Counsel and Client-At hearing of motion M. stated

that he appeared as counsel for B, and S. also stated that he appeared as counsel for B, and B. being present and being asked by Court whom he wished to appear as his counsel, and having stated that he wished S. to be his counsel, Court directed S. alone

to appear as B.'s counsel. Bass, ex parte, 245 Covenant-Party covenanted with single woman to

pay her for life, subject to proviso, an annuity of 401. per annum; and proviso was, that if she should marry, annuity should be reduced to 201. per annum. After marriage she was entitled to 201. per year only, there being no unqualified gift of annuity of 401. for life, and qualification of being unmarried being condition precedent to each successive payment. Principles of law as to restraints upon marriage being void as against public policy, not applicable in such case. Grace v. Webb, 13

Plaintiff conveyed piece of ground to E. in fee simple, and E. covenanted for himself, &c., with plaintiff, &c., to keep ground and iron railing round same in its then form, uncovered with any buildings, and that plaintiff and his tenants might have keys at their own expense, and privilege of admis. sion. Neighbourhood had become thickly populated, and ground greatly neglected and in ruinous condition, and for many years neither plaintiff nor his tenants had used or claimed to use it. Removal of some of railings by defendant, who claimed by purchase under Ě, and intention to make footpaths, and claim of right of building thereon, a breach of covenant; and he was restrained by injunction, although plaintiff had not established validity of covenant, at law, as binding upon assig

nee of land. Tulk v. Moxhay, 83 Creditors' Suit. See Administration of Estate.

of parliamentary allowances, and will not confine charges within allowances for business done in Chancery. Solicitor and agent of company retained parliamentary agents on behalf of company; and bills of costs delivered to solicitor, but directors obtained order for taxation. Order irregular. Sudlow, in re, 182

After defendant put in his answer, plaintiff let his house, and went to reside at Boulogne, but had since occasionally been within jurisdiction. He denied all intention to reside abroad, but said it was pleasant to remain where he was then staying, and also denied leaving England to avoid jurisdiction. Plaintiff's explanation ambiguous, and security for costs required. Kennaway v. Tripp, 298

In information by Attorney General on behalf of Crown against city of London, Master allowed exceptions to further answer for insufficiency, and certified costs ought to be paid by corporation. Corporation took exceptions to Master's report, but did not except to that part of certificate stating they ought to pay costs. Leave afterwards obtained from Court to discuss liability of defendants to pay costs. No general rule in equity that Attorney General cannot receive costs because he does not pay them, and corporation not exempt from costs. Aitorney Gen, v. Corporation of London, 339

Only those payments which are made in performance of professional duties and in a professional character, ought to be allowed as disbursements in solicitor's bill of costs. Remnant, in re, 374

One of defendants in suit to whom costs ordered to be paid by plaintiffs, died before taxation, and suit not revived. On motion by representative of deceased defendant, Court would not direct Master to proceed with taxation until suit had been revived, notwithstanding decree passed and entered, and costs, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 18, a charge upon real estate of plaintiffs. Robertson v. Southgate, 404

of obtaining money out of court. Chelwode, ex parte, 418

Each party directed to pay his own costs incurred by unnecessary litigation by defendant. Sentance v. Porter, 448

If plaintiff's motion successfully opposed by defendant on affidavits, and before answer, and rule is to reserve costs until hearing.–Secus, if plaintiff moves on defendant's answer. Waring v. Manchester, &e. Railway Co., 450

A. brought action against B. B. thereupon filed bill against A. in respect of matters which were subject of action. A. not entitled to security for costs. Watteeu v. Billam, 455

Suit to ascertain rights of plaintiff and others to certain property: plaintiff pending suit made three mortgages of his share to different persons who were brought before Court by supplemental bill. Decree made declaring plaintiff'entitled to one-fifth of estate, and directing costs to be paid as between party and party out of aggregate fund. First mortgagee presented petition for payment of his principal, interest and costs, and plaintiff claimed extra costs as prior charges which was resisted by second mortgagee. Plaintiff not entitled to extra costs, but second mortgagee entitled to take fund, leaving plaintiff's costs in that respect unpaid. Smith v. Plomer, 456

By order made in cause case sent for opinion of court of law, and certificate returned in favour of plaintiff. By final decree in cause costs of suit generally given to plaintiff, but costs of case not mentioned. Plaintiff entitled to costs of case. Humphrey v. Geary, 488

See Administration of Estate. Appearance. Charity. Mortgage. Pauper. Payment into and out of Court. Solicitor,

Debt on Bond. See Release.
DeedBill to set aside deed alleged by plaintiff to

in evil which deed intended to produce. Benyon v.

