cognoscitive power, that are universal and abstract notions, from which, as it were, looking downwards, it comprehends individual things." And for aught we can judge of the matter, this exposition may be very true, since perhaps it never was understood by any one, not excepting the framer of it. But it is one thing to reject his extraordinary solution, and another to deny the existence of a power, the nature of which we cannot perfectly comprehend.

For example, does not every one understand the meaning of the words honour and patriotism? Is it necessary that either of those words occurring in a book or conversation should cast a doubt upon the sentence of which it forms a part? Now let us think again; we shall find that however clear and precise the import of these expressions may be, yet the more we reflect upon and endeavour to ascertain the nature of the qualities which are so expressed, the less distinct will they appear; whereas our ideas of sense, if attended to, become the more perspicuous. And the reason of this perplexity occurring in such reflections upon one class of feelings or ideas, while the same scrutiny and reflection applied to another class, would make their impressions more distinct and vivid, seems to be, that the perceptions occasioned by abstract

a We say the same scrutiny, because care and caution are no less requisite to correctness in our general reasonings, than in our examination of the particular objects of sense. But while we deprecate the application of an improper test, it is surely not inconsistent to recommend the most accurate scrutiny which is appropriate to the subjects of abstract reasoning.

terms, not being material objects of sense, but relating to a faculty different from that by which sensations of the external world are perceived, are naturally rendered unintelligible and contradictory when we attempt to range them among phenomena belonging to a different organ, and impugn their reality before an incompetent power, which has cognizance of sensible objects only. If we admit not of this explanation, but, on the contrary, require that every notion should be brought to the test of sense; if we think that the reality of all things which are the subjects of our reasoning should be demonstrated by exhibiting them as particular ideas, or as immediate objects of the mind's perception, we must, according to these principles, conclude that all mental qualities are mere names, having their existence only in sound; and indeed a very celebrated moralist, a strenuous upholder of the doctrines of nominalism, has asserted and maintained that inference. "What," says this philosopher, "is honour?-a word. What is that word honour? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. Is it insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction [according to his theory he might have said abstraction] will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon”—an abstract idea." And so ends my catechism."-It seems indeed that we must either enrol ourselves among the disciples of this merry knight, or admit the existence

a Falstaff's Soliloquy, Hen. IV. P. I, Act 5, Scene 1.

powers states

of a principle, the nature of which we cannot conceive. Instinct, and the power of forming abstractions, or reasoning about them, must fall with honour and patriotism. Habit, which is a faculty equally incomprehensible, will share a similar fate; and reason itself, with all the powers of mind, must follow in the list of universal proscription. We may indeed denominate the operations and effects of these of mind, or vibrations of atoms. We may designate them in the most oblique phraseology that can be devised. To resort to such a method of mispending time, although neither instructive, nor perhaps quite innocent, may amuse us like the fictions of a romance; but let us not suppose that while we thus stand beating the air, we are either establishing truth or assailing error. Such senseless babble can convey no light to the mind-such idle trifling cannot withdraw the curtain that shrouds the mysterious elements of the soul. These mysteries defy our scrutiny, and to attempt the explanation of them to human faculties, is scarcely less folly than to deny their existence.

From practical observations, therefore, and directly against the speculative maxims which have occasioned this essay, we conclude that the mind is susceptible to many different kinds of impressions, and possessed of various powers and passions, that therefore it is nowise impossible that some objects may be perceived by certain faculties, or according to certain modes of perception, and not by or according to others,-that therefore words may be significant which stand not for ideas of sense, nor for direct and positive concep

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tions of any kind,-that propositions may be understood, and be useful wherein something is affirmed or denied concerning the existence, qualities, or operations of a substance whose nature and manner of acting are unknown, its effects only being perceivable,that as a thing may be real in nature, of which we cannot have a positive conception, so it may without inconsistency, or rather it may by possibility,-upon demonstration, or intuitive or moral evidence of its existence,―be believed to exist, and this opinion or belief be stated in words, without mere senseless, verbal trifling. For it should always be remembered, that however unaccountably the mind may be affected in such belief-however we may be foiled in our attempt to resolve speculative difficulties concerning the phenomena which the formation of such opinions presents, of this at least we must be satisfied, that no reasoning whatsoever against the possibility of those phenomena, i. e. against the possibility of framing opinions respecting the existence and operations of the mind can be more cogent than our own particular experience and consciousness of the facts themselves which are disputed. As well, indeed, might we say that every vague sensation of uneasiness which a sick man feels in the delirium of a fever is unfelt, and is really no sensation, because it cannot be expressed or determined by the patient, or that a man who has been blind from infancy must wish for nothing but an empty name, must truly have no wish, when he desires the sense of sight, which he has never experienced, and of which he can form no positive notion whatever; nay,

that he employs words without any import or meaning when, upon inductive proof, he affirms his belief or scepticism of its existence in others who direct his steps, and forewarn him of a distant object, as conclude the universal sentiments and language of the world, concerning mental powers and operations to be, not false, but senseless and unmeaning tenets, because those powers in their essence and real nature, abstracted from their effects, are imperceptible to our external organs, and incomprehensible to the understanding.

But the excessive propensity to simplification in metaphysics, which of late has prevailed over the ancient mysticism, seems to be so replete with absurdity and danger that I trust to be excused for detaining the reader a little longer on so important a point. To increase the empire of science, to bring all things under the survey and control of human reason, is indeed a proud and noble enterprize; and although it is frequently more ambitious than prudent, more dangerous than successful, we should still encourage even the misapplication of genius in her boldest and most forlorn attempts; we should respect the labours of the astrologer, the æronaut, the alchymist, and the metaphysician. No man can presume to state precisely the bounds of human discovery, and say to the intellect, thus far shalt thou go, and no farther. But is it because human discovery may extend its dominion and intellect penetrate into regions yet unexplored, that we are to presume that nothing can exist, the nature of which, after all our researches, remains incomprehensible.

These maxims indeed and the fashionable theo