him, than a faying which Cicero tells us he frequently made ufe of in private converfation, that he was fatisfi ed with his share of life and fame, Se fatis vel ad naturam; vel ad gloriam vixiffe. Many indeed have given over their pursuits after fame, but that has proceeded ei ther from the disappointments they have met in it, or from their experience of the little pleasure which attends it, or from the better information or natural coldness of old age: But feldom from a full fatisfaction and acquiefcence in their present enjoyments of it.

Nor is fame only unfatisfying in itfelf, but the defire of it lays us open to many accidental troubles which thofe are free from who have no fuch tender regard for it. How often is the ambitious man caft down and difappointed, if he receives no praife where he expected it? Nay, how often is he mortified with the very praises he receives, if they do not rife fo-high as he thinks they ought, which they feldom do unless increafed by flattery, fince few men have fo good an opinion of us as we have of ourfelves? But if the ambitious man can be fo much grieved even with: praise itself, how will he be able to bear up under fcandal and defamation? For the fame temper of mind which makes him defire fame, makes him. hate reproach. If he can be tranfported with the extraordinary praises of men, he will be as much dơ- jected by their cenfures. How little therefore is the happinefs of an ambitious man, who gives everyone a dominion over it, who thus fubjects himself to the good or ill fpeeches of others, and puts it in the power of every malicious tongue to throw him into a fit of melancholy, and deftroy his natural reft and repofe of mind? Efpecially when we confider that the world. is more apt to cenfure than applaud, and himself fuller of imperfections than of virtues.

We may farther observe, that fuch a man will be more grieved for the lofs of fame, than he could have been pleafed with the enjoyments of it. For though the prefence of this imaginary good cannot make us happy, the abfence of it may make us miferable: Be

caufe in the enjoyment of an object we only find that fhare of pleafure which it is capable of giving us, but in the lofs of it we do not proportion our grief to the real value it bears, but to the value our fancies and Imaginations fet upon it.

So inconfiderable is the fatisfaction that fame bringsalong with it, and fo great the difquietudes, to which it makes us liable, the defire of it ftirs up very uneafy motions in the mind, and is rather inflamed than fatisfied by the prefence of the thing defired. The enjoyment of it brings but very little pleasure, though the lofs or want of it be very fenfible and afflicting;and even this little happiness is fo very precarious, that it wholly depends on the will of others. We are not only tortured by the reproaches which are offered us, but are difappointed by the filence of men when it is unexpected; and humbled even by their praises. C.

SPECTATOR, Vol. IV. No. 257.

That I might not lofe myfelf upon a fubject of fo great extent as that of fame, I have treated it in a particular order and method. I have first of all confidered the reafons why Providence may have implanted in our minds fuch a principle of action. I have in the next place fhewn from many confiderations, first, that fame is a thing difficult to be obtained, and easily loft; fecondly, that it brings the ambitious man very little happinefs, but fubjects him to much uneafinefs and diffatisfaction. I fall in the last place fhew, that it hinders us from obtaining an end which we have abilities to acquire, and which is accompani ed with fulness of fatisfaction. I need not tell my reader, that I mean by this end that happinefs which is referved for us in another world, which every one has abilities to procure, and which will bring along with it fulnefs of joy, and pleasures for evermore..

How the purfuit after fame may hinder us in the attainment of this great end, I fhall leave the reader to collect from the three following confiderations. Fir, Because the ftrong defire of fame breeds feveral vicious habits in the mind..

Secondly, Becaufe many of thofe actions, which are apt to procure fame, are not in their nature conducive to this our ultimate happiness.

Thirdly, Becaufe if we fhould allow the fame ac tions to be the proper inftruments, both of acquiring fame, and of procuring this happiness, they would nevertheless fail in the attainment of this laft end, if they proceeded from a defire of the first.

These three propofitions are felf-evident to thofe who are verfed in fpeculations of morality. For: which reafon I fhall not enlarge upon them, but proceed to a point of the fame nature, which may open· to us a more uncommon field of fpeculation.

From what has already been obferved, I think we may have a natural conclufion, that it is the greatest folly to feek the praife or approbation of any being, befides the Suprême, and that for these two reasons : Because no other being can make a right judgment of us, and esteem us according to our merits; and because we can procure no confiderable benefit or advantage from the esteem and approbation of any other being.

