not permit me then to say that we speak of persons in the Godhead, in order to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons as applied to men, i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, etc.? Where then, considering the poverty of language in respect to expressing what belongs to the Deity, is our inconsistency in this, or how is there any absurdity in our language, providing there is a real foundation in the Scriptures on which we may rest the fact of a distinction, which we believe to exist?

I could wish indeed, on some accounts, that the word person had never come into the symbols of the churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has been in common use so long, it is difficult now, perhaps impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so guarded, as not to lead Christians generally into erroneous ideas of God. Nor can I suppose that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attribute to us as believing. Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and then charge them with the absurdities consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used aside from their ordinary import. And what can teach us in a plainer manner, that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, than that they do universally agree that God is one, both in essence and in attributes?

It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they were charged with subverting the divine unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its first introduction into the symbols of the church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, de

mands that " every word.... should be modified and explained according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances, and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of person is forever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is the specific nature of that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the specific definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt to make out. By what shall I, or can I, define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here, in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, that there are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained); that there is a distinction, which affords grounds for the respective appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation. for the application of the personal pronouns, I, Thou, He; which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent; to speak of Christ as being with God, being in his bosom, and of other things of the like nature in the like way, and yet to hold that the divine nature equally belongs to each; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding the fact that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with which it can be compared. To define it, then, is beyond our reach. We approximate towards a conception

of it, merely by negatives. We deny, for example, that the divine existence has any author or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. And here we must rest; for archangels, it is probable, cannot proceed beyond this.

The distinction in the Godhead, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot, consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character are founded upon it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and peculiar consolations administered, by it.

In regard to this distinction, we say: It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake, (at least the Trinitarians of our country with whom I am acquainted undertake), not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of the divine self-existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.

I may ask moreover: What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time when he did not exist, and never can be one when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time, before the planetary system which measures it had an existence? And what will time be, when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certian things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would

not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why then should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot affirmatively define it?

I do not feel, therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism and absurdity, when we admit that there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we feel utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer some time since published a piece, in a periodical work then edited at Cambridge, in which he laboured, with no small degree of acuteness, to show that no man can believe a proposition the terms of which are unintelligible, or which he does not understand. His object in doing this appears to have been, to fix upon those who believe in the doctrine of the Trinity the charge of absurdity. But it seems to me, that the whole argument of that piece is founded on a confusion of two things which are in themselves very diverse, viz., terms which are unintelligible, and things which are undefinable. You believe in the fact that the divine existence is without cause; you understand the fact that God exists uncaused, but you cannot define underived existence. I believe on the authority of the Scriptures, that there is a real distinction in the Godhead; but I cannot define the exact nature of it. Still, the proposition that there is a real distinction, is just as intelligible, as the proposition that God is self-existent. There are,

indeed, multitudes of propositions respecting a variety of subjects, which resemble these. We affirm, for example, that gravitation brings a body, which is thrown into the air, down to the earth. The fact is altogether intelligible. The terms are perfectly understood, so far as they are employed to describe this fact. But then, what is gravitation? An affirmative definition cannot be given, which is not a mere exchange of synonymes. Nor can any comparison define it; for to what shall we liken it?

The mind of every man, who is accustomed to think, will supply him with a multitude of propositions of this nature; in all of which the fact designed to be described is clear; the terms so far as they describe this fact are clear; but the sub

ject of the proposition, that is the thing itself, or the agent, concerning which the fact is asserted, is undefinable; and, excepting in regard to the fact in question, perhaps wholly unknown to us.

How easy now to perplex common minds, by calling a proposition unintelligible, the subject of which is merely undefinable. In confounding things so very different, consists, as I apprehend, the whole ingenuity of the piece in question; an ingenuity, which may excite the admiration of those who love the subtilties of dispute, but cannot contribute much to illuminate the path of theological science.

I have been thus particular, in my statement of this very difficult part of the subject, in order to prevent misapprehension. I certainly do not hold myself bound to vindicate any of the attempted definitions of person or distinction in the Godhead, at least any which I have yet seen, because I do not and cannot adopt them. My reason for this is, that I do not and cannot understand them; and to a proffered definition I cannot with propriety assent, still less undertake to defend it, until I do understand what it signifies. It is truly matter of regret to me, that some great and good men have carried their speculations on this subject to such a length, that, as I cannot help thinking, they have bewildered themselves and their readers. I would always speak with respect and tenderness of such men. Still I have no hesitation in saying, that my mind is absolutely unable to elicit distinct and certian ideas, from any of the proffered definitions in question which I have ever examined. May I be indulged with the liberty here of producing a few examples? In this way, I shall be able more readily to illustrate and establish what I have just said.

Let me begin with Tertullian, who flourished about A. D. 200. In his book against Praxeas (ch. 2) he says: "This perversity [viz. of Praxeas] thinks itself to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the self same; as if all were not one, while all