Outrages charged to

trade unions

Influence of

on strikes

Without disguising from ourselves the shocking character of certain atrocities which have been clearly brought home to unionists in various parts of the country, . . . it is some satisfaction to feel that a very great improvement in the general character of unionism is shown, as contrasted with the results of earlier inquiries.

The conclusion from this seems inevitable that whatever tends to keep the unions in the relation in which they stood to the old combination law is an evil, and the more nearly they can be placed on the footing of other legal bodies, the less has the public to fear from their character. These same facts are also a very instructive answer to a proposal which has been made to render the action of national associations illegal whilst legalizing the local; and, to another, which is still more unfortunate, to legalize mere trade unions, but to deprive them of all character of mutual assurance. The effect of either of these would be to put a premium on the existence of the more questionable form of unionism, whilst suppressing that form of it which is shown to be above suspicion.

It does not appear to be borne out by the evidence that the trade unions disposition to strike on the part of workmen is in itself the creation of unionists, or that this disposition increases in proportion to the strength of the union. It appears, in fact, that the relation of unions to strikes is rather the converse, and that many unions are hastily formed when the spirit of demanding a rise is rife; but that the effect of the established societies is to diminish the frequency and certainly the disorder of strikes, and to guarantee a regularity of wages and hours rather than to engage in constant endeavors to improve them. . . .

Strikes

union work

men

It is clear that it is a very general practice of unionists, against non- wherever their numbers are sufficiently great, to refuse work in company with nonunionists. It is, however, far from being universal. The evidence shows that in many trades no such practice exists. There can, however, be little doubt that it is constantly enforced whenever the union is strong enough to insist on it. The practice is no doubt unsocial, and is often carried out in a vexatious and arbitrary spirit, but it is one too common amongst other classes of the community to require

any special treatment. It is common to corporations, confraternities, and parties of all kinds; and, as it would be plainly unjust for the state to compel workmen to work with those to whom they objected, and even to punish them, directly or indirectly, for this refusal, it seems to us one of those things which must be left to gradual improvement of tone.

We are, on the whole, convinced by the evidence that the union is usually felt by the great body of workmen to be working for their benefit and with their adhesion; and we are inclined to think that the workmen who, under the influence of agencies without (such as the Free Labor societies), place themselves in antagonism to it, represent a very small and for the most part a wholly inferior minority.

of unions

It results that hardly any one of the features commonly at- Relative tributed to unionism in general can be said to be a general harmlessness principle; but only that the characters of the different unions vary like those of the different bodies of men of whom they are composed, and of the officials by whom they are influenced. It seems to us that in themselves the unions are simply associations to enable the workmen to obtain the best terms for themselves. Whether they regard their interest from an enlightened point of view, or the contrary, depends very much. on the members and the management, and on the conditions of the particular trade. We can see no reason why the whole of these societies, under good management, might not become what very many of them now are, peaceful and useful institutions. And as a general principle it appears to us impossible, when the right of combining to further their interests is conceded, to enact that there should be certain interests which they may not pursue, however lawfully and peacefully.

With respect to all the customs or rules complained of, we are of opinion that no sensible public injury has been shown to result from them; that they arise from a standing struggle between conflicting interests, with neither of which the state is identified; and that they are matters on which legislation must maintain complete neutrality, the rather that these customs are attacked and defended in the name of economic principles still far from settled or recognized. . . .

Real basis of existence of trade unions

The interest of the community is the welfare of the various classes which compose it, not the multiplication of products at constantly cheaper prices. The notion that the public is a gainer whilst goods are constantly growing cheaper, even though this end be obtained at the expense of each class of the community in turn suffering in liberty, health, or comfort, is disposed of by being stated. Such a theory would lead to the conclusion that slavery was a public benefit, if it could be shown that slave labor in any product would conduce to increased production at a lower rate. . ..