Nettlefold, 445
Dower. See Will.

stated to have been given to testator's niece, her
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns. Rent-
charge might be legally distrained for; and thing
contracted to be sold within words of contract; and
specific performance decreed. Ramsey v. Thorngale,

238
Devise (continued)— Testator devised share in New

River Company to A, upon such trust as he should
afterwards declare ; but never made declaration of
trust, and died without leaving any heir-at-law. A,
and not the Crown entitled. Testator made general
devise of all his property to A, upon trust, for pur-
poses or legacies he should make in any codicil he
might add to his will: and afterwards made codicil
unattested. A. not entitled in his own right to
property, but trustee for heir-at-law. Davall v.

New River Co., 299
---- S. G. devised to trustees certain freehold pro-

perty for term of ninety-nine years, at peppercorn
rent, upon trust, to permit his wife and such persons
as she should by will bequeath the same, to take to
his, her, or their own use and benefit rents, &c. of
said lands for said term of ninety-nine years, ex-
clusively of any husband of his said wife. Wife,
after husband's death, conveyed her interest in
property to certain persons represented by defen-
dant, and subsequently made her will, giving pro-
perty to plaintiff. Wife took properly for whole
term, and not life estate merely, with remainder
to such persons as she should appoint by will;
and had conveyed away all her interest to defen-
dant. Glover v. Hall, 305

of real estate to A. for life, and after her death
to all children of A. born at time of her death. A.
had two children, both of whom died in her lifetime.
Shares in real estate vested in them indefeasibly at
their births. Paterson v. Mills, 449

See Accumulations. Will.
Discovery-Information, by Attorney General against

corporation of London, alleged that Crown seised
of bed and soil of all navigable rivers in kingdom,
and of Thames in particular, and of banks and
shores thereof between high and low water mark,
and that corporation claimed to be conservators
by prescription or some grant from Crown, but
did not thereby take any interest in bed and
soil of river, and now claimed to be seised of bed
and soil of river; and asked that they might set
forth their title, and charged that they had divers
deeds, papers, &c. in their possession relating to
matter in question. Corporation, by their answer,
stated they were corporation by prescription; that
they were seised in fee of bed and soil of river, &c.;
they admitted they were conservators, and that
office exercised by mayor, and after stating that, as
owners, they had granted some modern licences to
embank, they said they had divers deeds, &c., but
they were evidence of their title, and did not shew
any title in Crown, and, therefore, they ought not
to produce them. Master allowed exceptions to
answer for insufficiency. Upon exceptions to
Master's report, office of conservator or bailiff of
river Thames held to have been derived from Crown,
and held under Crown, by its own grant, or com-
mission, or by act of parliament; that all authority,
out of which it was granted, must be considered as
reserved by Crown; that office of conservator was
fiduciary, and that defendants could not refuse
discovery; and exceptions disallowed. Quære-
Whether Crown any right to discovery beyond that
between subject and subject. Attorney General v.
Corporation of London, 314

Court not compel discovery in aid of plea, to
action on deed, which set up defence that consider-
ation for deed immoral, plaintiff having participated

Election. See Will.
Equitable Mortgage - A. leased land to B. B. made

an equitable mortgage of lease to C, and C. was
some time in possession of property, and paid rent
to A. C. subsequently gave back possession to B.
A. no equity to compel č. to take legal assignment
of property. Moore v. Greg, 15
Equity. See Settlement.
Evidence-Reference to Master to ascertain facts, and

witness examined upon written interrogatories, and
depositions published. Evidence of witness, after-
wards given vivá voce, objected to before Master,
but not on ground of previous examinations on
interrogatories, and Master received evidence. Ex-
ceptions taken to report on this ground not allowed.
Andrew v. Andrew, 222

