costs could not be enforced. The following cases were referred to in support of these arguments : The Attorney General v. the Corporation of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & Cr. 171; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chance. 51. The Attorney General v. the Corporation of Lichfield, 13 Sim. 547. See also 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 472. The Attorney General v. Wilson, 9 Sim. 30; s. c. Cr. & Ph. 1; 10 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 53. The VICE CHANCELLOR.-There is only one question to be considered in this case, because it appears to me if this Court is satisfied that a proposed payment is not a fair and equitable payment the Court will exercise its jurisdiction and restrain it. The first act of parliament referred to has been gone through and the particular act of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 91. has been gone through; but the question is, whether it is not sufficiently manifest upon the face of the case that the thing which the informant alleges is intended to be done by the corporation is unfair and inequitable. I cannot consent to give up a jurisdiction over that question to any other tribunal unless an act of parliament has expressly taken it away. Now, I must say it rather appears to me that such a question as this is not a question on which the Poor Law Commissioners could properly decide. In this case there is clearly no authority whatever for doing the proposed thing. The Poor Law Commissioners have already expressed an opinion, not that they would allow it, but have pointed out the only means which occurred to their judgment as the means by which it would be allowed, namely, the having an express authority by an act of parliament, and the parties who are sought to be restrained by the injunction actually so framed their bill as to take the benefit, if they could get it from the legislature, of raising the expenses of prosecuting the act out of the monies received by the guardians under the authority of the firstrecited act; it therefore appears to me to be a concluded case. I must say I think that so far as there can have been a legislative declaration upon the subject by the course which has been adopted by the case. House of Commons we have it in this The House of Commons did not think it right to pass an act of parliament which has for its substantive recital that it is expedient that better provision should be made for the rating of particular houses and tenements and for collecting the rates, but that the same cannot be effected without the authority of parliament, the better method being that which is detailed in the body of the act. This was brought before the only branch of the legislature which, according to the usual course of things, it could be brought before, and the House of Commons thought proper to reject the bill, and therefore I have what is equivalent to a legislative declaration that this was not a matter that was expedient. Then, if it was not a matter that was expedient that the bill should be passed, and if the parties themselves all along acted upon the known admission that they could not have the expenses of the act, even if it did pass, unless there was an express authority given by the act for that purpose, it seems to me idle to talk about sending it now to take the opinion of the Commissioners, which opinion, to a certain extent, the Court is already in possession of. My opinion, therefore, is that the only order I can make is to refuse this motion, with costs. K. BRUCE, V.C.) WRIGLEY v. SWAINSON. May 24, 28, 29. SWAINSon v. wrigley. Marriage Settlement-Fraud on Marital Rights. In March, Mr. W. was engaged to be married to Miss J. In July, Miss J. settled her property on herself and her relations, no benefit being given to Mr. W. In August, they were married. Three years afterwards Mr. W. filed a bill to upset the settlement, on the ground of its having been a fraud on his marital rights. Evidence was given on the part of the defendants that Mr. W. had, before the marriage, reason to believe that a settlement was intended, and had been made-Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. In November 1844 Joseph Wrigley began to court Elizabeth Jones. In February 1845, they were engaged to be married, and the courtship continued, without intermission, until their marriage. Joseph Wrigley was at the time a salesman in the employment of Messrs. Kay & Son of Manchester. He had six children, some of whom were grown up. Elizabeth Jones was the housekeeper in the family of Mr. Swainson, a manufacturer at Preston, and had been in his service for twenty-five years, and was very much valued and esteemed by him. Mr. Wrigley did not propose to settle anything on the occasion of the marriage, and had, in fact, nothing to settle. Miss Jones had several railway shares, some of which were sold by Mr. Swainson, for her, in the early part of the year 1844, and the purchase-money, amounting to 2,100l., was lent to Messrs. Clayton & Gladstone, who carried on business in partnership, as manufacturers, at