tain ray, and who designed that the rational worship, the true prayer and praise which exalts, not degrades, a human being, should proceed "out of the mouth of babes and sucklings."

In

But if the wisest of mankind, labouring in the mine, were unable to discover the object of their search, and were entangled in a complicated maze of delusions, into what egregious mistakes may we not suppose the common heathens to have fallen." short, we cannot imagine any thing so ridiculous that it might not have formed a part of their religion. Almost every one of their deities was a being of the most odious kind, insomuch that it was observed by Lucian, that a young man who has read the history of the gods, is afterwards surprised to find, upon coming into the world, that punishment and infamy are awarded to such actions as are ascribed to the beings he worships. Plato also makes an observation to the same purpose, complaining that the youth were corrupted by a knowledge of the gods. And he seems to have said this with good reason; for what else than a pious imitation of their divinities could have so debased a civilized people, that their most holy rites, whatever they might have been in their original institution, became afterwards the most shocking exhibitions of barbarity, profligacy, impiety, drunkenness, and every vulgar vice? The public festivals of the Floralia, which were celebrated in the open day,-the feasts of

a Note (14.)

Bacchus and Ceres, of which, it seems, that shame would not permit the celebration, except by night, and in the dark,- besides many others too numerous to be recounted,-were such as it would be indecent, among Christians, even to describe. Who

can suppose that a state of such gross universal darkness, into which, as we shall presently see, the human mind was by its natural feelings inevitably betrayed, and from which it was impossible that mere human reason could have accomplished its deliverance, was an ultimate purpose which the benevolent author of our being had in view, when he made man the creature that he is? Had it not been his design to assist and enlighten us with some further instruction than mere reason can afford, would he who has made manifest the unity of his wisdom in all other parts and relations of nature, have implanted in us a sentiment, which, without such assistance and illumination, must have proved his imbecility or caprice? These reflections, indeed, even before the advent of the Messiah, seem to have been thought to furnish evidences of a revelation in the scheme of nature. Even previous to that event they were not unknown among the speculations of philosophy, and have conveyed to the mind of a heathen some faint conception of "the promise," which was written in obscure but indelible characters upon the human heart. But, the same arguments which, during that former period, were just and forcible, although, perhaps, too finely drawn

a See Fost.

and theoretical to enforce assent, now receive a very superior and practical efficacy, when other reasonings also concur to prove, that the object of the UNIVERSAL PASSION has been revealed, and the "desire of all nations" manifested to mankind.

If then there is sufficient evidence, that, before the Christian æra, reason had, in every effort to discover the true object of piety, utterly and invariably failed, insomuch as to appear incapable of success; it now remains, before we can infer that a revelation which should set forth the proper object of faith and worship was originally contemplated in the plan of creation, only to shew, that there is in the human soul a natural determination and tendency to religion. And, indeed, what else could have engaged the philosophers in their fruitless researches, it is not easy to conceive.

The universality of belief in spiritual power must prove, that the opinion is agreeable, either to the common reason of mankind, or to some natural tendency or passion; for a general effect must have as general a cause. But, to say that it prevailed from evident conformity to reason, were to say that Epicurus was unable to comprehend a truth, with which every old woman was acquainted. Again, the only marks from which the operation of a spirit could have been suggested to reason, would have shewn, at least as to some qualities, what sort of being that spirit was. If, for instance, a deity, or number of deities, had been inferred from the clear and numerous manifestations of design in the creation, the attributes of wisdom and omnipotence would have been so surely established,

and universally admitted, that none would have dared to approve resistance to the gods, which nevertheless, we find to have been honourably esteemed, and, according to the popular notions, frequently attempted with success.

If each individual person in the world, or at least of the generality of men, had formed his creed by a process of reasoning from the same principles, (and the principles, i. e. the common phenomena of nature, must have been the same to all,) there could scarcely have occurred any differences or disputes about natural religion; since the principles are plain, and the deductions from them are by hypothesis the most obvious possible. Farther, if any difference should come to exist between the several conclusions, they might be expected to diverge rather than approach, according as they become more general, and consequently more distant from the common and acknowledged facts whence they were drawn. For, in reasoning we ascend from particulars to a general principle, whereas the operations of instinct are as those of a general rule applied to particular circumstances. But, the fact is the very reverse of that which would have occurred, had mankind embraced their religion from the principles and deductions of reason. The belief, "that spiritual agency exists," the most general principle of all, is the most universally prevalent, and if we render that proposition less general by specifying the particular attributes of goodness, or wisdom, the admission of which must, in a

a P. 8—12, ante.

logical argument, precede the conclusion that those qualities exist in a spirit, we will not find it an article of so extensive belief. Now all this is against the hypothesis of “reason,” but much supports that of" instinct," which, like every general rule or law, admits much diversity in the particulars to which it relates.

very

Lord Bacon accounts "LEARNED TIMES, especially when accompanied with PEACE and PROSPERITY,” among the causes of atheism; and the reason he assigns is, that "they be troubles and adversities which bow men's minds to religion." In the opinion of this philosopher, religion has prevailed in the world, not upon account of its conformity to reason, much less to the common sense of every man, but therefore, from having its origin in some natural tendency of the human mind; and he observes, what is in conformity with every one's experience, and is the remark of every day, that "troubles and adversities" are the occasions upon which this tendency is excited; although they are certainly not the most likely to suggest rational proofs of a deity.

Mr. Hume, also, is among the numerous authorities who might be summoned in defence of our position; and, indeed, the foregoing observation of Lord Bacon seems to have been the hint from which his theory of the origin and progress of religion was derived. 66 Imagine not," says he, "that a barbarous and necessitous animal, such as man is upon the first commencement of society, will so much as start the question, whence the whole fabric of the universe