take a bill from Palmerston, even though it should embody his own propositions. The subject of reform, he hesitates not to say, exclusively belongs to him. It is his peculiar province, with which no one else may interfere. He forgets that, although he was the nominal proposer of oue reform bill, which was passed twentyseven years ago, he has since been the real deviser of two abortive measures, which were repudiated by all parties, and are now repudiated by himself! Palmerston will not take a bill from Russell, both because it is not convenient to allow the latter an opportunity of replacing his squandered political capital, and because he, in common with the Whig magnates, has a serious and well-founded dread of the ultimate consequences of democratic ascendancy, and will in nowise ally himself with the Manchester Liberals, to gain whose support Russell is willing to make almost any concession. The Manchester men, on the other hand, make no secret of their reforming views, which may be briefly stated as comprehending the suppression of all minor boroughs and constituencies, the erection of electoral districts which will give the vast preponderance of power to large towus to the detriment of the counties, secret voting, and a qualification so low as to admit the greater portion of the working-classes. Which of these sections is to prevail? Suppose that Lord Derby were displaced, and Lord John Russell made premier on the condition that he should carry through a satisfactory reform bill, what would be the fate of his measure? It would be opposed by the Conservatives and Palmerstonian Whigs as being too ultra in its character, and by the Radicals as not being sufficiently democratic for the latter party have emphatically declared against instalments, and openly avow that they will oppose every bill which is not based upon their principles. If Lord Palmerston were made premier on the same condition, he would be opposed by the Russellites and the Radicals, and could not, after his conduct on this recent occasion, expect to receive support from the Conservatives. Against the Conservatives and Whigs

combined the Radicals are utterly powerless.

We say therefore that the Opposition, being in such a state of anarchy that they could not form a government capable of carrying a reform bill, was not justified in making any kind of factious demonstration. They might have defeated the ministerial bill fairly and openly, or they might have tried to amend it; but they acted unpatriotically and unfairly, we shall even say disloyally, in attempting to overthrow the Government when they were thoroughly aware that they could not provide a substitute.

And their conduct will appear the more odious when we consider what a time they selected for making this offensive party move. The continent of Europe was menaced by a terrific thunderstorm. France, the doubtful ally of Britain, was arming to the teeth, not certainly for the purpose of preserving the general peace. Notoriously she was the backer of Sardinia, a small but ambitious state, inflamed by the desire and stimulated by the hope of large territorial aggrandisement. In Count Cavour, King Victor Emmanuel possesses a minister of remarkable dexterity. Fertile in resource, far-seeing, and a profound calculator of chances, we regard him as one of the cleverest diplomatists of our time, but also, considering the situation which he holds, as one of the most dangerous enemies to the maintenance of the tranquillity of Europe. So far as regards the internal reforms of Sardinia, and its attitude in opposition to Papal supremacy, we admit that he is entitled to great credit; but Count Cavour was not satisfied with being the minister of a constitutional and well-regulated monarchy of limited dimensions, which might be contemplated as a model by the subjects of despotic states, and cited as a proof that even in Italy good government and uncoerced tranquillity might be realised. His sphere of action was too small. He conceived and nourished the hope that his master might one day drive the Austrians out of Lombardy, mediatise or absorb the smaller states, and assume the iron crown of Italy. But to do this, Sar

dinia of herself was powerless. She could not hope to prevail against the force and discipline of Austria, even though all Italy should be in a state of insurrection. Therefore it was necessary to make great alliances, and to purchase future support by exertions of no ordinary kind. The war in which Britain and France combined to baffle the aggressive attempts of Russia upon Turkey afforded the desired opportunity. Austria had hung back, or rather had taken temporary possession of the Principalities for her own behoof, if circumstances would admit, without assisting the Western powers, while she assumed a hostile attitude towards the Czar. To the amazement of Europe, Sardinia all at once appeared as a belligerent power. She not only declared war against Russia, without the slightest pretext, personal to herself, for doing so; but she sent a contingent to the Crimea, in order to support which she was forced to enter the money market as a borrower. A remarkable instance of devotion, for which it is difficult, nay, impossible to find a parallel! The absorption of Turkey by Russia could not affect Sardinia, even contingently. Only giants were in the field. States of medium dimensions were but too glad to escape from the strife; yet here was a valiant dwarf, praying to participate in the Gigantomachia, with as little power of rendering actual service to his confederates, as Sir Geoffrey Hudson when he was pleased to vouch a free protection to the Peverils.

