edifice will be found, on the clofeft examination, to arife from an opinion of exalted merit. Ift, From fuperiority of affluence and power. 2dly, From fuperior parts, genius, wisdom, and knowledge.

3dly, From a notion of superior virtue.

If, from a candid examination into each of thefe pretenfions, they fhould be found wanting in the balance, it might furely teach us to behave with meeknefs and humility, and not (as the apoftle fays) to be wife in our own conceits.

And firft then, amongst all those advantages which conftitute a fancied pre-eminence amongst men, and tend to nourish and increase the pride of the human heart, riches and power have a claim to the higheft and moft exalted flation: from the general conduct of the rich and great towards their inferiors, from the pride and infolence of their behaviour, one would imagine that they were a higher order of beings, adorned with nobler faculties and accomplishments, poffeffed of many more virtues and perfections than thofe whom they trample on, and defpife; that they were not liable to accidents, ficknefs, and misfortune, or, in fhort, fubject to the common laws of mortality: we cannot eafily bring ourselves to fuppofe, that fuch affumed fuperiority is owing merely to the caprice of a deluded multitude, or the files of fortune; that the poffeffors are indebted for it to the vigilance (at beft) of lucky induftry; or it may be to the undeferved fuccefs of active vice; and hence it arifes that pride is fed and nourished by flatterers;

the

the haughtiness and vain-glory of one half of mankind is fupported by the ignorance, meannefs, and fervility of the other.

There is certainly no reafon to be proud of that which neither beftows real merit nor implies any. If riches and power could beftow real happiness, if they were a mark of fuperior excellence, or a certain token of the divine favour; they would not be bestowed fo frequent-, ly as they are, on the worst and most abandoned of mankind. Shall we then be proud of that which is given to thofe whom we defpife and abhor? of that which is dangerous, fleeting, and tranfitory? of that which has no intrinfic value, or certainty of duration?

Pafs we on then to the 2d part which I propofed to confider; namely, fuperior knowledge and wifdom: and with regard to this it may with great truth be obferved, that there is no part of mankind more fubject to pride and vanity, than thofe favourites on whom nature hath conferred thefe fo much envied, fo much boafted privileges. It must indeed be acknowledged, that to be wifer than our fellow-crea. tures, to excel in that which fo eminently dif tinguishes us from the inferior part of the creation, muft be of all things the moft defirable: but what degree of knowledge, after all, can man arrive at, that fhould make him proud? If we could look around us without prejudice and partiality, if we could dive a little deeper, than we generally do, into the hearts and minds of others, we fhould moft certainly discover that our God is much more equitable in the difpen

fation of his gifts, than the pride and petulance of man will allow him to be; and that knowledge, as well as happinefs, is more equally divided among us, than we were at firft inclined to think it.. It hath always been matter of reproach against the learned, that they are vain and felf-fufficient, great admirers of themfelves, and great contemners of others. The truth is, we are too apt to imagine, that becaufe we are confiantly pouring in, our veffel must be fuller than our neighbours; but do not at the fame time reflect that we are pouring into a fieve, which lets as much through as it can poffibly retain: our bodies, we know, undergo perpetual change, fome particles every day go off by perfpiration, and other fresh ones fucceed; and fo it is with our minds alfo, one branch of fcience is feldom learned but another is forgotten, and as much perhaps is loft as acquired. Were it poffible for an inhabitant of the earth to place himfelf in the very centre of the univerfe, from whence he might behold all the plancts moving around him, what improvements might he make! how well acquainted would he be with the whole glorious fyftem! As it is, his gueffes must be very imperfect, and his knowledge very fuperficial; and all for this plain reafon, because he does not ftand in the right place. And as it is with the natural, fo it is alfo in regard to the moral and intellectual world; we do not ftand in the middle of things, our eye cannot take in the whole, but is confined to an inconfiderable part. The limits of human knowledge are

much

much contracted, her zones quickly terminated, and all our wifdom is comprehended in a very narrow circle. The wifeft will, upon ferious and mature reflection, find themfelves but a little lefs ignorant, and the moft innocent discover themselves to be only a little less guilty than their fellow creatures.

There is a knowledge indeed which makes many very wife in their own conceits, and which is very greedily fought after, though we have no reafon to glory in it; and that is, the knowledge of the world; but of this, when we glory, we may be truly faid to glory in our fhame: for what is this knowledge? and wherein does it confift? To know the world, is only to have arrived at a greater proficiency than others in fraud and diffimulation, to be fo well acquainted with the tempers and difpofitions of men, as to make them fubfervient to our own intereft and advantage; to know the deformities and imperfections of human nature, and thus to contract a difguft at, and abhorrence of it: to fee the good fuccefs of those who thrive by treachery and vice, and from thence to form a defire of imitating them; it, is but to know, in fhort, what a good man would wish to be ignorant of, and to fee that which a wife man would wish to fhut his eyes againft. After all, the only real and valuable knowledge which we acquire, is that which is gained by experience: but how dearly this is bought, we need not be reminded. Our fortune, our fame, our peace, and happiness, even our innocence and virtue are too often facrificed

in the purfuit: this is an acquifition, therefore, which, whilft it promotes our intereft, reproaches feverely our folly; and where we ought to blufh at the expence of our purchase, we have furely very little reafon to be proud of the bargain.

The laft kind of felf-conceit I purposed to confider, is that which fprings from the notion of fuperior virtue. That fo frail and finful a creature, as man, fhould lay claim to any merit on this article; that fuch unprofitable fervants as we are, fhould boaft of our labour, is both impious and abfurd, and must doubtless fubject us to the difpleafure of our great Lord and Mafter. Yet fuch is our pride and prefumption, that every audacious hypocrite, who has but the appearance, demands that refpect which is not due even to the reality of virtue. Every felf-fufficient enthufiaft who abftains from vices which have no temptations for him, or performs duties which give him no trouble to comply with, will boaft his fuperior goodnefs and piety, and, like the proud Pharifee, thank God that he is not like other men.

To fay the truth, the triumphs of human knowledge over human ignorance; of human virtue over human frailty; are like many other triumphs, more eafy to be gained than deferved. They are not fo much owing to the bravery of the conqueror, as to the want of it in the vanquished. But whilft every thing about us feems to reproach our weakness, we are boafting of our ftrength: like thofe abfurd Stoics, who pretended to finile in the midft of anguifh,