opening of the present feffion, and that it might be fufficient to dismiss you, with declaring my perfect confidence in your vigilant attention to the whole extent of your duty; but, fince it has been usual to detain you a fhort time with the formal discourse, I take this opportunity of doing that, which has not, I believe, been any where done in any difcourfe either spoken or written, and which you will find, I am persuaded, neither useless nor unacceptable: having no diflike to novelty, when utility accompanies it, I propose to give you a concife, but, as far as I am able, a perfpicuous, comment on the general form of the Oath, which you have taken, and on every material word, which occurs in it; nor will you imagine, that it is too clear to need illuftration, when I affure you, that I did not myfelf understand it entirely, till I had very attentively read and very fully confidered it; and that parts of it have appeared ambiguous to grand juries themselves, I know from the questions which have occasionally been put by them to the court, and often privately to me by fome of them, who were my intimate friends. intimate friends. You will not hear from me any common topicks on the fanction of oaths, which to men of education and principle would be needlefs and unbecoming; nor any display of antiquarian literature, which would here be idly oftentatious; nor fub any fubtil and abstruse doctrines, which my ject will by no means require; nor any exhortation to the conscientious discharge of your office, which would, I know, be fuperfluous: it has truly, indeed, been faid, that He, who 1 "admonishes another to do that which the other actually does, rather commends than exhorts, "and only conveys applause in the form of an "admonition;" but I wish to avoid addreffing you personally: I shall speak to you as to a grand inqueft in the abftract, and offer fuch rules as may be applied to practice by all, who fhall at any time serve their country in the character, which you now fuftain. It is not as a cafuift, a metaphysician, or an antiquary, but as a lawyer merely, that I shall explain the true sense of your oath, at least as I understand it; and I begin with a ruling principle, universally admitted, which you may confider as a key to the whole form, and which to fome parts of it will be clearly and forcibly applied. The intention of that power, which impofes an oath, is the fole interpreter of its meaning, the guide of those, who take it, and the measure of their duty. Now, fince your oath is impofed by the law, the intent of the law must be the pole-ftar, by which you are to direct your courfe. Your obligation in conscience depends, it is true, on your fincere opinion of that intent; but, fince the intention of the law is frequently fo deep as to elude a fuperficial view, you are bound in conscience to examine it minutely, and to feek affiftance from thofe, whofe office it is to discover and to declare it. From the imperfection of all human things, it is not always poffible to avoid ambiguity of language; and the intention of the law may fometimes be larger, fometimes narrower, than the verbal expreffion. Of an intention more extenfive than the words I will give you one ftrong example: we take a prefcribed oath, as judges, that "we will to the "beft of our knowledge, fkill, and judgment, duly and justly execute our offices, and impartially adminifter justice in every cause, matter, "or thing, which fhall come before us.' To act duly, justly, and impartially seems no more than what is required of Arbitrators, and might be thought confiftent with judgments given according to our own opinions of what is just and right, or, in other words, according to our honeft difcretion; the very mode of judging, which, from a wife diftruft of human integrity, it is the chief use of established law to preclude; and, fince the constitutional, or publick, law, of which we know the intent, was the imposer of our oath, we interpret it conformably to that intent, and hold ourselves bound, on questions of fact, to give true judgments according to the evidence, and, on questions merely legal, to decide according to law; even though, as men, we may in particular cafes think the law too auftere or too narrow, and may wish it changed by the only power that can change it; for we are to declare the law, not to make it. That the intent may not be less extensive than the popular fense of the words used, we shall see in your oath, when we come to the application of this introductory maxim. Your oath, as you may have observed, is a fingle period confifting of four members or divifions; and it is a period correctly fo called, or in the form, as it were, of a circle; the awful phrase at the conclufion being manifeftly connected in sense with the beginning of it: "So may GOD help you, as you fhall duly perform "the promises, which you call on him to atteft, "and which are diftinctly enumerated." The phrafe, which makes the whole period conditional (for it is not imperative, as the first words of each division might seem to imply) is placed at the end, for the purpose of your kiffing the gospel, as foon as the name of GOD has been pronounced, and thus making the whole oath your own, though it has only been read to you by the officer. I called it an awful phrase,because, though in form it invokes the fupreme being as a defender, yet by implication it addreffes Him as an avenger; and, though it openly expreftes a benediction, yet it virtually implies an imprecation; the expreffion could not be full, without raising too violent and too painful an image; and filence, on this occafion as on many others, is more fublime than the ftrongest eloquence. The period thus connected has this apparent meaning: "May the divine aid be granted to you, if the promises now made be performed; "and withdrawn, if they be violated!" than which a fublimer idea could not enter the mind of man; fince it is a clear deduction of reason, that the bare fufpenfion of the divine energy but for a moment would cause the inftantaneous diffolution of all worlds, and the tumultuous extinction of all, who inhabit them. You will readily believe, that I disclaim all idea even of the poffibility, that you should knowingly violate fuch promises; but (left any part of my subject fhould pass unnoticed) it is proper to observe, that a diftinction has been taken in the fecular or external forum, which the internal, or that of confcience, could never have made, between an oath, which is assertive, and relates to fome fact, paft or prefent, and an oath, which is promiffory, and relates to fome future act. A narrownefs, perhaps, in the old definition of perjury gave rise to the opinion, that it can only be committed in a legal sense by a false denial or by a false affertion; but it must surely |