480. Lord famous civis I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, Palmerston's as representing a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question now before it; whether the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has (in House of been conducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to Romanus sum speech Commons, 1850) 481. A mem ment ex plains why investors abroad ask diplomatic support think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the government of England; and whether, as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong. In the old days it was not necessary to call attention to such ber of parlia- matters [as the need of diplomatic support for English investments abroad]. Now it is a great international battle for the industries and the markets of the various countries, in which the Foreign Secretary must take part. . . . [It may be objected that] in all these matters you are touching very high politics, and when you are apparently only dealing with railways and railway expansions you are touching the fringe of big international disputes, quarrels and rearrangements with respect to boundaries, and so on, and we are bound to look in the interest of peace at the big European arrangements, compared to which these railway questions and these commercial points are really details. We have got to take the most important. For instance, we would rather have a Russian entente than gain a railway in central Asia. That is a big point which, so far, has not carried us far. . . . Any giving way on these matters will lead to far more bitter difficulties than those which exist today. To refrain from getting all we can for our traders is, I think, not good policy. We are told we are to promote British commerce all over the world. That, of course, is one of the first duties of the Foreign Office. It is a greater task than is laid upon any other department of the state. It is not merely that we are to encourage and protect trade which exists, but we are to open up other avenues of trade; and in each particular corner, whether it is 482. The Asia Minor, Persia, or China, where we obtain a concession, we foreign secare to achieve more and greater success than in the world. . . . any other country retary discusses the relation of his office to international I regard it as our duty, wherever bona fide British capital is forthcoming in any part of the world, and is applying for con- economic cessions to which there are no valid political objections, that we competition should give it the utmost support we can, and endeavor to convince the foreign government concerned that it is to its interest as well as our own to give the concessions for railways and so forth to British firms who carry them out at reasonable prices and in the best possible way. In the two decades preceding the war, citizens of other great powers had increasingly claimed similar " diplomatic support." Conflicts, diplomatic as well as economic, resulted. A number of such controversies, involving Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians, and Japanese, were peacefully adjusted during the years 1902-1911. Similar controversies between citizens of England, France, and Russia (the Triple Entente) and citizens of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (the Triple Alliance) — arousing, as they did, national pride and patriotic spirit - promoted armament rivalries and fostered conditions favorable for war. The general nature of these controversies is here illustrated by an extract from the agreement of 1907 between England and Russia concerning the division of Persia into spheres of influence. between I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to 483. From the support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects agreement of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial England and nature such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, Russia definroads, transport, insurance, etc. —beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the ing their interests in Persia (1907) Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to. II. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature - such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.- beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to. III. . . . [In the zone between the two lines, either nation may seek concessions.] IV. . . . [Persian customs revenues are to be devoted to guaranteeing the amortization and interest of loans made to Persia.] V. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement. One of the most serious of the outstanding controversies was the question of ascendancy in the Balkans and in the northeastern Mediterranean. This controversy was brought to a head by the assassination of the Austrian crown prince on June 28. All the great powers expressed a desire to localize the conflict, but once the "armed truce" was broken, all were drawn rapidly into the vortex. The immediate occasion for England's entering the war is indicated in the two following telegrams from the British foreign secretary to the British ambassador at Berlin, both dated August 4, but the latter written later in the day. The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms: 484. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen (August 4, "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 1914) friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply. 485. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen (August 4, 1914) We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning1 be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. As soon as the government had definitely committed the country to war, most of the people in England, as in other countries on both sides of the conflict, supported the war. In so far as criticism found expression, it came chiefly from those who, like the philosopher Bertrand Russell, quoted in the following passage, believed that neither side was blameless, or justified in resorting to war. Belgium showed Germany at its worst, but it did not show us at our best. It gave Germany an occasion for brutal vioby Bertrand lence; it gave our Foreign Office an occasion for hypocrisy. . . . So far at least as our Foreign Office is concerned, to say that we were against Germany because we were for Belgium is to invert cause and effect; the truth is that we were for Belgium because we were against Germany. . . . 486. A criticism of the government Russell Stripped of parliamentary verbiage, the fundamental fact about the European situation is that all the Great Powers of Europe have precisely the same objects: territory, trade and prestige. In pursuit of these objects no one of the Great 1 The preceding document. |