his right of entry, &c. commences. And therefore non-claim on a fine does not run against a person who has an interesse termini, till the time at which the right to enter under the term arrives (n).-So if there be a term, and the ownership of that term be, at the time when the last proclamation is made, or the right accrues (o), vacant, for want of letters of administration of the effects of the last owner, no right of entry exists till letters of administration are obtained.-Till that time there is not any adverse possession, or any existing right; and till there is an existing right, no entry is necessary, or indeed could be made with effect.

Again, when there is an estate in remainder or reversion, after an estate of freehold, or even for years (p), the fine will not begin to run against the owner of the remainder [239 Jor reversion, till the time arrives, at which this estate is to give a right to the possession (q).

So if tenant in tail aliens, so as to discontinue (r) or devest (s) the estate-tail, and his

(n) Saffyn's case, 5 Co.123. Cro. Jac. 60.

(0) Sanders v. Standford, cited Cro. Jac. 61.

(p) Laund v. Tucker, Cro. Eliz. 254.

Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk.

Whaley v. Tankard, 2 Lev. 52. Ventr. 241. 2 Vent. 334. (q) Plowd. 374.

(r) 3 Co. 87, a & b.

(s) Penyston v. Lyster, Cre Eliz. 896.

alienee levies a fine with proclamations; or the issue in tail accepts rent (t) reserved on a rightful conveyance made by tenant in tail; and afterwards a fine is levied by the owner who claims under that conveyance; in the first instance, during the life of the tenant in tail by whom the conveyance is made, and in the second instance, during the life of the issue by whom the rent is accepted, there is not any person by whom the fine can be avoided. For this reason, the operation of the fine, as a bar by nonclaim, will commence in the former case, on the death of the tenant in tail, by whom the conveyance is made, and in the latter case, on the death of the issue, by whom the rent is accepted. It is observable, that when the fine is levied, there is not any adverse possession. There is, however, an adverse title quoad the future issue, and this seems to have been allowed suf ficient to call the fine into operation against them; and so far there is a qualification of the general rule, which requires the posses-[240] sion to be adverse when the fine is levied.

It is also to be remarked, that when two rights exist in the same person, for distinct causes; as in the instance of a person who has a remainder or reversion in fee, after an estate for life, forfeited by a fine levied; the (t) Shep. Touch. 31.

entry to avoid the fine may be made, either within five years after the fine is levied, on the ground of forfeiture, or within five years after the death of the tenant for life, on the ground that his estate is determined (u).

But when there are several remedies for one right, as in the instance of a discontinuance for a life or lives, with a subsequent alienation of the reversion in fee by fine with proclamation, the persons in remainder or reversion must avoid the fine within five years after the right first accrues, Sawle v. Clearke (a). And yet if no fine had been levied, a bar by the statute of limitations, 21 James I. of the remedy by formedon would not have been any bar to the right of entry by reason of the estate-tail or remainders, when the discontinuance ceased by the determination of the lives, (being the estate for which the discontinuance was originally made.) Hunt v. Bour (b).

And observe 1st, That a discontinuance may be enlarged by warranty, as in Littleton, and Sawle v. Clearke.

And on the other hand, 2dly, A discontinuance may cease by the surrender, merger, or entry, for a forfeiture of the particular estate, during which the discontinu

(u) Whaley v. Tankard, 2 Lev. 52, Ventr. 241, 2 Vent. 333.

3 Co. 78, b. Bac. Ab. Rem.

Goodright v. Forrester, 8 East. 552,1 Taunt. 578. (a) Sir William Jones, 208. (b) 1 Br. Parl. cas. 48.

ance was affected. So the discontinuance may be enlarged by the tortious alienation, as an alienation by feoffment or fine of the particular tenant, claiming under the discontinuance.

So when there are in the same person distinct rights of entry, under distinct estates, or distinct titles (v), the owner may enter, so as to save his more remote estate, when the time arrives at which that estate is to confer a right to the possession, although he neglected to enter to save his right, under the more immediate estate (w). This is more particularly important, in the case of titles depending on cross remainders, since the right may, in that case, exist under some of the remainders, though it be barred as to others of them.

A tenant in tail demises for years, and then conveys in fee, and a fine is levied by the alienee. It will deserve consideration whether the issue have two periods of claim; one after the term, as well as one during the term (x). It may be contended they have the two periods for claim: the first

(v) Shep. Touch. 32.

(w) See Plowd. 372; and query if the person who has the present right, and is barred, can claim under the more remote estate. Catline and Weston, J. denied that he can make any claim under the

more remote estate. Mr. Cruise thinks he may; but the case he puts is not full in point. See Cruise on Fines, p. 214.

(x) See Co. Litt. 298 a; Salvin v. Clerk, Cro. Car. 156.

on the ground that they are not bound by the term, the second on the ground that the heirs have a right to enter on the determination of the term. This case is distinguishable from Salvin v. Clerk. In that case the estate for life caused a discontinuance; and the reversioner had only one title, and one period for avoiding the fine. [241] The point now under discussion is equally applicable, when the same person has two distinct estates; as in tail, and in fee; or for life and in fee.

Secondly. If the right devolve on an infant, or other person under disability, it is sufficient that he enter within five years after his disabilities are removed (y). But if there are several disabilities, existing in the same person,at one and the same time(z), or there are several disabilities arising at different periods, and one of them succeeds the other without any interval, (as is the case of infancy and imprisonment, or infancy and marriage (a), and consequently coverture during infancy,) the fine will not run while any one of these disabilities continues. Or if there be a succession of disabilities in distinct persons, having successive rights, under the same estate, as in the

(y) Stat. 7 Hen. IV. c. 24. sec. 5.

(z) Plowd. 375.

(a) Hulm v. Heylock, Cro. Jac. 200.