fequently muft moft clearly difcern the effential differences in things; and who is at perfect liberty to act from what motive he pleases; for fuch a being to neglect, or refufe to act agreeably to the nature, and the relations of things, and to make mere capricious humour (if I may fo speak) the rule and measure of his actions; for fuch an one to command for commanding fake, and not becaufe what he requires is fit, and proper to be commanded; for fuch an one to love and value, hate and defpife, either perfons or things, without regarding the fuitableness or unfuitablenefs of the perfons, or the things themselves, these are demonstrations of the want of wisdom and goodness in fuch a being, and yet this is the cafe, with refpect to God, fuppofing true religion to be founded upon his arbitrary will and pleasure, as aforefaid. God can, with regard to his natural liberty and power, act arbitrarily with his creatures in matters of religion, that is, with respect to their duty and his acceptance; and fo he can act the part of a weak and childish, or of an evil and vicious being. But he cannot act thus, and preferve his moral character; he cannot perform fuch a part, and yet be a wife and good being; because the doing fo is abfolutely inconfiftent with that character. Again, Secondly, If true religion is founded on the moral fitnefs of things, then man, by his own natural abi, lity (confider'd as a man) is qualified to discover it. Man is a creature endow'd with a faculty or power we call understanding; in the exercife of which, he is capable of difcerning the effential difference betwixt good and evil, or fitnefs and unfitnefs, as they arife from, and are founded on the nature and the relations of things; which good and evil is call'd moral, as it is the object of the understanding, and is difcover'd by it only, and as it is diftinguished from that good and evil which is natural or phyfical, phyfical, which is the object of our senses, and is difcovered by them alone. Man being thus furnifh'd with the faculty of understanding, and true religion being founded on the moral fitnefs of things he muft, of course, be qualified to discover it, because it falls within the proper province of the foremention'd faculty, Let him but turn his thoughts upon himself, and confider how he is conftituted and circumftanced, and how he stands naturally related to God, and to his fellow-creatures, and then he may, with eafe, difcover and certainly know, what he must be and do, to render himself acceptable to fuch a wife and good being, as (upon the prefent fuppofition) God is allow'd to be; and what it is, in the nature of things which will make him a fuitable and proper object of divine approbation, or dislike. I fay, a man, by the exercise of his understanding, may easily know what is true religion, because it confists in acting agreeably to his nature, relations, and circumfances, as aforefaid; which agreeableness his understanding qualifies him to discover. It is true there may be cafes attended with fuch perplexing circumftances, and whofe confequences may be fo very uncertain, that it may be exceeding difficult to know what is beft and fitteft to be done. But then, even in these cases, if a man, after due examination, does that which, upon the whole, ap. pears to him to be beft, that is, what is moft for the common good, he will not fail of divine acceptance, whatever the confequence of his behaviour may be. For, as he makes wisdom and goodness the rule and measure of his actions, fo, if God is a wife and good Being (as is here fuppofed) he will approve of fuch a conduct. On the other fide. If true religion is founded on the arbitrary will of God, then man is not, by his own natural abi lity, qualify'd to discover it; he has not any foot fteps to trace, or any rule to guide him in his enquiries after it. He is, in this cafe, in a much worse condition, than the blind man is in, when in pursuit of the objects of fight; for tho' the blind man cannot discover the object fought for, by that sense, yet, poffibly, he may do it by another; whereas, in the prefent cafe, man has not any natural faculty, which can discover what is true religion, or diftinguish it from the contrary. The exercise of his understanding cannot stand him in any stead. For tho' it qualifies him to difcern, and judge of moral fubjects; yet as religion, in this cafe, is not of moral confideration (it arifing only from arbitrary pleasure) fo it does not come within the reach of this difcerning faculty. And therefore those men say right, who fay, that reafon has not any thing to do with religion; fuppofing true religion