arose. He will not mention the beauty of final causes, with which he is wholly unacquainted, nor bid you contemplate the various circumstances which render each member fitted for the particular use to which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed, and therefore beholds them with unconcern. But he will tell of the sudden death which occurred the other day, the fall or bruise of such a person, the excessive drought of this season, the cold and rains of another; which events he always ascribes to the immediate operation of a deity." To this extent Mr. Hume's reasoning and ours perfectly agree, that, distinct from the force of nature, there is a natural inclination of the mind to religious faith. For, as this philosopher in another place observes, "sudden deaths and extraordinary appearances are no proofs of a God, of wisdom, or of providence;" he might have added too, that they are the only tolerable support of that frightful system of demi-atheism, which is inculcated in his dialogues concerning natural religion,-a production abounding with the most extraordinary subtleties, and presumptuous opinions, that ever were conceived against the majesty of heaven. But, the uncertainties of this transitory scene, although they are not the proper arguments for a Deity, are yet the occasions, (as Mr. Hume unwittingly declares,) or immediate objects, which excite a natural passion. This, therefore, must be his conclusion; and I cannot but congratulate him upon it.

a HUME's Natural History of Religion, p. 405 and 427. b See the tract entitled "A Brief View, &c." post.

Some, however, among whom may be reckoned not a few of the most celebrated divines, are of opinion, that the universal prevalence of certain doctrines in religion, is to be ascribed, not to those principles of human nature to which I have referred them, but, to an original revelation, the substance of which, in its transition through successive ages, and in its wide dissemination among the several families of the earth, has been mixed up with much extraneous matter, and, exceedingly and differently, corrupted and disfigured. Although there are not wanting, writers of great eminence who have taken a different view of the case, yet, in deference to the high authorities by whom this hypothesis is supported, I am most unwilling to dispute its truth. I cannot, however, avoid thinking that the reasonings of these theorists scarcely deserve to be noticed exeept as the reveries of learned and ingenious men. Such assuredly the two following propositions must be considered. First, that there are several truths of universal religion, so essentially unreasonable, that they never could have been admitted into any one, much less into every, system of popular theology, unless this came to pass in consequence of a positive precept from God, originally delivered to the first man, or in a very early period of the world,— that they could not by possibility have prevailed from any other cause-that no fertility of superstition, nor any train of natural causes, could ever have introduced them among even the most ignorant and credulous of mankind. 2ndly, that the absurdity of any religious rite or other custom common among

men, is a capital demonstration, and among the best evidences of its divine origin.

The divine institution of language has also been asserted. Now, without entering largely upon an examination of this curious hypothesis, it may be proper to observe, that, while the reasonings which are employed to maintain it are extremely similar to those by which the divine origin of certain religious rites is attempted to be inferred, the premises of either argument are, in the most important respects, the very reverse of those upon which the other is founded. The art of speech is supposed to be derived from heaven, not because it is an absurd, an useless, or a pernicious invention; but on account of the consummate wisdom which is manifested in its structure, and in its wonderful adaptation to purposes of the highest utility, and of the utmost importance to human life. The rule of evidence, therefore, by which divine and human institutions are to be discriminated, seems to be this; whatsoever art, custom, or system, is unaccountably prevalent in the world, must of necessity have originated from a miraculous interposition of the Deity. If the system to which we apply this rule be, on the one hand, highly useful, important, and ingenious, as is the case with language, these characteristics are additional demonstrations of the finger of God; and if, on the other hand, it be an absurd, pernicious, and wicked system, as sacrificial observances generally are, this even more plainly bespeaks its origin from heaven.

Such shocking and monstrous paradoxes might

have served well for a trial of wit among rhetoricians, or might be deemed very proper subjects for the exercise of debate in the schools, like the panegyrics upon folly and a fever; but, when gravely propounded as philosophical tenets, or as doctrines in religion, I am inclined to think that the rational Christian will pronounce them to be, no less despicable in one point of view, than they are impious in the other.

If language be of divine origin, it seems highly reasonable to refer algebra, nay, penmanship also, to the same source; and, pursuing this rich vein of invention, we may expect to find presently, that music must have been the subject of some obsolete revelation. Nor will our sagacious inferences stop here many arts of civilized life, which cannot be traced in history to their commencement, or by hypothesis to an obvious source, must be accounted for by a miraculous interposition. From the same tremendous theory it follows, that language must be spoken with the greatest purity and propriety among savage nations, where it has received fewest corruptions from foreign admixture, and from the presumptuous alterations of man. A similar observation is applicable to religion; but it will appear more forcible, when we consider how much easier it is to make additions, but more difficult to effect improvements, in this subject than in language; and, how much more disposed human nature is, to inquire after matters relative to their future existence, to frame or receive opinions of a ruling providence, and to engage in fanciful speculations, than to study grammars, or correct dictionaries.

The course of nature is not an unstable concurrence of casualties, in which we may with as little hesitatation acknowledge a miracle as the most ordinary event. So far, therefore, as a revelation is really miraculous, (and I am far from holding that tenet,) there are objections enough against it as such, howsoever numerous and incontrovertible may be the external or internal evidences in its favour. Such objections are neither few in number, nor futile in importance; and it is a mockery of the understanding so to undervalue or misrepresent them. Probability is one thing, mathematical demonstration another; and none but enthusiasts or imposters pretend to that certainty which belongs to the latter alone. These sceptical objections to which I allude, are, it is true, not only best refuted by the Christian religion, but are intrinsically less adapted to it than to any other system. They lie, however, with peculiar force against the hypothesis of the divine origin of language, or of sacrificial observances. Let us not therefore give just cause to the enemies of our faith, to reproach us with the superstition and absurdity of introducing a special providence into all the circumstances of common life, and the details of human art, but let us rather thoroughly feel what we really assent to, in admitting a DIVINE REVELATION, or we will render ourselves and our religion ridiculous, by mixing up these reveries with the sure doctrines of inspiration, and transmuting our holy faith into a phantasmagoria of miraculous interpositions, in which truth is confounded with the delusions of men, and the Christian system is presented, only to glide with them away.