In the first place, no other being can make a right: judgment of us, and efteem us according to our merits. Created beings fee nothing but our outfide, and can therefore only frame a judgment of us from our exterior actions and behaviour; but how unfit these are to give us a right notion of each other's perfections, may appear from feveral confiderations. There are many virtues, which in their own nature are incapable of any outward reprefentation; many filent perfections in the foul of a good man, which are great ornaments to human nature, but not able to difcover. themselves to the knowledge of others: They are tranfacted in private, without noife or fhew, and are only visible to the great Searcher of hearts. What actions can exprefs the intire purity of thought which refines and fanctifies a virtuous man? That fecret reft and contentedness of mind, which gives him'a perfect enjoyment of his prefent condition? That inward pleafure and complacency, which he feels in

doing good? That delight and fatisfaction which he takes in the profperity and happiness of another? Thefe and the like virtues are the hidden beauties of a foul, the fecret graces which can not be difcovered by a mortal eye, but make the foul lovely and precious in his fight, from whom no fecrets are concealed. Again, there are many virtues which want an opportunity of exerting and fhewing themselves in actions. Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object and a fit conjuncture of circumftances, for the due exercife of it. A ftate of poverty obfcures all the virtues of liberality and munificence. The pa tience and fortitude of a martyr or confeffor lie concealed in the flourishing times of christianity. Some virtues are only feen in affliction, and fome in profperity; fome in a private, and others in a public capacity. But the great Sovereign of the world beholds every perfection in its obfcurity, and not only fees what we do, but what we would do. He views our behaviour in every concurrence of affairs, and fees us engaged in all the poffibilities of action. He difcovers the martyr and confeffor without the trial of flames and tortures, and will hereafter entitle many to the reward of actions, which they had never the opportunity of performing. Another reason why men cannot form a right judgment of us is, becaufe the fame actions may be aimed at different ends, and rife from quite contrary principles. Actions are of fo mixt a nature, and fo full of circumftances, that as men pry into them more or lefs, or obferve fome parts more than others, they take different hints, and put contrary interpretations on them; fo that the fame actions may reprefent a man hypocritical and defigning to one, which makes him appear a faint or a hero to another. He therefore who looks upon the foul through its outward actions, often fees it through a deceitful medium, which is apt to difcolour and pervert the object: So that on this account alfo, he is the only proper judge of our perfections who does not guefs at the Gincerity of our intentions from the good

nefs of our actions, but weighs the goodness of our actions by the fincerity of our intentions.

But farther; it is impoffible for outward actions to reprefent the perfections of the foul, because they can never fhew the ftrength of thofe principles from whence they proceed. They They are not adequate ex-preffions of our virtues, and can only fhew us what habits are in the foul, without difcovering the degree and perfection of fuch habits. They are at best but weak refemblances of our intentions, faint and imperfect copies that may acquaint us with the general defign, but can never exprefs the beauty and life of the original. But the great Judge of all the earth knows every different ftate and degree of human improvement, from thofe weak ftirrings and tendencies of the will which have not yet formed themfelves into regular purposes and defigns, to the laft intire finishing and confummation of a good habit. He beholds the first imperfect rudiments of a virtue in the foul, and keeps a watchful eye over it in all its progrefs, till it has received every grace it is capable of, and appears

its full beauty and perfection. Thus we fee that none. but the Supreme Being can eftcem us according to our proper merits, fince all others muft judge of us from our outward actions, which can never give them a juft eftimate of us, fince there are many perfections of a man, which are not capable of appearing in actions; many which, allowing natural incapacity of fhewing themfelves, want an opportunity of doing it; or fhould they all meet with an opportunity of appearing by actions, yet thofe actions may be mifinterpreted, and applied to wrong principles; or though they plainly difcovered the principle from whence they proceeded, they could never fhew the degree, ftrength, and perfection of thofe principles.

And as the Supreme Being is the only proper judge of our perfections, fo is he the only fit rewarder of them. This is a confideration that comes home to our intereft, as the other adapt itself to our ambition. And what could the most aspiring, or the most selfish man defire more, were he to form the notion of a