to be founded on arbitrary pleasure, and that by reafon is meant either the exercife of the foremention'd faculty, or the object of it, viz. the moral fitnefs of things. To reafon, in this cafe, is exceedingly abfurd, and is the fame, as if a man fhould attempt to distinguish colours by his ear. Reason, in the nature of the thing, cannot discover, or be at all a judge in those things which depend only on the arbitrary will of God; fuch things as thefe, as they are discoverable only by divine revelation; fo it is that alone which muft determine every thing concerning them. Which leads me to observe, Thirdly, If true religion is founded on the moral fitnefs of things, then man is naturally qualify'd to diftinguish betwixt divine revelation and delufion; at leaft, he is qualify'd to guard aga nit all fuch delufion, as is hurtful to mankind. When any thing comes forth under the character of divine revelation, our understandings qualify us to ex amine and judge, whether it is agreeable with, or contrary to the nature and the relations of things. And tho' its agreeablenefs, with the nature of things, is no certain proof that it is divine, but only that it may be fo; yet its difagreeableness therewith is a demonstration, that it cannot poffibly come from God; feeing (upon the prefent fuppofition) God makes the moral fitnefs of things the rule and measure of his actions, which such a revelation is repugnant to. For the farther illuftration of this point, I fhall offer the following cafes. Suppofe a man fhould come to me under the character of a heavenly meffenger, and should declare it to be the will of God, that I fhould love my neighbour as myself, and do unto all men, as I would they fhould do unto me (taking these general rules with their proper limitations) and that in fo doing I fhould recommend myself to divine regard? And, fuppofe this man was not fent of God, but was himself under a delufion? I examine his meffage, and find that it is right and fit, in the nature of things, that I fhould do as it requires; and that in fo doing I render my felf a fuitable fubject of divine favour: I likewife (from the fuitablenefs of the meffage) am induced to give credit to what the man declares of himfelt, viz. that he is a meffenger fent from God. Now, tho' in this latter point I am deceived, yet it is not to my hurt; and if I am prevailed upon by it, to render myself more agreeable and useful than I fhould otherwife have been, the delufion will prove a benefit to me, and to thofe I have to do withal. Again, Suppofe a man fhould come to me, and pretend himself a heavenly meffenger, as aforefaid, and fhould declare it to be the will of God, that 1 fhould afflict and grieve my fellow-creatures, without any just caufe, that is, for not agreeing with me in fome fpeculative points, which do not admit of abfolute certainty on either fide of the question; and in like cafes, where, in the nature of the thing, there is not a proper foundation for refentment; and that in fo doing I should entitle myself to divine favour? I examine this meffage, and find it really disagreeable, in the nature of things; and from hence conclude very juftly, that this meffage is not divine, and confequently that the meffenger is either deluded himself, or elfe that he is an impoftor. So that I have a plain rule to direct and guide my judgment, in diftinguishing betwixt divine revelation, and all dangerous and hurtful delufions; and therefore, as I faid before, tho' in this cafe we are not abfolutely fecure from all impofition, yet we are qualify'd to guard against all fuch as are prejudicial to mankind, as I have here fhewn. Whereas, on the other fide, If true religion is founded on arbitrary pleasure, then man is not qualify'd to diftinguish betwixt divine revelation and delufior, and confequently lies open to, and at the mercy of every impofer. The internal characters of a revelation, whether good or bad, afford no light in this cafe. For, as God makes whatever he pleases the conditions of his favour, fo the goodnefs or badness of a revelation, or of what is required by it, cannot poffibly prove it to be divine, or to be the contrary. If I should take upon me to prove a revelation to be divine, or to be otherwife, from its agreeableness with, or its being contrary to truth, juftice, goodness, &c. it would be just the fame, as if I attempted to prove that a man can fee, by giving several inftances in which it is evident that he heard; there being no more connexion betwixt juftice, goodness, &c. and arbitrary pleasure, fo as to argue from one to the other, than there is betwixt colour and found, The |