Que ce bail avait eu son exécution, et que le Demandeur en vertu d'icelui avait pris possession du dit banc, et en avait joui jusqu'au 8 Juillet, 1853, à laquelle époque les Défendeurs avaient dépossédé le Demandeur du dit banc et l'avait empêché d'un jouir.

Que le 15 Décembre, 1852, le Défendeur avait payé le second terme de son bail, et que le 28 Juin, 1853, il avait offert la somme due pour les premiers six mois de la seconde année,―qu'il réitérait cette offre et qu'il faisait dépôt du montant offert.

A cette action les Défendeurs plaidèrent par exception, que par le bail allégué par le Demandeur il avait été spécialement stipulé qu'à défaut du paiement du dit loyer, aux divers termes et époques y fixées, dès lors et aussitôt après l'expiration d'aucun des dits termes, le dit bail serait et demeurerait nul et résolu de plein droit, et que la dite Fabrique rentrerait en possession du dit banc, et pourrait procéder à une nouvelle adjudication d'icelui sans être tenue de donner aucun avis ou assignation au dit preneur.

Que le Demandeur avait fait défaut de payer ce loyer tel que convenu par le dit bail, et qu'en vertu de la clause cidessus alléguée les Défendeurs avaient repris possession du dit banc, et l'avait depuis loué et affermé, de la manière accoutumée, à une autre personne.

Les parties ayant respectivement fait leurs preuves, furent entendues aux mérites.

DUVAL, Justice: The question submitted to the Court in this cause arises out of a clause in the lease by the Defendants to the Plaintiff, which is to the effect that upon default of payment of the rent to accrue, at the period fixed by the lease, the lease will, immediately after the expiration of such period, become and be null and void and of no effect,

and that it will be lawful to the lessors forthwith to take possession of the pew leased and proceed to relet the same, without being bound to give any notice whatever to the lessee.

The rule, in relation to this matter, is that parties to contracts have a right to insert in such contracts all clauses or conditions which are not contrà bonos mores, or against law, such being the rule it is difficult to understand, as it has been pretended by the Plaintiff, why this covenant should not be enforced.

It is said that this covenant is what in our Jurisprudence is called a clause comminatoire, at this day the doctrine in relation to clauses comminatoires is not admitted in Courts of Justice. The interests of commerce, and in truth the interests of parties generally, require that contracts should be, and they are, enforced as they are entered into, without the delays which it was discretionary with Courts of Justice to grant to parties who neglect to fulfil their contracts, if in our day it were otherwise, the Legislature of the country would be bound to interfere, and prevent our Courts of Law from varying the contracts entered into by parties, or rather of making contracts for them. (1) Lord Kenyon has truly said, that Courts of Justice sit not to make contracts, but to enforce the execution of contracts entered into by parties.

It has been contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Fabrique, the Defendants, had been guilty of a voie de fait in taking possession of the pew leased to the Plaintiff, upon its own authority, and without the Judgment of a Court annulling the contract under which he was in possession. It is to be remarked that this is not the case of a man in possession of a house, the Plaintiff only uses the pew on Sundays and holidays, here the pew is leased to him upon the express

(1) 6 Toullier, Nos. 245, 550:-Merlin, Rep. vbo. Emphytéose, §3, p. 268:— Merlin, Rep. vbo. Clause Comminatoire :-Guyot, Rep. de Jurisp. vbo. Comminatoire, pp. 79 et 80:-L. C. Den. vbo. Clause Comminatoire.

condition that he shall retain the same so long only as he shall pay the rent, failing which it shall be in the power of the lessors to take possession of the pew, he fails to make payment of the stipulated rent, the Defendants, as they are authorized to do under the contract, take possession, and I think they are right. Upon what pretence can the Plaintiff feel himself authorized to retain possession of the pew if he fails to pay the rent? If he took possession of the pew and went into it without having paid the rent, he would be the trespasser committing the voie de fait. (1)

MEREDITH, Justice: According to the Jurisprudence which existed in France before the Code Civile, the Courts would, I think, have held the resolutive clause, clause résolutive, in the case before us, to be comminatory, and would not have allowed it to have the effect of annulling the lease, without the aid of judicial authority.

