cipal stores and magazines. Both these projects, however, though brought to the very verge of execution, were nipped in the bud by wholly insuperable difficulties.

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Sir Henry all this while, by means of an intercepted mail, had accurate intelligence of the enemy's most secret designs. Thus it was that he had learnt their first scheme of an attack upon New York. Thus, also, had he become apprised that in their own opinion a visible languor to "their cause began universally to prevail." But as he declares it, "the most interesting piece of intelligence "which this capture procured us was an intimation from "the Court of France that this was the last campaign in "which the Americans were to expect assistance of either "troops or ships from that nation, as she began to be ap"prehensive that her own exigencies would put it out of "her power to continue her support, if the war should "be protracted much longer,-thereby strongly pointing "out to us the policy of avoiding all risks as much as "possible, because it was now manifest that if we could only persevere in escaping affront, Time alone would 66 soon bring about every success we could wish."*

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Hence it will be seen that even at that late period the British cause in North America was, to say the very least of it, not lost. But the current of affairs and the nature of the country were now rapidly leading to a great disaster, such as afterwards no successes could outweigh, and no skill retrieve. Among the lesser causes of that disaster must be reckoned the personal estrangement of Clinton and Cornwallis. Differences between them had for some time past been smouldering; and on their return to England at the peace, they eagerly assailed each other in a paper war. Yet, without following the complaints of both into minute detail, it may be asserted that they give no just ground for the serious arraignment of either. Of the two, Clinton was probably the abler, Cornwallis the more enterprising chief; but both alike were men of the highest honour and courage, full of zeal for their country's service, and when it came to action, ever desirous to postpone-if not, in fact, postponing their personal differences to the public

* Sir Henry Clinton's Memoirs, vol. ii. MS.

1781.

FRENCH FLEET IN THE CHESAPEAK.

cause.

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Both-Cornwallis more especially-may have erred in judgment; yet it seems only equitable to remember how thorny and bewildering were at this time the paths before them.

Another, and the most efficient, cause of the disaster that ensued lay in the superiority of naval force which the French suddenly acquired in these seas. In the month of May, a new chief, the Comte de Barras, had arrived from Europe, and taken the command of the French squadron, still lying at Rhode Island, and hitherto in some degree neglected.* Towards the same period, Sir Henry Clinton, at his own earnest and repeated request, had been freed from the counter-action of a most untoward colleague; Admiral Arbuthnot being recalled, and Admiral Graves appointed in his place. Thus far the chiefs only were changed, and the balance of force was, as before, in favour of the English. But the balance was wholly turned against them when, in the latter part of August, the Comte de Grasse arrived from the West Indies with eight and twenty sail of the line. De Grasse was followed by Sir Samuel Hood, but Sir Samuel could bring only fourteen.

On his voyage De Grasse fell in with and took the packet from Charleston, having on board Lord Rawdon, who thus found himself within a few weeks from a victor at Hobkirk's Hill a prisoner in the Chesapeak. Entering that bay, the French Admiral set on shore between three and four thousand land troops, under the Marquis de St. Simon; a most welcome addition to the force of La Fayette. So ill-informed, meanwhile, was Hood of the true number of De Grasse's vessels, that, writing to Sir Henry Clinton from off Cape Henry, on the 25th of August, he declared his own fleet fully equal to defeat any designs of the enemy, let De Grasse bring or send what ships he might in aid to those under Barras. On these assurances Sir Henry Clinton relied, and certainly was justified in relying, and he afterwards appealed to

* "Il y avait dix mois que nous étions partis de France; nous "n'avions pas encore reçu une lettre ni un écu," says the Duke de Lauzun. (Memoirs, p. 353. ed. 1822.)

them as indicating the hopes that he had cherished and the plans that he had formed.

Admiral Graves, on his part, hastened to join Hood with five ships, all those he had ready for sea; and, as the senior officer, he assumed the chief command. When he appeared off the Capes of Virginia, De Grasse went out to meet him with the greater part of his force, and there ensued between them, on the 5th of September, a desultory and indecisive action. Several ships were damaged, but none were taken, and at last, after some days, they parted; the English fleet returning to New York, and the French fleet to the Chesapeak. There De Grasse was joined by the squadron of Barras, from Newport; but, on the other hand, some ships from England, under Admiral Digby, increased the force of Graves. The relative superiority, however, still continued, as before, greatly on the side of the French. While they, in the Chesapeak, could boast thirty-six sail of the line, we, at New York, had no more than twenty-five.

