very strong, and seve ral of the states seem inclined to arm in Austria's quarrel, indepen dent of federal considerations. The representatives of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Darmstadt, have been urging the Diet to order the immedia movement of three corps-d'armé towards the Rhine; a proposition which, if agreed to, would, in our opinion, be construed by the French nation into a challenge. Besides this, there is another danger very likely to arise_contingently on the success of the French and Sardinian arms. The latter could hardly effect their object of driving the Austrians out of Lombardy, without entering some part of recognised German territory. It may, indeed, be said, that as such territory will presumably be Austrian, no new complication can arise, because the bellige rents continue the same; but those who argue thus know little of the spirit which animates the German Bund; for as certainly as the roll of thunder follows the flash of lightning, will Germany rise in arms so