Toullier describes the old french Jurisprudence on this subject in the following words:

"Les clauses par lesquelles il était convenu qu'un acte "demeurerait nul et résolu, dans le cas où l'une des parties "n'aurait pas rempli ses obligations, étaient considérées

comme simplement comminatoires; elles ne s'exécutaient "point à la rigueur, et la convention n'était pas résolue par "le seul accomplissement de la condition dans le temps fixé 66 par la convention, quand même il eut été expressément "stipulé que la résolution serait encourue de plein droit, (6 par la seule échéance du terme, sans qu'il fût besoin d'acte "ni de sommation, etc. Quelles que fussent les expressions "dont les contractants s'étaient servis, leur volonté la mieux “ marquée était impuissante pour opérer la résolution de "plein droit. Les tribunaux s'obstinaient à juger que ces

(1) 11 Toullier, pp 178, 179, Nos. 135, 136, 137, Voie de Fait :-1 Argou, P 302-Instructions sur les Conventions, p. 75:-Rep. de Jurisp., vbo. Voie de Fait.

"clauses n'avaient d'effet qu'à l'arbitrage des juges, selon la “ qualité du fait et des circonstances." (1)

The condition for the prepayment of the pew rent, under pain of the lease becoming absolutely void, would, it seems, have been held comminatory under the Jurisprudence above described.

This Jurisprudence has been condemned as arbitrary and unjust by our most eminent jurists; (2) and I have no hesitation in saying that I think it was so.

It appears to me that when parties have entered into a contract, not opposed to law or good morals, and which can be carried into execution without injustice, that a competent tribunal refusing to give effect to such a contract, is guilty of a denial of justice; applying this principle to the present case, I am of opinion that we would not be justified in refusing to give effect to the clause which makes the pre payment of the pew rent, the condition of the continuance of the lease. That clause not only has no immoral or illegal tendency, but on the contrary, tends to promote the public good.

The prepayment of the pew rents enables those who have to meet obligations contracted for the building or repairs of the church, to know that at a given time they may count upon a certain fund; and it obviates the delay, expenses, litigation, losses and other désagréments, incident to the collection of arrears. It is established that the system of causing pew rents to be paid in advance has been universally followed in the church in question since it was built in 1849, and also in the Church in the St. Roch suburb of this

(1) 6 Toullier, p 581, No. 550:-Rep. vbo. Clause Comminatoire :-Pothier, Vente No. 459:-Brodeau sur Louel, lettre P. No. 50.

(2) The language of Toullier on this subject is very forcible-same number 550." Nous avons observé supra que cette jurisprudence était marquée au coin "de l'erreur la plus manifeste, destructive des conditions, sans lesquelles les con"trats n'auraient point eu lieu; qu'elle était attentatoire à la foi publique, et "qu'elle attaquait ses conventions jusque dans leurs bases les plus sacrées,"

city for a considerable number of years, and that it has been productive of great advantages; as to the Plaintiff, it is not contended that he has suffered any actual loss or damage by the resale of his pew. That proceeding will merely cause him to sit in another part of the church, which is not a grievance that calls for the interference of this tribunal. For these reasons it appears to me, that, as the agreement under review is not only in all respects perfectly unobjectionable, but is moreover a very judicious arrangement, we ought to let it have its full effect, according to the clearly expressed intentions of the parties; and, consequently, to hold that the resale of the Plaintiff's pew by the Defendants, was legal and perfectly effectual.

A case decided by me in the Circuit Court has been cited by the Plaintiff. In that case the Plaintiff sued for arrears of pew rent, and at the same time prayed that the lease might be declared null, in consequence of the non payment of the pew rent at the time agreed upon. The Defendant having offered to pay the arrears, I allowed him to do so, and refused to cause him to be ejected from the pew. I do not know whether the conditions of the lease in that case were exactly the same as those in the lease now before us, but even if they were, the fact of arrears having been allowed to accumulate would seem to shew that both parties had treated the clause for the resale of the pew as comminatory, and if so, the Court might well do so likewise.

In that case also, there was no proof, such as we have in the present case, as to the importance or utility of the stipulations for prepayment, nor have I any recollection of the case having been argued as involving any important general principle. It certainly did not occur to me then that I ought to deviate from the Jurisprudence to which I have already alluded; and it will at once be seen, that if there is to be any change in the Jurisprudence, as to the effect of resolutive