Manchester. Mr. Clayton was the son-in-law of Mr. Swainson. By an indenture, dated the 7th of July 1845, and executed on that day, and made between Elizabeth Jones, of the one part, and Mr. Swainson, Mr. Birley, and Mr. Clayton, of the other part, after reciting that Elizabeth Jones was entitled to 2,1007., then in the hands of Messrs. Clayton & Gladstone of Manchester, and some London and Greenwich railway shares, and that she was desirous of settling the premises on the trusts thereinafter declared ; it is witnessed that Elizabeth Jones assigned the said debt and shares to the trustees, upon trust that the trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them, or the executors or administrators of such survivor, should, at such time or times as they or he should think proper, or as Elizabeth Jones should direct, call in the said debt, and convert the shares into money, and should, when and as they or he should think proper, invest the monies arising therefrom at interest upon real security, or in the bonds or debentures of any railway, dock, or joint-stock company, or on any other personal security, or in any other way which. they or he should think proper; and should pay the income to Elizabeth Jones, for her separate use, independently of any husband she might afterwards marry, and should stand possessed of the capital, after her death, upon trust for the children of the marriage, and in default of children, upon trust for such purposes as she should by will appoint; and, in default of such appointment, upon trust for the persons therein mentioned, who were relations of Elizabeth Jones. The indenture then contained a power to invest the trust-monies in the purchase of freehold, copyhold, and leasehold lands, or in any other description of property; and a power for the trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them, or the executors or administrators of the survivor, to appoint new trustees. The settlement did not contain any reference to the intended marriage with Mr. Wrigley, or any intended marriage. On the 14th of August 1845, more than a month after the settlement, the marriage was solemnized. In December 1845, Mr. Wrigley, being in want of money, applied to his wife to assist him, and she undertook to procure 300l. for him, if he would give a promissory note to Mr. Swainson for that sum. The note was given accordingly, but was afterwards brought back by Mrs. Wrigley, and another note was substituted for it, whereby Mr. Wrigley and another person, as his surety, promised to pay 300l. to Mr. Swainson, Mr. Birley, and Mr. Clayton. The money was soon after paid to Mr. Wrigley. In April 1846 Mrs. Wrigley left her husband, and returned to her old place as housekeeper in Mr. Swainson's family. In November 1847 Mr. Wrigley received a notice to repay the 300l. to Mr. Swainson, Mr. Birley, and Mr. Clayton. In January 1848 Mr. Wrigley filed a bill against the trustees of the settlement, Mrs. Wrigley, and such of Mrs. Wrigley's relatives as took interests under the settlement. The bill stated the engagement, the settlement, the marriage, and the circumstances relating to the loan of 300l.; and also stated that the settlement had been made without any communication with the plaintiff, and without his knowledge or assent; and prayed that it might be declared that the settlement might be delivered up to be cancelled, as being a fraud on his marital rights, and that the promissory note might also be cancelled, and that the sums which had formed the subject of the settlement might be paid to him. This was the suit of Wrigley v. Swainson. To this bill Mrs. Wrigley and the trustees put in a joint answer which contained the following statements: - Mrs. Wrigley stated that in the February before the marriage, Mr.Wrigley said to her "that he did not want any of her property, and was desirous that the whole should be settled on her, and to be at her disposal." Mr. Swainson stated that on the 14th of April before the marriage, he had an interview with Mr. Wrigley, by appointment, for the purpose of talking the marriage over, and that, at that interview, Mr. Wrigley expressed his desire of marrying Miss Jones, and stated "that he would secure to her a comfortable home, and that he did not propose to make any settlement of his own property upon her, but that he did not want any of her property, and was desirous that all her own property, which he understood to be in his (Mr. Swainson's) hands, should be settled upon herself, independently of him ;" and that he (Mr. Swainson) thereupon, and in consequence of this interview, gave instructions to his solicitor to prepare a settlement accordingly. Mrs. Wrigley stated she saw Mr. Wrigley immediately after this interview, and that he repeated his remarks as to her property. Mr. Swainson and Mrs. Wrigley both stated generally that Mr. Wrigley was, both before and at the time of the marriage, informed of the settlement.. The plaintiff read as evidence several of Mrs. Wrigley's letters before the marriage, in which there was no mention of any settlement or any allusions to her property. The defendants also entered