policy effected by the curé upon
the church and sacristy; the curé
and one of the marguilliers-en-
charge, by a notarial instrument,
transferred to the Appellants (" the
Quebec Fire Assurance Company,"
who had granted the policy), in
consideration of the payment by
them of part of the amount of the
damage sustained by such fire, the
right to sue and claim from the
Respondents the amount so paid.
Held, that this constituted a valid
subrogation of the debt due to the
insurers in right of the fabrique
according to the French law pre-
vailing in Lower Canada.
Held, also, in an action brought upon

the notarial Acte, that though the
declaration was not strictly in form,
yet it was substantially good; for
the Plaintiffs (the Appellants) could
not be held to sue as assurers (in
which character they had no title);
but as being subrogated to the debt
due to the fabrique of the church
by the Defendants (the Respon-
dents), by reason of the payment
made on their behalf in respect of
the damage occasioned by them.
Semble. By the old French law, the

curé and marguilliers together could
not convey by way of assignment
without the consent of the Bureau,
though they might subrogate a debt
due to them in their official cha-
racter. [The Quebec Fire Assur-
ance Company v. St. Louis]

SUSPENSION.

See "PUBLIC OFFICER."

286

1. Upon the reversal of the Judg-
ment of the Supreme Court at
Calcutta, finding for the Plaintiff,
this Court, in the circumstances of
the constitution of the Supreme
Court, directed a verdict to be
entered for the Defendants, instead
of awarding a venire de novo.
[Bank of Bengal v. Macleod] 35
2. At a trial, certain documents con-

tained in the schedule to the an-
swer of the Defendants to a Bill
of Discovery, filed in Equity, were
read as evidence for the Plaintiff,
but the Court refused to allow the
Defendants to read the answer to

which the schedule was annexed.
Held, that as the Supreme Court
at Calcutta, being Jurymen as well
as Judges, had refused to allow the
answer to be read, on the ground
that such answer contained nothing
material to the issue, which could
influence their verdict, a new trial
on the ground of such refusal would
not be granted. [The East India
Company v. Oditchurn Paul] 85
3. Plaintiff sued in trespass in the
Supreme Court of the Island of
Jamaica, laying his damages at
£3000, a sum above the limit of
the jurisdiction of the Local Courts,
in the Island, constituted by the
Jamaica Act, 5 Vict., c. 26, and
recovered a verdict for 40s. Held,
First, that the sum recovered by the
verdict and sanctioned by the judg
ment, and not the sum laid in the
declaration, was the test to be ap-
plied, to ascertain the right to sue
in the Supreme Court, and to en-
title the Plaintiff to Supreme Court

next Government sale at Calcutta,
each party knowing that the other
might use means to enhance or
depress such price. Held, that the
bidding at the sale by one of the
Plaintiffs, though done colourably,
and, as it appeared, only to enhance
the price, was no fraud on the De-
fendants, or upon the public, as he
had a right in common with all the
world to bid at such sale, and was
not precluded from recovering the
amount of such wager contracts, by
the fact, that such bidding tended
to bring about the event by which
the wager was to be won.
Held also, that employing agents at
such sale (all of whom were cogni-
zant that the object was to enhance
the price of opium sold) to bid,
there being no crimen falsi com-
mitted, did not constitute an illegal
conspiracy, or such frand as would
vitiate the wager contracts.
By the 6th Article of the Convention
between Great Britain and France,
the French Government had a
right to demand, out of the quanti-
ties sold at the Government sale,
300 chests of opium, at the average
rate of sale. Held, that no fraud
on the vendors was committed by
inducing the French Consul to
exercise that option in favour of
the Plaintiffs. [Doolubdass Pet-
tamberdass v. Ramloll Thackoorsey-
dass]

WASTE LANDS.

See "GRANT."

239

WILL.

By the Statute of Wills (1 Vict., c.
26, s. 21), obliterations, interline-
ations, or other alterations in a
Will, after execution, are void, if
not affirmed in the margin, or
otherwise, by the signature of the
Testator, and the attestation of
witnesses.

The mere circumstance of the
amount, or the name of a legatee,
being inserted in different ink,
and in a different handwriting,
does not alone constitute an oblite
ration, interlineation, or other
alteration, within the meaning of
the Statute, nor does any pre-
sumption arise against a Will
being duly executed as it appears.
The case is different where there

is an erasure apparent on the
face of the Will, and that erasure
has been superinduced by other
writing. In such circumstances,
the onus probandi lies upon the
party who alleges such alteration
to have been done prior to execu-
tion, to prove by extrinsic evidence,
that the words were inserted be-
fore execution, and that they had
the sanction of the Testator.
In the absence of proof, that certain
words in a Will, written with
different pen and in a different ink,
and in a different handwriting,
partly upon an erasure, were in-
serted prior to execution, so much
of such Will, consisting of the
inserted words, which constituted
a reversionary disposition, pro-
nounced against.