through Notice of an unregistered Deed. (1576.) But it seems that in this case a mere 19 V. J. 439. Constructive Notice is not sufficient; there (1551, &c.) must be clear proof of an actual Notice, amounting to Fraud in the Purchaser; and under this restriction the rule cannot be thought objectionable, since no person can be affected by it whom it was the intention of the legislature to protect. (1577.) The origination and continuation of Equitable Rights by mere implication or Construction, may be considered as one of the causes of that uncertainty and liability to accident, which must be confessed to affect in some degree the Title to Real Property. And therefore length of time is in general allowed to operate as a bar to the enforcement of Constructive Trusts (1578.) and it seems also that where the Trust or Equity is of a very doubtful nature, it will not be held to attach upon a Purchaser, though acquainted with the cir- 1 Sand. Us. cumstances. (1373.) 597; 1 Sand. Turn. 11, 12. 55. 321; Sugd. Vend. 730. SECT. 4. Of the Concurrent Jurisdiction of - Courts of Equity with Courts of Law. (1579.) THE merely Equitable interests of which we have hitherto been treating in this Chapter, are for the most part cognizable by Courts of Equity only; but the subjects of these interests, the Lands and Tenements upon (408.) which they attach, are equally, and indeed primarily, within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law; and the result of the system may be said to be, that what on one side of Westminster Hall is held to be the absolute property of A., on the other side is decided to belong in effect no less absolutely to B., or at least to be subject to his claims. In order that two such apparently opposite sentences may stand together, it is evident that some compromise or understanding must subsist between the two Courts; that what is asserted by the one must be admitted, in some sense at least, by the other; and that it must be ascertained to which of the two the right of qualifying the first decision, and of pronouncing the final decree, and enforcing it when pronounced, is to be ascribed. (1580.) And accordingly we find that Equity always admits and supposes the authority of the Common Law; but on the other hand, whatever doubts and contests may have arisen formerly on these subjects, it is now fully settled that the clearest Legal Right is no answer to a preferable claim in Equity, and that whoever attempts to enforce the former to the detriment of the latter, though by strictly legal means, may be restrained by the Injunction of a Court of Equity or punished for proceeding in contempt of it. * (1580. n.) As to Injunctions to restrain the repetition of Ejectments, see Mitf. 127. * Id. 22. (1185.) (1581.) Hitherto then we have been considering Equity in her highest pitch of superiority to Law in another view she may be regarded rather as a successful rival. Thus, where a Partition is desired between Copar- 1 Fonbl. 18. ceners, Joint-tenants, or Tenants in Common, or where a Widow's right of Dower is to be established, Courts of Equity have acquired a jurisdiction, and it has become more usual to proceed there than in Courts of Law; and the same may be said of Tithe Cases, as already noticed. So where the Tenant of a Particular Estate is unlawfully committing Waste, the most effectual and speedy remedy for the son next in succession is to apply to a Court of Equity for an Injunction to restrain him. (1582.) But the most remarkable advantage which Courts of Equity possess over Courts of Law, in cases within the jurisdiction of both, is the practice of compelling the Specific Performance of Agreements, instead of merely awarding pecuniary damages for their nonperformance. This practice indeed arises from the view which Equity takes of the Agreement per See 7 Bac. Ab. 286, &c.; 1 Fonbl. 32. (718.) (1366.) (1582.) Those parts of the Chancellor's Jurisdiction. which are not referable to the general system of Equity, but to a peculiar Commission always attending the Great Seal, do not here require a particular consideration. Such are the custody of Infants, Idiots, and Lunatics; (as to which see 2 Fonbl, 237, &c.; 1 Fonbl. 57, &c.) and the principal Administration of the Bankrupt Laws, (241, &c.) which now depends on St. 6 G. 4, c. 16. 1 Fonbl. 348. 370; 1 Russ. 358. as creating a Trust, and therefore depends on principles which have been generally stated. already; but it may not be improper to consider them a little more fully in this place. (1583.) We have seen that to enable a Court of Equity to decree a Specific Performance, there must be an Agreement conforming to the (1565, &c.) Statute of Frauds, or exempted from it by peculiar circumstances. There must also be a sufficient Consideration for the Contract; and this may be either the foundation of a Family, as an intended Marriage; or something simply commodious, as the stipulated release of a contested claim; or valuable, as money, or whatever money can purchase. The last kind of Consideration, where the alienation is intended to be complete, constitutes a Contract of Sale, and it is of such Contracts that we propose here to treat, though within limits little answering to the importance of the subject. Sugd. Vend. 231. kins, Jac. 280. (1584.) And first, if the transaction be otherwise unimpeachable, no objection can in general be made on account of the inadequacy or exorbitance of the Consideration; though Stilwell v. Wil- it should be remembered that a grossly unreasonable price will afford a strong presumption of fraud; and where the interest sold is merely reversionary, great jealousy has always been shown on this point. (1585.) Nor does it appear that any accidental alteration of value, or even the total failure of the consideration on either side, happening subsequently to the Sugd. Vend. 236. (1533.) Id. 243. 341, &c. signature of the Agreement, will be sufficient to excuse from its performance. (1586.) By the Agreement a day is ordinarily fixed, for the Sugd. Vend. completion of the engagement by paying the price and executing the Conveyance; but as many accidental delays may occur, particularly in the investigation of the Title, Equity does not consider the time thus appointed as an essential condition of the Contract, unless it be expressly stipulated that it shall be so regarded; or unless the nature of the bargain, or the conduct of the party applying to the Court, be such as not to merit indulgence; or unless the subject of the contract be so liable to variation (as in the case of a Coal Mine, or Williams v. Atof a Life Estate or Reversionary interest in tenborough, Land) that lapse of time may materially affect its value. (1587.) In general, if the Contract be not completed on the day prescribed, the Purchaser will nevertheless be entitled thence- 479.489. forward to the rents and profits of the Land, and must pay interest on his Purchase Money from the same time, at the rate of four per cent, unless there be some express stipulation on the subject. 1 Turn. 70; Withy v. Cottle, Id. 78. Sugd. Vend. (1588.) Every Contract of Sale is made on Sugd. Vend. an implied condition, (if it be not expressed,) 192. that the Vendor shall make out a good Title to the property; and for this purpose he must at his own expense prepare an Abstract of the Id. 366, 367. necessary documents, and deliver it to the Pur. 448. chaser or his Solicitor or Agent, and afford |