Books of joint-stock company evidence against
person representing himself to be a proprietor of
company. St. George's Steam Packet Co. ex parte
Maguire, 256

Bill filed to impeach deed, on ground of fraud,
and production of cases and opinions and con-
fidential letters by solicitor relating to execution of
deed required. Defendants, who claimed under
deed, alleged documents had reference to proceed-
ings in suit, and privileged. Documents to be pro-
duced. Follett v. Jefferys, 389

Reception of, where replication not filed. Chalk
v. Raine, 472
Exceptions. See Pleading.
Execution. See Partnership.
Executors-Liability of personal representatives of

executors for their wilful default. Authority of
executors to carry on testator's trade (see Will).
Kirkman v. Booth, 25

See Company. Parties.
Guardian. See Infant.

Immoral Consideration. See Deed.
Impertinence. See Pleading.
Incumbrances. See Mortgage.
Indemnity. See Solicitor.
Infant-Motion to appoint guardian ad litem to two
infant defendants resident within jurisdiction, with-
out their appearance, or commission, refused. Mower
v. Orr, 50

On motion for appointment of guardian of infant
defendants, appearance of one of them, less than
month old, in court dispensed with, on production
of affidavit of birth, and that it would be prejudicial
to remove it. Stuteley v. Harrison, 336

Order of course obtained by direction of next
friend of two infant plaintiffs,' discharging their
solicitor, and appointing new one, considerable time
after one had attained twenty-one, though it was
doubtful whether other had attained that age,
irregular, and discharged, with costs to be paid by
next friend. Brown v. Brown, 388

Life policy of assurance settled, on marriage of
A. and B, on wife, for life, with remainder to hus-
band for life, remainder to children of marriage
at twenty-one, with remainder, in default of
children, as B, the wife, should appoint. B. ap-
pointed her interest to A, and died, leaving only
one child.

After B.'s death a bonus payable on
policy. Petition presented by trustees and A,
stating that A, unable to support child, and
going to emigrate, and praying that sum receivable
in respect of bonus be paid to trustee, and applied
for maintenance of child. Prayer of petition granted,
on condition that A. gave up his life interest under settlement. Hays, ex parte, 441

See Amendment. Company. Legacy: Injunction- Where injunction obtained by plaintiff to restrain joint action against him by several defendants, all of whoin but two put in answers, and obtained order to dissolve as against themselves; and other two put in answers, but refused to move to dissolve, those defendants who had obtained order to dissolve at liberty to move to dissolve as against other two, without serving them with notice of motion. M'Gregor v. Conyngham, 41

Railway company filed bill against surveyors who had brought action at law against them in respect of surveys made by them for company, and other matters connected with those surveys, and for monies expended by them for company. Bill alleged that with discovery asked for, company could successfully defend action. Injunction when action was nearly ready for trial, applied for on ground that accouuts too complicated to be taken in action at law, refused. South-Eastern Railway Co, v. Martin, 103

Plaintiff who had never been in possession, and whose alleged title first accrued nearly twenty years since, filed bill againt defendant in possession of certain real estates, and in respect of which an action of ejectment between plaintiff and defendant was then pending, praying for injunction to restrain defendant from felling certain ornamental and other timber. Demurrer, on ground that person out of possession must first establish his right at law before he can come into equity allowed. Davenport v. Davenport, 163

Dissolution of, by amending bill by adding plaintiff. Attorney General v. Marsh, 272

Special injunction granted, without bill filed, to restrain creditor from proceeding against company with suit in Lord Mayor's Court, commenced previously to order made, for winding up affairs of company. Injunction dissolved with costs; and that notwithstanding interim manager appointed since application for injunction. Indian Mail Packet Co., 390

Guardians of poor of Southampton applied for act of parliament to authorize levying of poorrates upon owners instead of occupiers of small tenements; and bill which contained proviso for payment of costs incurred in promoting same out of poor-rates, rejected. Injunction granted to restrain guardians from paying these expenses out of rates. Allorney General v. Guardians, fc. of Southampton, 393

