teries. The tactical efficiency of a larger force would have been a very doubtful quantity. Men and rifles would have been superabundant; but the infantry battalions would have been largely composed of recruits; the cavalry would have consisted of elegant extracts' from all regiments in the service; the batteries of artillery would have been worse off than the infantry; and the Army Service Corps could not have supplied the needs of more than the two divisions. Furthermore, on service each arm is dependent upon the others. Close and constant co-operation is essential to success; and in order that such co-operation may be a matter of course, not only must each arm bear a certain proportion, fixed by the experience of many wars, to the remainder, but each must be capable of rendering the assistance which the others demand. If the cavalry is too weak to scout, the infantry and artillery, however efficient in themselves, will be reduced to immobility. If the guns are too few, the infantry can only win victories at a terrible cost. Again, even if the cavalry is numerous and the individuals well trained, it cannot carry out its duties unless both men and horses are accustomed to work together. And it is the same with the other arms. A battery or battalion in which the greater part of the men, seasoned soldiers as they may be, are strangers to their officers and each other, has the same defects as a scratch football team. The habit of playing together' is as powerful a factor in war as in sport, and in a contingent of 12,000 men mobilised in 1896 this habit would most certainly have been lacking.

Lord Wolseley's first step, then, was to organise the army. A definite pronouncement was obtained from the Government that at least two army corps and a cavalry division might be despatched in case of need from the United Kingdom. A standard was thus supplied which all the administrative branches could work up to, and the incubus of uncertainty was at once removed. Provision was made by raising new battalions, including two in the Guards, for increasing the colonial garrisons without depleting the army at home. Our Imperial needs were thus fulfilled; the military forces were made adequate either for attack or defence, and at the same time their tactical efficiency, both as units and in co-operation, was restored. Eighty privates were added to each line battalion. An increase to the artillery was proposed which would give five guns to every thousand bayonets. The cavalry was re-constituted in regiments of three strong squadrons, always at war strength. The effect,

however, of this determined effort to evolve order out of chaos is not yet fully apparent. That the measures are excellent in themselves is self-evident. But, in the first place, they want time; for instance, the Treasury insisted that the increase of fifteen batteries, urgent as was the need, should be spread over three years; and in the second, much depends on whether we can attract sufficient recruits of the right quality. On this question, however, we shall speak again; for the present we are only concerned with the reforms of the past four years of office. The means has been provided for vigorous action across the seas without leaving the United Kingdom insecure or depleting the garrisons of India.

When war was declared 52,000 men, in addition to the 25,000 already in Natal, were at once embarked; and, shortly afterwards, in consequence of the unfavourable turn of events, the force was rapidly increased by two entire divisions, three battalions, a battery, and large colonial contingents. Since then the force has been still further augmented, and on the day this article is published we shall have approximately 140,000 men in South Africa, and every one of them is wanted. So far, so good. The first aim of the strategist should be to concentrate superior forces, as superior as lies within his power, on the theatre of war, for such concentration is the surest and least expensive method, both in life and money, of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. As we have already said, however, between the mobilisation of the army and its concentration on the enemy's frontiers there must be a certain lapse of time, long or short in proportion to the distance the troops have to be conveyed; and this lapse of time, in case the enemy concentrates the sooner and takes the initiative, may be a very dangerous period. To those who had to do with the preparations for the South African campaign, it must have been evident that this period would be prolonged for several weeks; and, moreover, it was perfectly well known that boasters amongst the Boers had declared their intention, in case of hostilities, of overrunning Natal and driving the leopards into the sea.' Common-sense, then, would dictate the necessity of making the most careful preparation to meet such an emergency; and we may refer for a moment to an incident in the history of a great military nation. Long before 1870 it had been apparent to Prussian statesmen and Prussian soldiers that war with Napoleon was inevitable. The contingency was faced without misgiving. The over

whelming numbers of admirably trained soldiers which North and South Germany could put in the field permitted no doubt as to the ultimate issue, and the mechanism for their mobilisation and concentration was in perfect order. the precautions of the General Staff went much further than the organisation and location of the field armies and home. garrisons. The French army was studied with a minuteness which detected every weak point and every strong point. The numbers that would be available for field service were calculated to a man and to a gun. The condition of the troops at the outset of a campaign, their readiness for war, their efficiency, their mobility, and, more than this, the probable action of their armies, the plan of campaign, the movements to the frontier, the initial dispositions, were so accurately forecast that the mantle of prophecy appears to have fallen on the shoulders of the General Staff. But they were not content with mere foreknowledge. It was always possible that during the dangerous period which lies between mobilisation and concentration the French, despite their weakness, might win advantages which could hardly fail to embarrass the German operations. That they would actually cross the frontier before the German armies were ready to confront them was considered improbable. Nevertheless, measures for meeting such a contingency were most carefully thought out. The action to be taken by the frontier garrisons, the action to be taken by the field armies, the action to be taken as regards the lines of communication and supply, were laid down in detail, and the positions selected for the supply depôts were sheltered from all possibility of attack. The consequence was that, when the French did threaten invasion, there was neither surprise, confusion, nor mistake. The frontier garrisons fell back as they had been ordered. The railways were dealt with as had been ordered. The line on which the field armies were concentrating was put further to the rear, and the advanced guards of the armies which were already approaching the frontier either retreated or stood fast as the situation demanded. We may apply the lesson to South Africa. At the beginning of the year the garrison of Natal and Cape Colony consisted of 6 battalions, a regiment of cavalry, and 3 field batteries. When war seemed probable, 4 battalions, 4 regiments of cavalry, and 3 field batteries were ordered from India, 3 battalions from the Mediterranean, 4 battalions and 6 field batteries from home, and half a battalion from