It would be ungrateful to treat lightly the promptitude which Sardinia displayed on that occasion; at the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the motive, which clearly was a desire to secure the future co-operation of France and Britain in schemes for enlarging her boundaries at the expense of Austria. The Emperor of France, it would appear, was well enough disposed to adopt the Sardinian views, in so far at least as regards rupture with the Austrians. What his ultimate ideas on the subject of Italian partition may be, admits of serious doubt. That Italy should become a mere appanage of France was the settled conviction of

the first Napoleon, and we have no reason to suppose that the third of that name entertains an opposite opinion. The marriage of his cousin with the Princess Clothilde, showed what value he set on the Sardinian alliance; and then followed that extensive warlike preparation, which has continued down to the present hour, and which most naturally has given an alarm to the whole of Europe. If peace was to be preserved, that could only be through the efforts and firm attitude of the British Government, for no other power had a voice potential enough to restrain. Most strenuously and skilfully did the Ministry apply themselves to this difficult and all-important task; and yet it was in the very midst of their negotiations, any interruption of which would instantly have precepitated the war, that the Liberal party attempted to upset the Government!

We call upon the great electoral body to keep these things in view, and not be fed astray by empty declamation about the importance of immediate reform. That question is not one whit more important now than it has been any time during these last twenty years. The nation is not pressing for it. No material interest can be promoted by its immediate solution. We have other things to look to, which absolutely concern the safety of the nation, and must be instantly taken in hand.

It seems more than probable that peace cannot be preserved. Sardinia evidently is bent on war, and counts on the support of France. So far from showing any willingness to disarm or reluctance to enter into hostilities, she is at this moment, and has been for some time back, receiving, enrolling, and organising troops of insurgents from the minor Italian states, who have flocked to Turin on the assurance that a speedy opportunity would be afforded them of rioting in Austrian blood. All the world knows that the revenues of Sardinia are not such as to warrant a large expenditure; and we cannot believe that a sagacious financier like Cavour would have gone so far for the sake of mere demonstration. He could hardly expect that Austria would be overawed, and induced to

give up her treaties or her possessions by any show of preparation. He must have anticipated resistance and defiance, and must also have received direct assurance of support from France, or rather from its ruler. For ourselves, we do not hesitate to say that the fearful responsibility of having kindled a European war, must, in the event of that calamity occurring now, rest with Louis Napoleon. It is of the utmost consequence that the people of England should know who has been the originator of this disturbance, which, ere these pages meet the reader's eye, may have become an awful calamity. We learn from a telegraphic message, that war is likely to be precipitated without any Congress whatever being held, in consequence of a formal demand made by Austria on Sardinia that the latter power shall disband and disperse the legionaries whom she has received into her territory, and that, failing her agreement to do so, war will be immediately declared. We lament that such a step should have been taken, but we are not therefore prepared to denounce Austria as the violator of the peace of Europe. From the very first we have not felt any confidence in the power of a Congress to allay the elements of strife. It might have done so, had all the parties been sincere. But we more than doubt, we utterly disbelieve, the sincerity of the Emperor of the French. For many weeks al! Europe has been ringing with his military preparations. His troops have been moved towards the frontier, and concentrated in formidable masses. The army of Algeria has been brought over to France. The arsenals are busy, rations and clothing have been contracted for, and every disposition has been made which a great military power would deem necessary for the opening of a difficult campaign. Never indeed, according to universal report, has France so rapidly and effectively brought forth its military power. For this unparalleled preparation there must be some adequate cause. It cannot be from fear that Austria would invade Sardinia, for Austria has not been the aggressor. It can only be to support Sar

dinia; or rather, under that pretext, to invade the Austrian dominions. No Congress, meeting under such circumstances, could have prevented the catastrophe; and our deliberate opinion is that no human influence would have availed to restrain Louis Napoleon from prosecuting his designs upon Italy. No doubt he was willing-ray, desirous, to prolong the negotiations, and to keep alive the hope that the quarrel might be settled by arbitration; for it is understood that his preparations, though far advanced, are not completed, and that three weeks must elapse before he can take the field. Austria is well aware of this, and has declined waiting until France is ready to cope with her. Hence her summons to Sardinia, and the probability of an immediate conflict.