If it appear that powers of act of parliament for making railway were to be exercised contrary to conditions for which they were granted, or contrary to conditions on which shareholders subscribed their capital, Court has jurisdiction to interfere. If coinpany declined or are unable distinctly to state they were constructing part with the view of completing whole line, Court will interfere. Court will' interfere upon application of single shareholder. Directors no right to apply capital subscribed for whole line to make part only. "Cohen v. Wilkinson, 419

What amounts to a breach of. Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Dimes, 411

Where order for, discharged upon appeal, defendants entitled to costs of original motion. Beardmer v. London and North-Western Railway 432

What species of fraud sufficient to give Court jurisdiction. Injunction against company for determining contract and entering upon incomplete works refused, mala fides not being established. Waring v. Manchester, fr. Railway Co., 450

New Series, XVIII.- INDEX, Chanc. & Bankr.

Plaintiff having obtained ex parle injunction, afterwards dissolved on ground of concealment of facts, not precluded making application for another injunction upon merits. Fitch v. Rochfort, 458

See Administration of Estate. Affidavit. Copyright. Covenant. Partnership. School. Ship and

Shipping Insolvent-Bill of sale as to personal property given

by insolvent to creditor more than year before insolvency, but possession not taken by creditor till one month prior. Creditor restrained from proceeding to sell property, and could only avail himself of bill of sale under insolvency. Parrott v.

Congreve, 279 Insurance--Loan granted by insurance company upon

bond with sureties, and policy on life of borrower, as collateral security. Premiums not paid within days of grace, but demanded by company, who brought actions against sureties who refused to pay, and pleaded non est factum and payment. Suit instituted to restrain such actions, and it being contended that demand by company after policy "was actually void" had revived it, such revival neutralized by fact of refusal to pay, and bill dis

missed, with costs. Edge v. Duke, 183 Irregularity. See Practice. Jurisdiction-Power and duty of Lord Chancellor or

other Judge having sole jurisdiction over suit in which he has an interest. Decree of sole Judge, though interested, not void for incapacity, and ought not to be treated as a nullity. Grand Junction Canal v. Dimes, 365

Power of Judge being an interested party. Vice Chancellor no power to alter or discharge order made by Lord Chancellor, but order must be taken, as it appears to be, without reference to power of his Lordship to make it. Ibid. 419

In suit for distribution of trust fund, one of plaintiffs, married woman, entitled for her separate use to share in property: her busband, who was made a defendant, not having been heard of since 1843, application made, upon authority of Mores v. Mores, to have cause set down for hearing notwithstanding husband had not appeared. Upon objection raised by Registrar to jurisdiction of Vice Chancellor, Court refused to make order. Russell v. Lucy, 464

See Arbitration. Costs. Patent. Railway.

Land Tar-Guardians of A, an infant, tenant in tail

in possession of an estate, contracted for redemption of land-tax, under 38 Geo. 3. c. 60, and made all transfers of stock, agreed to be made, before 1804. In 1804 A. attained his majority, and suffered recovery. In 1805, A, by indentures of lease and release, executed in consideration of intended marriage, conveyed estate, with its rights, members, and appurtenances, &c. to certain uses, and entered into usual covenants for title. Land-tax not noticed in these deeds. After execution of deeds and during A's life, said charge in lieu of land-tax kept separate from rents of estate. Charge not pass by settlement, and not merged in estate during A's

life. Blundell v. Stanley, 300 Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. See Railway. Leasehold. See Equitable Mortgage. Legacy-Under bequest of, to A. B, his wife and chil

dren, parents and children take together as joint tenants, and A. B. and wife reckon as one person, and take only one share. Gordon v. Whieldon, 5

Bequest of personal estate to A. for life, and after her death to testator's brothers and sisters; but if any of brothers and sisters should die before they became entitled to their shares, shares of them so dying to go to their children. Testator