Washington, meanwhile, had not been diverted from his designs against Lord Cornwallis, either by the descent of Arnold in Connecticut, or by any apprehension for Rhode Island. He was wisely impressed with the importance, at that juncture, of striking a great blow. Every where around him, he found a vague dependence on French aid unnerve and take the place of a selfrelying zeal. He saw the Congress, so energetic and so well supported at its outset, utterly failing in ability, and sunk in reputation. He saw the people in the very throes of national bankruptcy; 'our poor old currency "is breathing its last gasp;" writes, at this time, an accomplished lady from Boston.* He saw the Eastern States especially, as their own writers have acknowledged, grown almost indifferent to the war since it had passed to other shores. Thus, to use Washington's words at a later period, "some splendid advantage was "essentially necessary at the crisis in question, to revive

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*Letter to Mr. John Adams, from "Portia," May 25. 1781. (Mrs. Adams's Correspondence, p. 125. ed. 1848.)

1781.

THE

"VILLE DE PARIS."

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"the expiring hopes and languid exertions of the "country."

With these views, the American General, and in combination with him Comte de Rochambeau, after several feints, drew off their main forces to Philadelphia, and from thence marched to the Head of Elk. On this onward route into Virginia, Washington was enabled to pay a passing visit to his beloved home of Mount Vernon, which he had never seen (so unremitting had been his public services) since he left it to attend the second Continental Congress, six years and a half before. On the 14th of September he reached the head-quarters of La Fayette, near Williamsburg, and assumed, of course, the chief command, while under him De Rochambeau had the more particular direction of the French. Next, the two commanders travelled towards Cape Henry, to hold a conference with Comte de Grasse on board his ship. That ship, the VILLE DE PARIS, was already much renowned; it carried 106 guns, and was, perhaps, the largest vessel then afloat; larger, certainly, than any of our own first- rates." It had been built at lavish cost and with scientific care, by direction of the citizens of Paris, as a present to King Louis, who, in accepting their gift, had bestowed on it their name. †

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At the conference on board the Ville de Paris, the, Comte de Grasse gave his colleagues notice, that owing to his other duties, and his precise orders from home, he could not continue on this station longer than the 1st of November. Meanwhile, it was determined to press the operations against Lord Cornwallis with the utmost vigour. The net, indeed, was rapidly closing around the English Earl. During the month of August he had relinquished Portsmouth, and taken post at Yorktown, in pursuance of some instructions from Sir Henry Clinton, which Sir Henry meant as permissive, but which Cornwallis understood as peremptory. Yorktown, as Cornwallis afterwards declared, was not, in his judgment, well adapted for defence. It is a small village,

* See Mr. Sparks's Life of Washington, p. 360.

On the "Ville de Paris," see Mundy's Life of Rodney, vol. ii, p. 243.

about twelve miles from Williamsburg, built upon a high bank, the southern one, of York river. There, the long peninsula, extending between the rivers York and James, is little more than eight miles broad. There, the river York itself is one mile in width; and, on a point of land projecting from the northern bank, lies Gloucester, another small village, which Cornwallis also held. Both posts, but more especially York-town as the larger, he had fortified as he best might, with redoubts and intrenchments; and these unfinished works he was now to maintain with 7,000 men, against a force which by degrees grew to 18,000. His position was not really perilous, so long as the English retained the superiority at sea; but the great fleet of De Grasse was now interposing, and cut off his retreat.

With proper frankness Cornwallis had not left his commanding officer in any doubt as to his difficulties. So early as the 16th of September he wrote thus to Sir Henry Clinton from York-town: "This place is in no "state of defence. If you cannot relieve me very soon, 66 you must expect to hear the worst."

It was on the 28th of the same month that the combined army of Americans and French first appeared in sight of York-town. Cornwallis is alleged to have neglected a favourable opportunity to fall upon and overpower the separate division of La Fayette before it was supported by the rest. Yet such success, had it even been achieved, and had not the Americans come up quicker than was thought, could have had no material bearing on the result of the campaign. On the evening of the 29th the English General was cheered by the arrival of an express, bringing despatches from Sir Henry Clinton of the 24th of September. "At a meeting," wrote Sir Henry, "of the General and Flag Officers, held this day, "it is determined that above 5,000 men, rank and file, "shall be embarked on board the King's ships, and the 'joint exertions of the navy and army made in a few days to relieve you, and afterwards co-operate with 66 you. The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the "line, three of which are three-deckers. There is 66 every reason to hope we start from hence the 5th of "October."

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