Mauritius. Local contingents under Imperial officers were raised at Kimberley, Mafeking, and Buluwayo; and in addition the colonies supplied some 1,500 volunteers and 3 batteries of small calibre. The frontier garrisons thus attained a total strength of 17,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, 60 guns, and 3,500 Volunteers. But, as at least five weeks must elapse before they could expect reinforcements, their distribution was a question of great importance. Was their distribution such as to avoid all risk of reverse and of embarrassing the concentration of the army corps on its arrival from England? When the war broke out, the situation was as follows:

At Glencoe, near the apex of the Natal triangle, were 5 battalions, a regiment of cavalry, 3 field batteries, and some Volunteers. At Ladysmith, seventy miles south, were large magazines, protected by 3 battalions, 3 regiments of cavalry, 3 batteries, and some Volunteers; and 4 more battalions were expected from Durban.

In Cape Colony, principally at Orange River and Naauwpoort, were 4 battalions, a regiment of cavalry, 3 field batteries, and some Volunteers. In Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, two local contingents, each about 800 strong, were based respectively upon Mafeking and Buluwayo.

If the Boers remained on the defensive, those dispositions would doubtless do as well as any other. The colonists would feel themselves secure; important industries, such as the Dundee coal-pits and the Kimberley diamond-mines, would be protected; the railway junctions would be held; the swarming tribes of natives, as well as disloyal colonials, would be impressed, and the concentration of the invading army corps be carried out without disturbance. But there was the enemy to be reckoned with. His intentions had been made public, and his strength was accurately known. The Intelligence Department, many months before the war, knew everything that was to be known about the numbers, the armament, and the equipment of both the Transvaal and the Free State forces. Would these dispositions prove suitable if 45,000 Boers, accompanied by several field batteries of the newest pattern, were to swoop down upon Natal and at the same time harry the frontiers of Cape Colony? Let us revert for a moment to the location of the garrisons. In Natal there were two detachments; in Cape Colony three; in the northern provinces two. But both Glencoe and Ladysmith were positions difficult of defence, Kimberley was hardly proof against a coup de main, and the magazines

in Natal had been established in one of these weak positions. Moreover, nothing had been done to protect the line of railway between Ladysmith and Dundee, with its numerous bridges and single track; and lastly, although the contingents based on Mafeking and Buluwayo might do some good by threatening the enemy in rear, they might prove serious embarrassments if they were driven to seek shelter in their bases. A situation more favourable to a vigorous enemy could hardly have been conceived. On October 12 the Boers invaded Natal in four columns, numbering, all told, about 25,000 men. Their first effort was made against Glencoe. Two columns were employed, which were to join hands on the field of battle. One, however, was behindhand, and on October 20 Sir William Symons, by a brilliant stroke of tactics, fell upon the other and defeated it. The next day another of the invading columns, now completely isolated, was routed by General French at Elandslaagte; but on October 23 the force at Glencoe, surrounded by high hills, on which the Boers were establishing heavy guns, was compelled to fall back on Ladysmith. The retreat was covered by Sir George White, who on October 24 defeated the fourth Boer column at Reitfontein, but the wounded at Glencoe, together with a large quantity of stores, were abandoned to the enemy. The Natal field force, 12,000 strong, was now, with the exception of two battalions who were holding the railway bridges at Colenso and Estcourt, respectively 15 and 40 miles south, for the first time concentrated. The situation, however, was still precarious. The Boer columns had combined. In addition to their field batteries they had managed to bring up a couple of 40-pounders, pieces of great range and accuracy; and Ladysmith, commanded on three sides by lofty ridges, is nothing more than a shell-trap. Sir George White, in order to prevent the enemy from occupying the most dangerous of these eminences, left camp on the night of October 29, and gave battle the next morning. The enemy, however, was far too strong to be dispossessed. A fierce counterstroke threatened to envelope the right of the attack, and the troops fell back on Ladysmith in some disorder. Fortunately, just as the Boer shells were beginning to play havoc on the line of retreat, four long 12-pounders, brought up from Pietermaritzburg by the Naval Brigade, covered the movement, and, in the very nick of time, silenced the enemy's heavy ordnance. But the whole force had not escaped. A detachment which had been sent out to cover the