into evidence. The principal witness examined by them was Mrs. Wren. Mrs. Wren stated that she lived at Preston; that she was a common friend of Mr. Wrigley and Miss Jones; and that the courtship took place at her house :-Miss Jones coming there on Sundays, where she was joined by Mr.Wrigley from Manchester. Mrs. Wren stated repeated conversations between her and Mr. Wrigley, between November 1844 and August 1845. In one of them Mrs. Wren observed that "Miss Jones would require her property to be settled on herself," to which Mr. Wrigley replied, "that it was very proper to do so; that money was not his object in marrying, as he had sufficient money of his own to make his wife comfortable." On the 14th of April 1845, the day of the interview with Mr. Swainson before mentioned, Mr. Wrigley told Mrs. Wren "that he was going to see Mr. Swainson, who was going to inform him about Miss Jones's property and a settlement." He afterwards told Mrs. Wren "that he had seen Mr. Swainson, and that every thing was arranged satisfactorily, and that all would be comfortable." Mrs. Wren was sure that the word "settlement" had been frequently used in conversation between them. A cross-bill was filed by Mrs. Wrigley and her trustees against Mr. Wrigley, praying that the indenture of settlement might be declared to be binding on Joseph Wrigley, and that he might be ordered to pay to the trustees the 300l. which had been lent to him, and interest. This was the suit of Swainson v. Wrigley. Mr. Wrigley, in answer to this bill, stated that he had, in an interview with Miss Jones, said, "that as his business did not require much capital, he would not want any part of Miss Jones's for the purpose of his business, and, therefore, he would not object to such capital being settled, so as to remain at her own disposal." He also admitted that the interview had taken place with Mr. Swainson on the 14th of April, and that, at that interview, he said to Mr. Swainson" that he should not want any of her property for his business, and that when his income was increased by the income of her property, he should be able to make her comfortable;" to which he added he had no intention of becoming bound by any settlement of the property which might be executed without his further concurrence, or of authorizing Mr. Swainson to cause any settlement of such property to be prepared or executed. The causes now came on to be heard. Mr. Russell and Mr. C. J. Simpson, for Mr. Wrigley. This settlement is, under the circumstances, invalid. The law as to the point is stated in Goddard v. Snow (1). "It must be made out in evidence, that, at the time of the execution of the settlement, marriage was in the con (1) 1 Russ. 485, 490. templation of the parties; that the woman executed the settlement in contemplation of the future marriage; and that she concealed it from her future husband. If these facts be proved, the cases have established the principle, that such a settlement cannot stand against the marital right of the husband." Here marriage was in the contemplation of the parties: Mrs. Wrigley executed the settlement in contemplation of her future marriage, and it was concealed from the future husband. Mr. Wigram and Mr. Bazalgette, for the trustees. In all the cases in which settlements have been upset on the ground of the future husband not having concurred in them, there has been a scheme for keeping him in the dark-a deliberate and intentional concealment-what may be called a fraudulent concealment. There is no decided case of a settlement, made bona fide, without any intention of concealment, being upset, merely because it happened that the husband did not know anything about it. The Courts have always taken hold of the circumstances of fraud on which to ground their decisions, and escaped from having to decide simply on the ignorance of the husband. To decide a case simply on the ground that the husband did not know of it, would be going a step further than the decided cases. But the case does not rest on this ground. The evidence establishes these points: first, that there was no intention to defraud or deceive Mr. Wrigley; secondly, that, if Mr. Wrigley did not concur in the deed of settlement now sought to be upset, he did concur in some settlement of the same nature. He cannot therefore sustain a case of fraudulent concealment, or of concealment at all. In addition to this, if he had any right, after the marriage, to upset it, he is now barred by his concurrence in it after the marriage, by means of his dealing with the trustees of the settlement in respect of the loan of the 3001. They cited The Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, De Manneville v. Crompton, 1 Ves. & St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl. & K. 623. Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Hare, 608; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 73. Mr. Bacon and Mr. Follett, for Mrs. Wrigley. Mr. Milne, for the surety in the promissory note. Mr. Russell, in reply.