207 No. II. A BRIEF VIEW OF HUME'S THEORY OF Religion. He who has never read Hume's Essays knows not what arguments may be advanced against religion; and whoever has attentively studied the writings of that philosopher, can learn nothing new in infidelity. To him no doubts will bear an aspect of unprecedented extravagance, and no determined rejection of evidence, admitted to be insuperable, will indicate a degree of obstinacy too absurd to exist in the mind of a rational being. Among the licentious productions of the last century, which were the less contemptible because they possessed a hypocritical affectation of decency not even assumed by the vulgar latitudinarians of the present times, there was no work, written by any other author, which was so ably calculated to unloose all moral obligations, and to promote universal irreligion and disorder, as the two volumes of Essays, by David Hume; yet these are pious effusions, -they are divine,-compared with his "Dialogues upon Natural Religion," in which that author has exceeded himself. The young metaphysician, being duly prepared in the philosophy of those Treatises, has completed his diabolical education. He can plunge no deeper into the abyss of scepticism, and can encounter no antagonist more acute or insinuating, for, from the rare example as well as the astucious arguments of Hume, he must admit, that, to be an infidel, implies neither mediocrity of genius, nor any deficiency in learning, nor want of virtue. Yet, of all Deists, this very Hume was the most profane and incorrigible. He approached nearer to atheism than perhaps any one ever did, who had heard of a God. He really entertained, as the deliberate conviction of his mind, such a resolute contempt of established opinions, and such a rooted scorn of all venerable institutions, and of every sacred system, especially of the Christian, (feelings which he neither gloried in, nor disguised,) that the most impious scoffer cannot invent or imagine any blasphemies, which the disciples of this formidable sceptic have not been instructed to approve. The serious Christian has a right to inquire, for what purpose these alarming concessions are granted? Is it intended to represent impiety as a trifling failing, into which the best of men may fall? I confess, that, after the foregoing expressions, it behoves me to obviate any possible imputation of being little better than an infidel myself. Impiety, even in thought, is a vice, into which no sensible man is likely to be betrayed. Still more is open profaneness detestable to every person of ordinary taste, of common politeness, or of decent morals. How then, it may be asked, did it happen, that, during a long life devoted to literary and philosophic pursuits, a philosopher possessing such excellent abili ties, and of so amiable a disposition, persevered, with unshaken hardihood, in a system of opinions not many steps removed from atheism; to the propagation of which he omitted no argument, because it was too daring, and no sarcastic jest, because it might involve the most terrible insults to his Creator? This is a startling question; for, it is impossible to avoid being in some degree influenced by the opinions of others, nor, indeed, would it be reasonable to receive, with equal readiness, doctrines which the learned have doubted, or denied, and those which have gained universal assent. The fact, therefore, of such a man as Hume being a sceptic and scoffer at religion, supplies, undoubtedly, a prima facie presumption against its truth; and the statement of that fact by me, without comment or explanation, might accordingly be alleged proper, in evidence, that I was undermining the cause which I have professed to support. It will be therefore, for the credit of religion, that this ensnaring question should receive a satisfactory answer; and necessary, in my own defence, that such an answer to it should here be rendered by me. Now, it were a poor explanation, to affirm, that this philosopher's impiety arose from his neglecting to "search the Scriptures," in the manner which some have absurdly recommended, namely, with faith, and prayers for grace to believe them; since he, who could ever dream of so commencing his investigations, must either be incapable of the simplest reasonings, or already possessed with a most irrational conviction of that upon which he laments his incredulity, and which he labours P so fantastically to believe. Nor would it avail to urge, that Hume" wanted a meek and humble spirit;" for, the arrogant and conceited have believed, the meek sometimes demurred,—and, at any rate, overweening vanity does not appear to have entered into the character of our sceptic. The truth is, he split upon that rock, which must be dangerous to all, and has ever been most fatal to the most enterprising spirits. He neglected the general sense and opinions of mankind; he professedly abandoned the universal method of reasoning from facts; and, not at all pretending to disprove or annul the evidences of the Christian faith, an attempt which had been often tried before him, and which had invariably terminated in the most shameful discomfiture, he left the beaten track of practical, every day argument, to pursue an airy, fantastic course, and, as must ever be the case with those whose better genius recalls them not from such distracting, visionary speculations, to nature, to their senses, and to earth, he hurried on from doubt to doubt, from one metaphysical uncertainty to another, till, like the fiends of Milton, who, from their compeers The Essay on Miracles, it will be remembered, makes no account of particular testimony, but was framed for the purpose of refuting all such evidence,-no matter how forcible and convincing it might be. Its object was, not, to impugn the credibility of the Christian narrative, by directly assailing the evidence by which it is sustained, but, as Mr. HUME himself states, to be, in spite of evidence, an "everlasting remedy" against the belief of miracles, and an infallible antidote, therefore, against the force of truth. See p. 159-160, ante, and HUME's Essays, vol. ii. p. 117. apart, Sat on a hill retired, and reasoned high Of fate, free will, fore knowledge absolute, he, at last, in a kind of delirium, actually congratulates himself upon his "happy escape" into those " obscure regions," where, he informs us, "bewilderment is the result of our most accurate scrutiny," and where nothing is to be found but "doubt, uncertainty, and suspense of judgment." It is my intention, in the present tract, to review very briefly the THEORY OF RELIGION, which this subtle sceptic has devised; and, for this purpose, I shall here quote the whole of his introduction to that treatise, in which he professes to write its natural history. The reader will then have as clear and distinct a summary, as can be sketched, of that metaphysical system, which betrayed its penetrating projector into “doubt, uncertainty, and suspense of judgment." 66 “ As every inquiry” (says he) “which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. Happily, the first question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious, at least the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author, and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment, with a See Nat. Hist. of Religion, concluding paragraph. |