B

left five brothers and sisters, two of whom died in
lifetime of A. Word “entitled” refer to death of
testator, and not of A, and shares vested absolutely
in brothers and sisters, and representatives of each
of them who died entitled to fifth of fund. Hender-

son v. Kennicolt, 40
Legacy (contiuued)-Testator, who died in 1838, left

legacy to person of weak intellect, and a year after
executors invested amount in funds, and regularly
invested dividends; and suit instituted by legatee,
by next friend, against executors, claiming legacy
with 41. per cent. from year after testator's death,
and costs of suit. Executors not bound to pay
legacy and interest; and stock ordered to be trans-
ferred into court, and costs of suit paid out of testa-
tor's general estate. Pothecary v. Pothecary, 48
- Executors invested legacy of 501. to infant, minus
legacy duty, in 31. per cent. consols. Upon bill filed
by legatee on coming of age for amount, with 41.
per cent. interest, decree made for plaintiff, with
costs. Executors should have paid legacy into
court. Rimell v. Simpson, 55
- Testator gave to A. stock to be paid to him
within six months after testator's decease, and in
case it should happen that A, should die not having
received legacy, and he should leave any children,
such children should be entitled to same in equal
proportions, payable at twenty one or marriage.
A. died during testator's lifetime, leaving three
children who had attained twenty-one, and were
living at testator's decease. Legacy lapsed, and
children took no interest therein. Smith v. Oliver,
80

- Testator gave to his daughter 15,0001., to be
kept in trust by his executors till she should attain
twenty-one, or marry with consent, whichever might
first happen, when sum was to be settled on said
daughter; but failing her attaining twenty-one, or
having issue by such marriage, money to devolve
upon others. Daughter having attained twenty-
one without having been married, entitled to legacy
absolutely, without settlement. Arnold v. Arnold, 90

Case in which illegitimate daughter of testator
entitled to share with legitimate children in residue
of testator's property. Evans v. Davies, 180
- In 1795 reversion in real estate devised to trus-
tees upon trust, after death of tenant for life, to sell
estate and pay part of purchase-money to A. A, by
will, made F. his executor and L. his residuary lega-
tee. By deed dated in 1828, in consideration of
6,0001. paid to F. as executor of A, F, by direction
of L, assigned right to purchase-money to S. No
mention made of legacy duty at time of sale. In
1835 estate sold, on death of tenant for life, to S,
and A.'s share of purchase-money allowed to him.
In 1845, F, as executor of A, made to pay legacy
duty. L. died insolvent. Upon bill filed by F. in
1846, against executors of s, and devisee of estate
under his will, praying to be recouped sum paid for
legacy duty, F. no right to recover, either against
executor or devisee. Farwell v. Seale, 189
- Where testator, who died in 1789, by his will
gave all his property to defendant upon trusts which
did not exhaust whole beneficial interest in estate,
and appointed defendant his executor, next-of-kin,
and not executor, entitled to undisposed-of residue.
Mapp v. Ellcock, 217
- Son of testator dead at time latter made his will,
but left issue, who survived testator. Bequest in
will to son not lapse or become void, but passed, as
part of his personal estate, to his administrator
under 33rd section of 1 Vict. c. 26. Mower v. Orr, 361

Testator bequeathed personal estate to trustees
upon trust to place so much money in funds as
would produce yearly 1001. to be paid to wife, and

further sum of 2,1201. upon like securities, and pay
dividends of part thereof to W. H. for life, and re-
mainder of 2,1201. to other persons; and testator
declared that in case estate not sufficient to pay
legacies in full previously to death of wife, then
legacies should only be paid in part during life of
wife, and be made up after her decease. Estate
proved insufficient to pay legacies in full during life
of wife. Legatees only entitled to interest upon
unpaid portion of legacies from time at which re-
mainder capable of being paid up. Holmes v. Crispe,
439

Testator devised estate of which he was in pos-
session to B. for life, with divers remainders over;
he subsequently bequeathed to executors live and
dead stock, household furniture and effects, and all
personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, upon
various trusts. Growing crops passed to executors,
and did not belong to devisee of estate. Testator
directed trustees to raise sum of 12,0001., for portions
of children of his son J. and his daughter E, towards
whom he stood in loco parentis, and also to levy
and raise for their maintenance and education in
mean time, until respective portions should become
payable, such yearly sum (not exceeding what in-
terest of expectant portion would amount to after
rate of 4l. per cent. per annum) as to trustees should
seem sufficient. Trustees raised for maintenance
less than 41. per cent., and it was held, upon a
petition by legatees, they were not entitled to interest
but to maintenance only. Rudge v. Winnall, 469

