relations; as a man may be, at the same time, both a poet and an orator. We must say, moreover, that the three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole."*

With as little success, did that somewhat original thinker and reasoner, the celebrated Toellner of Frankfort, labour to define the distinction in question. "It is certain," says he, "that we must conceive, as coexisting in God, three eternal and really different actions, the action of operation, of idea, and of the desire of all possible good within and without him. "Three really different actions, coexisting from eternity, necessarily presuppose three really different and operative It is thus, through the aid of reason quickened by the Scriptures, we come to know, that the power, the understanding, and the will, in God are not merely three faculties, but three distinct energies, i. e. three substances."†

causes.

* Remarques sur le livre d' un Antitrinitaire Anglois, p. 26. I cannot think, however, that he has added much explicitness to his former statement. What are relations substantial? He must mean, as it seems to me, relations that pertain to substance; for the substantiality of a relation, in any other sense than this, is not intelligible to me. The last clause, "that the three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole," has added nothing to the perspicuity of the matter. The implication seems to be, that the three persons are so many substances, but not absolute. Now what is a substance in God, which is not absolute? And if numerical unity of substance is predicable of the Godhead, how can diversity of substances be attributed to him? Personality, which implies diversity, cannot well be predicated of essential substance or of essential attributes; for these are numerically one. His former definition, therefore, comes nearer to the mark. See Supp. Note, at the end of this Letter.

† Es ist gewiss, dass wir uns in Gott drey ewige wahrhaftig von einander unterschiedene Handlungen neben einander, gedenken müssen; die Handlung des Wirkens, der Vorstellung, und des Begehrens alles möglichen Guten in und ausser ihm.

Drey wahrhaftig verschiedene Handlungen, zugleich von Ewigkeit her neben einander, erfordern auch von Ewigkeit her drey von einander wahrhaftig verschiedene handelnde Gründe. Und so verkennen wir mit der durch die Schrift erweckten Vernunft, dass die Kraft, der Verstand, und der Wille, in Gott nicht drey blosse Vermögen, sondern drey von einander verschiedene Kräfte, das ist drey Substanzen sind. [Vermischte Aufsätze. B. i. p. 81. edit. 1769.]

This does not, indeed, seem to be very intelligible. But still, the basis of this attempt at definition has something in it deserving of notice. It is simply this, viz. that three modes of development in the Godhead, presuppose correspondent diversities, in some respect or other, in the substance or attributes of the Divinity.

I will produce but one instance more; which is found in the works of the celebrated Lessing, himself far enough from being a theologian, but sometimes inclined to speculate about subjects of difficulty. "Must not God," says he, "have the most perfect idea of himself? That is, an idea which comprises everything that is comprised in himself. Could this however be the case, if of his necessary reality, as of his other attributes, there were merely an idea, merely a possibility? This possibility exhausts the being of his other attributes; but can it exhaust his necessary reality ?* Consequently, God can either have no perfect idea of himself; or this perfect idea is even as necessarily actual as he himself is."t

If now Lessing himself understood his own problem, I think that I hazard nothing in declaring my conviction, that he was the only man who has been able to understand it.

I have not produced these instances, merely in order to satisfy you, that all attempts of this nature are and must be

* I have rendered the German literally here; but I am not certain that I understand the meaning. I suppose exhaust means, is adequate to` comprise, extends to the whole of, represents the whole. Quicunque melius intelligit, corriget.

† Muss Gott nicht die vollständigste Vorstellung von sich selbst haben? d. i. eine Vorstellung in der sich alles befindet was in ihm selbst ist. Würde sich aber alles in ihr finden was in ihm selbst ist, wenn auch von seiner nothwendigen Würklichkeit, so wie von seinen übrigen Eigenschaften, sich blos eine Vorstellung, sich blos eine Möglichkeit fände? Diese Möglichkeit erschöpft das Wesen seiner übrigen Eigenschaften; aber auch seiner nothwendigen Würklichkeit? Folglich, kann entweder Gott gar keine vollständige Vorstellung von sich selbst haben oder diese Vorstellung ist eben so nothwendig würklich als er selbst ist. (Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. 1785, p. 68.)

