left flank, consisting of a mountain battery and ten and a half companies, had been either killed or captured.

On the other side of the theatre of war matters were not much better. Colonel Plumer, in Bechuanaland, had not been troubled; but Baden-Powell was besieged in Mafeking; Kimberley was invested, and the garrisons of Orange River and De Aar Junction were rapidly fortifying themselves in anticipation of attack. At the latter, too, a large amount of supplies and transport animals had been collected.

So November dawned ominously. Five British garrisons were beleaguered in posts which were hardly defensible. So far three victories had been gained in Natal, and the enemy had been twice repulsed at Mafeking. But the former had no further effect than merely staving off defeat, and the enemy's moral had been restored by success before Ladysmith. Well might they be elated. But for their tactical inefficiency the game was almost in their own hands. At Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking the siege was pressed. Fortune, however, sided with the defenders, and vigorous sorties, carried out in every case with as much skill as prudence, held the enemy at a most respectful distance. On November 8 the first battalions of the army corps reached Capetown, and the relief of the garrisons appeared close at hand. But in Natal, where the danger was greatest, the vice of the original dispositions made the problem very difficult. 25,000 mounted infantry were besieging besieging Ladysmith. Numerically they were so superior that they could easily detach a large force to destroy the railway to the south. They would thus compel the relieving column to leave the railway many marches south of the beleaguered town, and, if the column were weak, their superior mobility would enable them to sting it to death as it moved slowly northward. This plan was adopted by the Boer leaders. The small garrison at Colenso was forced back to Estcourt, and the Tugela railway bridge, one of the most important on the line, fell into the enemy's hands. The bridge at Frere, seven miles south, met the same fate. But that at Estcourt, over the Mooi River, was saved by the arrival of reinforcements and a brilliant sortie by General Hildyard. Again the Boers had just missed their chance. If their detachment had moved south a few days earlier they might have seized Estcourt; and even if that were impossible, had they been more enterprising, they might have destroyed the railway a few miles. north of Pietermaritzburg. But whether it was from fear of the armoured trains-or, more probably, from want of

information of the strength and disposition of the troops coming up from Durban-they made no effort to cut the line south of Frere, nor did they attempt to hold their forward positions. As further reinforcements were pushed up from Durban they gradually fell back on Colenso. With Ladysmith still holding out, 23,000 men assembling for its relief, and the road open as far as Colenso, the horizon was decidedly brighter. In the west, meanwhile, 18,000 men had been landed in Cape Colony. A division of infantry under Lord Methuen, accompanied by three squadrons, some mounted infantry, and a small Naval Brigade, which had concentrated at Orange River, was marching to the relief of Kimberley; and a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and Volunteers, under Generals French and Gatacre, protected De Aar, Naauwpoort, and the railways from the coast.

These brighter prospects were destroyed by the three serious reverses, which by the middle of December had entirely checked the further advances of General Gatacre, Lord Methuen, and Sir Redvers Buller. And this was not all, for the events of the preceding eight weeks had already produced grave complications. In the second week of December the army corps, which had begun to land during the second week of November, was nearly as much dispersed as the frontier garrisons in the second week of October. All semblance of organisation had wellnigh vanished. Not a single division, infantry or cavalry, was together. Scratch brigades had been hastily constituted, with scratch Staffs, and of varying strength. Divisions had lost their cavalry, their engineers, their ammunition columns, their supply columns, and in one case their batteries. Half the army corps was in Natal and half in Cape Colony; and it was now definitely committed to an advance by two distinct lines of operation, so far apart that one wing could do nothing to support the other and could only render indirect assistance.

A double line of operations is not necessarily fatal, although both in Zululand and Afghanistan we have learned that it is unquestionably dangerous, but, provided that each column is unquestionably superior to any force that the enemy may concentrate against it, the double line has certain advantages. But where two columns are divided by the length of time it takes to send a telegraph message from the northern frontier of Cape Colony to the northern

frontier of Ladysmith concerted action is by no means simple. Nor are we great sticklers for the army corps organisation. In fact where the theatre of war is large, and detachments consequently numerous, the organisation by divisions, with a mass of artillery in reserve, such as Wellington employed in the Peninsula, is probably less cumbersome. But that the choice of the line or the lines of operation, and the strength of the force to be assigned to each, should be taken out of the hands of the General-in-Chief is ruinous to decisive strategy. And we have no hesitation in saying that this occurred in South Africa because the dispositions of the frontier garrisons had been carelessly made. These dispositions should have facilitated the concentration and distribution of the army corps at whatever base and on whatever line of advance the General-in-Chief might choose. Or, to put it in other words, the disposition of the frontier garrisons should have conformed to the needs of the army corps. What actually happened was that the army corps had to conform to the needs of the frontier garrisons. In the project of the Prussian General Staff, already referred to, the arrangements for tiding over 'the dangerous period' had but one end in view, viz. to enable the field armies to concentrate in security on the line most favourable for offensive operations. And it was because he was able to concentrate on this line, and because this line was the best that could have been selected, that Von Moltke was able to carry out his preconceived plan without let or hindrance, and to destroy the Imperial army of France within a few marches of the frontier.