At such a time it is of vital importance to the welfare of the country, that her Majesty's ministers should receive the general support of the nation; for we cannot disguise our apprehension that before the termination of this war, which now may be regarded as inevitable, Great Britain may be compelled to take an active part. That, we may safely assume, will not be done rashly, nor can any party in this country desire it, for our real interests are identified with neutrality, and no strong sympathies are enlisted on behalf of any of the belligerents. Austria's protectorate of and separate treaties with the minor Italian potentates, by virtue of which she garrisons their towns, and supplies them with a foreign soldiery, have been generally objected to; but no one denies her right to the Lombardo-Venetian provinces which were guaranteed to her by the Treaty of Vienna. Her title to them is indeed the same as that in virtue of which Sardinia holds Genoa, which, from being a republic, was annexed to Piedmont, for a purpose which ought not to be forgotten.

Italy," says the historian of Europe, while treating of the Congress of Vienna, "Italy presented in some respects a more complicated field for diplomacy. The cession, indeed, of Lombardy to Austria, and of the Genoese republic to the kingdom of Piedmont, was at once agreed to

without any difficulty, despite the earnest remonstrances of the citizens of the latter commonwealth, who passionately desired the restoration of their ancient form of government: so strongly was the necessity felt of strengthening the States on the French frontier, and, above all, the kingdom of Sardinia, in whose hands the keys of the most important passes from France into Italy were placed." Sardinia, therefore, would be guilty of a gross act of treachery and a public crime to Europe, if she were to conspire with France, as some think she has been doing for her future aggrandisement, by despoiling Austria of Lombardy and Venice, in return for the desertion of her post as a sentinel between France and Italy. Had Austria interfered in any way with the rights of Sardinia, the sympathies of the British public would undoubtedly have been enlisted on behalf of the smaller State; but as there has not been even a shadow of such interference, we cannot regard the present attitude of Sardinia as otherwise than dangerous and deplorable; and if, as is most likely, she should be the first to suffer, Britain certainly will not interfere to shield her from the consequences of her folly. With France, we need not say, there is no kind of sympathy whatever. It is a sad thing that we must identify a great, gallant, ingenious, and highly-cultivated people with the acts of a single man, and regard his will, his designs, and his motions, as being those of a mighty nation. Yet this is what France has earned by breaking down the ancient landmarks, by abolishing aristocracy, elevating democracy, and practically carrying into effect those very doctrines which Mr Bright and his followers advocate. The inevitable results of manhood suffrage and electoral districts are the destruction of constitutional government, anarchy, and an iron despotism maintained by the military arm, to which millions are fain to submit, even at the sacrifice of their real freedom, their vested rights, and the utterance of their honest opinion. L'Etat, c'est moi, is the maxim on which Louis Napoleon lives and rules; and although we are firmly convinced that the great

majority of the French people, comprehending the industrial and commercial classes, who cannot but be sufferers, are secretly averse to war, they are as effectually deprived of the power of utterance as if their tongues had been torn from the root. Therefore, when we speak of France, we do actually designate that mysterious and dangerous man in whose hands real France is a puppet; and with him, we know full well, no section of the British public will sympathise. It is always presumptuous for the uninspired to prophesy; but if we may argue from experience and from historical parallels, the step which Louis Napoleon is now meditating will lead to his utter discomfiture, and to the extinction of his slender dynasty. He cannot hope to confine the war to Italy. He cannot even make war in Italy without violating the Treaty of Vienna; and he can hardly expect that Europe will stand idly by, and allow him to ravage and annex kingdoms and principalities without combining to stay the plague. Does he come as a liberator to restore freedom to Italy? Where is the freedom of France? Will he who, in his own dominions, has stifled the liberty of the press, and extinguished even the vestige of representative legislation, bestow those boons upon aliens, should he become their lord and master? Napoleon and freedom! Besotted indeed must the Italians be, if such a cry shall arise among them.

The country may well congratulate itself that, at such a crisis as the present, Lord Derby is at the head of the Government. The Italian difficulties, which for some time past have caused much apprehension, and which now have eventuated in a crisis, were rendered more complicated and difficult of extrication by the policy of Lord Palmerston, who held out hopes to the Italians which never could be realised. We do not mean to deny to that eminent statesman the credit of a sincere wish that Italy should be better governed; but we demur to the means which he adopted, because they were calculated to give the Italians a false impression, and to make them believe