fruitless. You doubtless need no such proof. I have produced them for two reasons: the first, to justify myself, in some good measure, for not attempting a definition in which no one has yet succeeded; the second, to show, that notwithstanding all the fruitless attempts at definition which have been made, and notwithstanding the varieties of method in which men have chosen to make these attempts, yet, for substance, there is a far greater unanimity of opinion among Trinitarians, than you and your friends seem to be willing to concede. That there is a great variety in the modes by which an attempt at definition or illustration is made, is indeed clear enough. But this does not prove so much an actual variety of views, as it illustrates the difficult nature of the undertaking. With my present feelings I am disposed to look upon all attempts of this nature with regret. I expect no light from them. But I am far from accusing such attempts in general of any ill design; and surely I would not treat them with contempt.*

Patient investigation and candour will lead one to believe, as it seems to me, that the thing aimed at in the main was, simply to assert the idea of a distinction in the Godhead. Το do this with the more success, as the writers hoped, some of them endeavoured to describe affirmatively the nature of that distinction. But here they have all failed. But how can this prove, that there is actually a great variety of opinion among Trinitarians, in regard to the substance of the thing in question, merely because endeavours to define this thing have been unsuccessful, and have produced a great variety in the attempted methods of illustration? I cannot help feeling that this matter is sometimes misrepresented, and that very generally it is imperfectly understood.

But quitting this topic, permit me now to ask, whether you feel yourself able, by any argument a priori, to prove to me that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with itself,

* See the subject of definitions as further illustrated, in the Supp. Note at the end of the present Letter.

or (as you aver) "subversive of the doctrine of divine unity," and therefore untrue? We say that the divine essence and attributes are numerically one, so far as they are known to us; but that there are in the Godhead some real distinctions; for example, between the Father and the Son. (I omit the consideration of the Holy Spirit here, because your Sermon merely hints at this subject, and because all serious difficulties in respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, are essentially connected with proving or disproving the divinity of Christ). I abjure, for myself, all attempts to define those distinctions; I admit them simply as a FACT; and this, on the authority of divine revelation. Now how can you prove, that a distinction does not exist in the Godhead? I acknowledge that the want of evidence in the Scriptures.to establish the fact, would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. But we are thus far making out a statement of the subject, and answering objections that are urged, in an a priori way, or independently of the Scriptures. The proof which the New Testament exhibits, we are hereafter to examine. How then, I repeat it, are you to show that we believe in a self-contradiction, or in an impossibility? If the distinction in question cannot be proved, independently of the Scriptures, (and most readily I acknowledge it cannot), it is equally certain that it cannot be disproved in an a priori way. In order to prove that such a distinction contradicts the divine unity, must you not be able, first of all, to tell what that distinction is, and then what the divine unity is? Can you do either?

Will you allow me to dwell, for a moment, on this point of unity. It is clear, as I think, that the unity of God cannot be satisfactorily proved without revelation. It may perhaps be rendered probable. Then we must depend, as it would seem, on scriptural proof for the thorough establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures anywhere told us what the divine unity is? Will you produce the passage? The oneness of God they often assert. But this they assert,

always, in opposition to the idols of the heathen-to the polytheism of the Gentiles-to the gods superior and inferior

which the heathen worshipped. In no other way have the Scriptures defined the ONENESS of the Deity. What then is oneness, in the uncreated, infinite, eternal Being? In created and finite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it; but can created objects be both just and adequate representatives of the uncreated God? Familiar as the assertion is, in your conversation and in your Sermons, that GOD IS ONE, can you give me any other definition of this oneness, except a negative one? You deny plurality of it; you say God is but one, and not two, nor more. All this is mere negation. In what, I ask, does the divine unity actually and positively consist? God surely has different and various faculties and powers. Is he not almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, just, good? Does he not act differently, i. e. variously, both in the natural and in the moral world? Unity, therefore, is not an universal sameness of attribute or of action. Does it consist, then, appropriately in his essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that his unity consists appropriately and solely in this, unless you know what his essence is, and so be able to judge, whether oneness can be more certainly predicated of this than of his attributes and actions?

Your answer to all this is:

The nature of God's essence

is beyond my reach; I cannot define it. I can approach to a definition of the divine unity, only by negatives.' In other words, you deny the numerical plurality of God; or you say, that there are not two or more essences, omnisciences, omnipotences, etc. But here all investigation, at least all knowledge, is at an end. Is it possible to show what it is, which constitutes the internal nature of the divine essence or attributes? To show how these are related to each other, or what internal distinctions exist? Of all this revelation says not one word; and certainly the book of nature gives no instruction concerning it. The assertion then that God is one, means, when fairly and intelligently understood, nothing more positively than that he is numerically one, i. e. it simply denies polytheism. Beyond this it can never reach. The