What Sir Redvers Buller's original plan may have been we are not aware. It is very possible that he so far foresaw what was likely to happen that he had not decided on the distribution of the army corps when he landed at Capetown. It was certainly not difficult to predict, even before the Boers crossed the border, that at least one of the frontier garrisons would require relief, and that the first thing to be done with the army corps would be to divide it. But division could not fail to be prejudicial. If such a project as that drawn up for the invasion of France in 1870 had been drawn up for the invasion of the Boer Republics, a main line of invasion, either through the Free State or the Transvaal, would have been selected, the army corps concentrating either in Cape Colony or Natal; and the plan of campaign would have been to advance in overwhelming strength on the selected line, leaving a sufficient force on the other to

defend the frontier and to create diversions. The project might well have taken the following shape; both lines possess certain advantages and disadvantages:--The line through the Free State runs through an open country, deficient in strong defensive positions, eminently suited to cavalry and artillery, and easy for marching. On the other hand, it is very long. On such unfavourable ground it is not likely that the enemy will risk a pitched battle, but will resort to guerilla tactics; and the railway is much exposed to determined raiders. The line through the Transvaal is beset with natural obstacles. North of Pietermaritzburg the country is unfavourable for cavalry. Strong positions abound. The passes of Van Reenen and Laing's Nek block the line of march, and the railway is exposed. Concentration, moreover, will be slower in Natal, where there is only one port and one railway, than in Cape Colony, where there are three ports and three railways. Nor will concentration in Natal impress on the disloyalists and the Basutos to the same extent as concentration in Cape Colony. Yet, despite the tactical disadvantages, the line through Natal is strategically the better. Once concentrated on the Tugela, the army, leaving a detachment to watch Van Reenen's Pass, might move on Laing's Nek; or, feinting in the direction of Laing's Nek, it can force Van Reenen's, and march over the open veldt to Standerton, menacing the enemy's line of supply, and turn the strong position at Laing's Nek. It may thus effect a strategical surprise. It will compel the enemy to divide his forces, it may bring about a pitched battle on the very frontier. The strategical decision would thus be attained, and the hostile strength much broken, before the real advance on Pretoria begins. Undoubtedly the forcing of one of the passes may be a costly operation. Will it be more costly than a protracted guerilla warfare? Undoubtedly the enemy has strong positions. But is it not sounder to tackle him at once, while we are in full strength, than to permit him to postpone a decisive action until we reach Pretoria, where, advancing through the Free State, we shall arrive with an army much reduced in strength, first by the detachments required to protect our communications, and second by the casualties incident to a long march and guerilla warfare? It is not to be forgotten that an invading force becomes weaker every mile it advances; a defending force, if it can avoid serious engagements, stronger. It was by his retreat to Torres Vedras that Wellington saved Portugal. It was by retreat to his zone of manœuvre on the

Seine and Marne that Napoleon so nearly saved Paris in 1814. It was by retreat to their strong fortresses that the Russians destroyed the Grand Army in 1812. We shall not venture to assert, however, that the line through the Transvaal is to be preferred to that through the Orange Free State. The temper of the natives, the extent of colonial disaffection, the condition of the enemy's supplies, the amount of water to be found on either line, the tactical efficiency of his troops, have all of them an important bearing on the choice of routes, and of these only the man on the spot can really judge. Nevertheless, whichever line be chosen, the plan of operations we have briefly sketched-i.e. a strong offensive on one line, the defensive and eventually diversions on the other-is the natural solution of the strategic problem. But to adopt either this solution or any other, except one hastily improvised on the arrival of the first reinforcements, was rendered absolutely impracticable by the faulty disposition of the troops during the dangerous period.' How difficult was the situation is evident when we call to mind that the Prussians in 1870 had to provide for a dangerous period of only two weeks. That in South Africa was prolonged to six, and was complicated by the restlessness of the natives and the dubious attitude of the Afrikanders.

To comfort ourselves with the idea that the unfavourable opening of the campaign was due simply to the accidents of war is neither wise nor patriotic. The mismanagement of the Santiago expedition, the needless sufferings of their troops, and the loss of all credit as a military power, was the price paid by the United States for their utter forgetfulness of their experiences at the outset of the struggle with the South. If we are modest enough to acknowledge that we have still some deficiencies to repair, our reverses may be blessings in disguise. But we must remember that mistakes which may be committed without absolute disaster in face of an unskilful and ill-organised enemy may, in other circumstances easily conceivable, be visited with terrible retribution. It is this reflection that impels us to look so seriously on the occurrences in South Africa. general idea of the Boers, to concentrate heavily against our detachments in Natal and to leave only sufficient men in the Orange Free State to hold the garrisons in check, was unquestionably sound. It is true that President Kruger's ultimatum to some extent alienated European sympathy. But sympathy which never gets beyond sentiment is of little value in war; and the British fleet would hardly allow the

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