See Mortmain.
Lelter Missive-Service of, out of jurisdiction. Anony-

mous, 229
Lien-Plaintiffs conveyed estate but retained con-

veyance as security for unpaid purchase-money,
and purchaser mortgaged estate, but mortgagee
neglected to ask for first conveyance. Plaintiff's
lien upon estate prior to that of mortgagee. Worth-

ington v. Morgan, 233
- of solicitors of company on papers of company,
not affected by Joint-Stock Companies Winding-up

Act. Orford and Worcester Extension Railway, 247
— See Banker. Baron and Feme. Costs. Solicitor.
Limitation—though void for remoteness, subsequent

limitation valid (see Devise). Goring v. Howard, 105
Limitations, Statute of- Annuity and certain extra

premiums for life insurance were charged upon
lands of grantor and secured by his covenant to pay,
by demise with power of sale of lands charged, and
by judgment entered up and duly registered. Re-
presentatives of annuitant entitled to recover whole
of arrears of annuity and all extra premiums which
had respectively become due to and been paid by
them, or grantee, within twenty years from last pay-
ment by grantor. Hunter v. Nockolds, 407
Lunatic. See Legacy.

Marriage. See Baron and Feme. Covenant. Will.
Master-Further evidence before, after warrant issued

on preparing reports (see Practice). Skalleross v.

Wrighi, 119
Merger. See Land Tax.
Mortgage--Mortgagee devised mortgaged estates to

three trustees, one of whom could not be found.
Costs of petition, under 1 Will. 4. c. 60, for recon-
veyance, borne by mortgagor. King v. Smith, 43

Testatrix bequeathed 1,0001, to trustees, in trust
to invest and pay annual produce during life of M.
F. H. to her order or separate use. Testatrix died
in 1838, and, by deed, dated 24th October 1840, M.
F. H. in consideration of 3001. granted annuity of
301. to J. H, out of dividends and interest to accrue
on legacy of 1,0001., or securities for same. This
annuity assigned to trustees for J. H. By deed of

like date, between C. H. and parties to other deed, C. H. covenanted with J. H. to pay to herannuity of 301. as often as default made in payment by M. F. H. until legacy invested by testatrix's executor, and C, H. was to stand in place of J. H, as regarded interest and dividends to accrue due to extent of any sums paid by him to J. H. previously to investment of legacy. C. H. paid divers sums to J. H. under his covenant, and in November 1840 executor received notice of J. H.'s security, and in 1846 notice of subsequent mortgage executed by M. F. H. of her interest in same dividends and interest to S, but no express notice was given to executor of deed to which c. H. was party until May 1848. In July 1848 legacy of 1,0001., less duty, and interest thereon amounting to 3391. 108., paid into court by executor under 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96, to " The account of M. F. H. and her incumbrancers." C. H. entitled to priority over S. to extent of payments made by him to J. H. Expenses attending payment into court paid by executor out of testatrix's estate. Cawthorne, in re, 116

Payment of, out of residuary estate. Brooke v. Warwick, 137

Estate mortgaged, to A, for term of 500 years, and A. filed bill of foreclosure against persons entitled to equity of redemption and reversion, some being infants; and by consent, Master ordered to inquire whether sale in fee would be for benefit of infants, and, if he should so find, that property should be so sold. Property sold under decree; but realized less than mortgaged debt. Defendants entitled to difference in value between term and fee. Foster v. Eddy, 151

Extra costs of reconveyance of mortgaged estate, caused by lunacy of mortgagee, ordered to be paid by mortgagor, lunatic being trustee of mortgage money only, and that fact disclosed on face of mortgage deed." Lewis, in re, 153

