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APPENDIX.

No. I.

REMARKS ON THE QUESTION OF MATERIALISM.

THE doctrines of materialism, after having long slumbered in oblivion, seem now at length about to revive; and some, even among the learned, have of late been found unexpectedly contributing their endeavours to resuscitate the long forgotten and exanimous notion of a corporeal soul. These opinions, indeed, no longer wear the frontless aspect of atheism or irreligion. They do not now come to us in their wonted insolence of dogmatism, decked in the trumpery with which they were bedizened by the materialists of former times, who, by matter and motion, affected to account for the acts and essence of the soul, and undertook to explain the mystery of its nature to the meanest capacity, (for which, indeed, their arguments were best adapted,) by an unmeaning rhapsody about the concurrence of atoms, and the modification of particles. But, however these barbarous tenets may be softened to the taste and temper of the present age, however tenderly they may be advanced,

or however dubious may be the favour with which they are received, it is, I fear, much to the discredit of our philosophy, that, under any form, they should now be dragged from the merited obscurity to which, in this kingdom, the good sense of almost all sects in religion or philosophy had consigned them; and it is especially to be lamented, that, in the present state of science, they can make their bow to the public, smiling under the patronage of distinguished individuals, to whose opinions upon other subjects, none can be more willing than I am myself, to pay that respect which their metaphysical notions seem not equally to deserve.a

The reader is doubtless aware that Lord Brougham has, within a late period, enriched the literature of his country with a discourse on Natural Theology, and that his position of the "immateriality" of the mind, together with the vis consequentiæ of his inference, that therefore it must be "immortal," have been doubted, or denied, by some answerers and reviewers of that work. But whether or not those answers are as satisfactory, or those reviews as just, as some of them may be caustic and unfriendly, is a question which so nearly concerns us all, and so vitally affects some not unimportant parts of the reasoning delivered in these Essays, that I shall make bold to examine the matter, without permitting myself to be

a See Observations, &c. by THOMAS WALLACE, K. C. and LL.D., Dublin, 1836; also Metaphysic Rambles by the late SIR W. C. SMITH,

biassed by the authority of great names among the illustrious quick, yet with the utmost deference and respect for the sentiments of those, whose labours have previously been directed to the same point, and whose exalted station, no less than superior learning, and preeminent abilities, entitle their efforts to precedence, in dignity as well as in time, above my humble exertions in the present inquiry.

Had I

It cannot, however, be expected, that, in such a tract as this, I should collate together all the arguments which are presently at issue, without exception of any one, however futile, fallacious, or impertinent it may be; and that I should invariably refer the reader to the particular pamphlet and page of the modern author, in whom it is to be found. indeed inclination or patience for such a task, I would want the effrontery to seat myself in so marked a manner upon the tribunal, not merely to "decide where doctors disagree," and pronounce the qui meruit between conflicting philosophers, but (what would, doubtless, in me be a far greater presumption) to criticize minutely what a chancellor has ruled, or controvert those philosophical doctrines which have been solemnly argued by "his Majesty's counsel learned in the law." It shall be my business, therefore, with the greatest humility, merely to take a correct general view of the question, to state it simply, and to maintain, by the best arguments which I am able to adduce, that side which appears to me to be nearest the truth, as it seems also to be that which, in its main points at least, most modern philosophers (including the

noble author of the Discourse) have almost uniformly embraced.

The question respecting the immateriality of the mind is divided into at least four principle parts.

1st. Is the soul a spiritual essence, inseparably united to matter?

2ndly. Is the soul a spiritual essence, having, or capable of having, a separate existence from matter?

3rdly. Is it a material essence, possessing, in addition to its qualities of extension, &c., those of thought, reflection, reason, &c. &c.?

4thly. Is it a mere modification of particles, thought being only a species of motion, a kind of vibration of the brain, an agitation of the nerves, a sort of running about of the animal fluids? I do not remember any other distinct leading opinion upon this subject.

Of the last notion, few, I believe, will be found followers in the present century, nor, perhaps, is the third opinion, which I have enumerated, very extensively believed. The remaining two seem to be the most commonly received doctrines, of which the second is, I believe, the most orthodox in the opinion of divines, as well as the most popular of them all; however, I am inclined to think, that the first is not only the most conformable to the highest authorities, but also by far the most reasonable in itself. To the consideration of this first question, therefore, I shall chiefly direct my inquiries in the present tract.

To ask what is the nature of the mind, is to propose a question which may have different meanings,