-The case stated by the defendants, if in every respect true, amounts only to this, that there was a talk about the settlement, and that Mr. Wrigley expressed a general intention that, if a settlement should be made, he would offer no obstacle in the way of the property of his wife being secured for her benefit, with a full reservation to himself to make any suggestions as to detail. He gave no sanction to any plan of a settlement being made without him. He had a right to presume that, if a settlement was intended, he should hear more of it-that it would be submitted to him. He had a right to presume that, if he heard nothing more of the matter, there would be no settlement. The case is exactly the same as if nothing had been said about a settlement, in which case the plaintiff would be clearly entitled to the property. To refuse relief to the plaintiff on the ground of the conversations mentioned in the evidence establish that a conversation with an intended husband, where he expressed a wish genèrally that the lady's fortune should be settled for her benefit, would justify the lady and her friends, without any further communication, to make what settlement they pleased. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.C.-It would, very probably, be improper to decide against the validity of this settlement, without knowing the testimony that Mr. Swainson would give, if examined as a witness; especially, as I think that the defendant Mrs. Wrigley is undoubtedly, considering the state in which she is, not able to be examined as a witness. The question, however, is, whether it is necessary to put the parties to that expense, and to incur the delay of examining Mr. Swainson as a witness. That question depends on these other questions, which may, I think, be represented thus: first, whether, consistently with a due regard to what Mr. Wrigley has sworn in the cross suit, and to what Mrs. Wrigley and Mr. Swainson have sworn in the original suit, it is a just inference from the evidence that Mr. Wrigley had notice, in fact, before his marriage, and notice, in fact, early enough before the marriage, that it was intended by Miss Jones, now Mrs. Wrigley, and Mr. Swainson, previously to the marriage, that her property, or the bulk of it, should be settled; and secondly, whether, if Mr. Wrigley married under the impression that a settlement of her property had not been made, that belief or impression was one which he was justified in entertaining. I think that Mr. Wrigley had notice that there was an intention of settling the property, and that he was not justified in thinking that no settlement had been made. The facts already proved are, in my judgment, sufficient to preclude Mr. Wrigley from saying or from complaining that he married (if he did, in fact, marry) without notice of the settlement. I think that, consistently with all the authorities, the relief which the plaintiff asks ought to be refused. I think that both bills must be dismissed, with costs. laugh, in the county of Norfolk, either in my lifetime or after my death, and that if I shall not erect the same in my lifetime, then that my trustees shall forthwith after my death erect the same, according to such plan as I shall in my lifetime approve of, or if I shall die before such plan shall be prepared and completed, then according to such plan as the trustees or trustee for the time being, under this my will, with the consent of the person for the time being beneficially entitled to the immediate freehold of my said manors, &c. under this my will, shall think proper to adopt, adhering as closely as possible (situation and other incidental circumstances being considered), to the plan of the house now the residence of Robert Marsham, Esq., of Stratton Strawless, in the said county of Norfolk :-now, therefore, in order to provide a fund for the erection of the said mansion house and offices after my death, in case I shall not erect the same in my lifetime, I give and bequeath unto my said trustees, in the event of my not erecting or completing the erection of the said mansion house in my lifetime, the sum of 20,000l. sterling money, to the intent to be applied for the purposes aforesaid, and in the mean time to be laid out by them, in their names, in the purchase of stock in some or one of the public stocks or funds of Great Britain, or at interest on real security; and also that my said trustees shall from time to time receive the interest, &c. of the said stocks, funds, and securities, and lay out such interest, &c. in the purchase of other stocks or funds as aforesaid, so as for the annual income and produce of the said stocks or funds to accumulate in the nature of compound interest, until the said money shall be wanted for the purposes herein before and also hereinafter mentioned." The mansion house was not built or commenced during the testator's lifetime; and a bill was filed after his death for carrying out the trusts of the will, and the cause came on for hearing upon a question as to whether the accumulations directed by the testator were within the Thellusson Act (reported 12 Sim. 304), and it was then decided that the trustees were to build the mansion house out of the accumulated |