Mortgagee of two distinct estates, each of which subject to prior mortgage to different mortgagees, entitled as against mortgagor to decree for redemption or foreclosure of either or both of mortgaged estates. Observations on withdrawal by plaintiff of gratuitous offer in bill. Reference for inquiry as to substantial repairs and lasting improvements not ordered at hearing on further directions, merely on statements of counsel for an incumbrancer that such repairs, &c. have been made; unless all parties interested consent, petition is necessary. Pelly v. Wathin, 281

A. mortgaged estate to B. for term, and died, having devised estate to his wife and children, some of them infants. B. filed foreclosure bill against A.'s wife and children. On application of plaintiff, solicitor of suitors' fund appointed guardian of infant defendants. Decree made that, in default of payment, defendants should be foreclosed, and that in event of foreclosure property be sold. Plaintiff liable to pay costs of suit. 'Harris v. Ilamlyn, 403

Plaintiff was member of building society, constituted under 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 32, which by its rules was to continue till each share had realized 1201.; plaintiff became purchaser of twelve and a half shares, and in consideration of 7501. advanced to him in respect thereof, he executed to trustees a mortgage deed of real property which contained power of sale in case of default in payment of subscriptions; and it was declared, that all sums afterwards becoming due should be treated as due at time of sale: the 62nd rule, relating to redemption of a mortgage to the society, though not in same terms, was not inconsistent with these trusts. Upon bill by mortgagor to redeem, held, that the Master, in taking account of what was due

upon the mortgage, was to calculate probable duration of the society, and to treat future accruing subscriptions and other payments until that period as due at time of redemption. Mosley v. Baker, 457

Devise by mortgagee of mortgaged estate to trustees, upon trust to sell, with power to give receipts to purchasers. Bill of foreclosure by mortgagee against trustees only not bind cestui que trusts under will of mortgagor. Chamberlain v. Thacker, 489

See Equitable Mortgage. Lien. Mortmain-Testator gave shares in Northumber

land and Durham Bank, and money due upon railway debentures of Newcastle and Carlisle Railway Company, to trustees for benefit of certain charities. Bank shares within Statute of Mortmain; but railway debentures, being merely promise to pay money upon credit of undertaking: not a charge upon land, and therefore not within Mortmain Acts. Myers v. Perrigal, 185

Dock and canal companies seised of considerable real estates, yielding large net income, divisible among proprietors of respective companies. Shares, by several acts of incorporation declared to be personal estate, and transmissible and distributable as such, and not of nature of real property. Shares not within Mortmain Act. Also, bonds of companies, given for money borrowed under powers of acts by way of mortgage of undertaking, and to secure payment of annual sum, not within Mortmain Act. Walker v. Milne, 288

Testatrix gave all her property, consisting of leaseholds and personalty, to her brother, who died nine days after her, and by will bequeathed whole of his property to charities

. Duty of representatives of testatrix was to sell leaseholds for payment of debts, &c. Brother who had made no election took leaseholds as personalty, and charities therefore entitled to them under his will. Shadbolt v. Thorn

ton, 392
Motion to dismiss. See Bill.
Necessaries. See Baron and Feme.
Orders--67th Order of April 1828, 119

23rd and 24th Orders of August 1841, 105
33rd Order of May 1845, 211, 229
65th Order of May 1845, 71
125th Order of May 1845, 150

of December 29, 1848, 503 Order of Course. See Practice. Parties– In suit for an account of trust premises, bill

claiming no more than trust deed comprised, and trustees by their answer not charging that settlor had mixed up settled property with his own, his executor not necessary party. Gaunt v. Johnson, 45

In suit for administration of testator's estate, A. B. in whom certain leaseholds vested, made party. A. B. became bankrupt, and official assignee appointed. Before creditors' assignee appointed A. B. put in plea of bankruptcy. Plea not supported, and bankrupt necessary party prior to creditors' assignee having been appointed and having elected to take leaseholds. Until that time no final vesting of property. Turner v. Nicholls, 278 - Defendant died before appearing to bill. Representative brought before Court by means of bill to which none of defendants in suit made parties. All defendants in first suit ought to have been made parties in second. Foster v. Foster, 356

See Company. Specific Performance, Partnership-Banking firm in which A. was part