It seems to us that quite sufficient ground for unionism is to be found in the following considerations. The capitalist having a reserve fund, or accumulation of labor, is necessarily in a better position to treat for terms than the individual laborer who has no reserve fund. The capitalist is a combination in himself. The workmen, by combination, and by contributing to form a reserve fund, can place themselves on a footing of equality with the capitalist. The economic principle to which the critics of unionism the most often appeal is that the interest of the community is best secured by the individuals who compose it striving to improve their own conditions for themselves. It is beyond doubt that a great number of capitalists honestly hold and carry out this doctrine. Without attributing any harshness or injustice to capitalists individually, or as a class, it is plain that the efforts of each of them to improve his own condition must lead him to many things which are prejudicial to the immediate interest of others. For instance, he introduces a new process or machine by which he saves immensely in labor, and at once dispenses with a body of workmen. By his own principles he considers that they are the proper persons to take care of their own interests, and not he. They proceed to do so, and their answer is unionism; that is, they combine and seek their ends in common.

They find that their interest lies in making their demands and refusing offers in concert, and not individually. Under a system which professes the right or rather the duty of all men peacefully to pursue their own interests for themselves, unionism appears to us the exact correlative of competition. The

stronger prefer to pursue their ends by means of competition, the weaker by means of combination. But for the capitalist to deny the workman unlimited freedom to combine is for the stronger to object to the weaker pursuing his interests by the most obvious resource in his reach.

The plan of a third reform bill had scarcely been formulated, in 1884, when the House of Lords intimated that this measure would be defeated by them. The conflict immediately took the form of an attack on the House of Lords. The following letter from John Bright, the old Radical statesman, puts the matter clearly.

Dear Sir:

446. John Bright to J P. Hartley (July 18,

I am glad to hear of the arrangements for your great meeting to-morrow. Accrington and the surrounding district will not fail in its duty at this crisis. The question is not one of 1884) the franchise bill only; that bill will not be defeated or long delayed. There has arisen another and a greater question. Shall the House of Lords subject to its will the ministry, which represents the crown, and the House of Commons, which represents the nation? Shall the policy of a great and free country be thwarted by men sitting in their hereditary chamber, who are there by no right of votes given them, and through whom the voice of the millions of the United Kingdom is not heard? Their veto is a constant insult to the House of Commons, and if the freedom of our people is not a pretense and a sham, some limit must be placed upon a power which is chiefly manifested in or by its hostility to the true interests of the nation. A parliament controlled by hereditary peers is no better, perhaps it is worse, than a parliament influenced by and controlled by a despotic monarch. Ask your friends to consider this question seriously. Let them join with their countrymen in demanding a change which shall free the House of Commons from fetters as humiliating to it as they are injurious to the country.

Believe me, sincerely yours,

JOHN BRIGHT.

447. The plan

rule in 1886

IV. IRISH HOME RULE

The bill for home rule for Ireland, in 1886, was a far-reaching political measure that proved too difficult even for the influence of Mr. Gladstone. Nevertheless the Irish question has always since remained prominent, and home rule has been constantly advocated. This account, including Mr. Gladstone's speech, is from Morley's Life of Gladstone.

The foundation of the scheme was the establishment in of Irish home Ireland of a domestic legislature to deal with Irish as distinguished from imperial affairs. It followed from this that if Irish members and representative peers remained at Westminster at all, though they might claim a share in the settlement of imperial affairs, they could not rightly control English or Scotch affairs. This was from the first, and has ever since remained, the Gordian knot. The cabinet, on a review of all the courses open, determined to propose the plan of total exclusion, save and unless for the purpose of revising this organic statute.

The next question was neither so hard nor so vital. Ought the powers of the Irish legislature to be specifically enumerated? Or was it better to enumerate the branches of legislation from which the statutory parliament was to be shut out? Should we enact the things that they might do, or the things that they might not do, leaving them the whole residue of lawmaking power outside these exceptions and exclusions? The latter was the plan adopted in the bill. Disabilities were specified, and everything not so specified was left within the scope of the Irish authority. These disabilities comprehended all matters affecting the crown. All questions of defense and armed force were shut out; all foreign and colonial relations; the law of trade and navigation, of coinage and legal tender. The new legislature could not meddle with certain charters, nor with certain contracts, nor could it establish or endow any particular religion. . .