and the sense of the words "in this manner" are attentively weighed, that distinguished lawyer is recommending the several and distinct vouchers of different persons of the family. And it would have been nugatory, on the part of Mr. Pigott, to have advised a treble voucher, if a voucher of the father and son jointly would have answered every purpose. See also Cruise on Recoveries, 219. Mr. Justice Blackstone in the 2d vol. of his Commentaries, p. 359, certainly supposed, that the exigency of the case might require a treble voucher. Such voucher cannot be requisite in any case, unless it be requisite in a case attended with [137]the circumstances now circumstances now under discussion. Though for the purpose of supporting recoveries as common assurances, the court may determine that both intails will be barred by a joint voucher, of several tenants in tail, even when one of two estates-tail is derived out of another; in the same manner as a recovery on the voucher of a tenant in tail, who has several estates-tail, or the right of different intails, in the same land under different titles (h), will þar all the intails; yet the law on the point cannot be safely acted upon, or considered as clear, till it shall have received the determination of a court of competent jurisdiction, and the (h) Supra, 126. question shall be decided by that determination. By what Tenants in Tail a Recovery may be suffered with Effect; and to what Extent in Point of Share. First. It is now to be considered by what tenants in tail a common recovery may be suffered, so as to bar the estate-tail, and the remainders and reversions expectant thereon. In this division, which, in a great measure, is a summary, or review, of points already noticed, it is impossible to avoid the appearance of repetition. A recovery is peculiarly the assurance by which a tenant in tail may enlarge, or, more properly speaking, convert, his estate-tail into a fee, by barring the estate-tail, and all remainders and reversions expectant on that estate. Under such recovery there will be acquired an ownership, co-extensive with that of the person by whom the estate-tail was created. Cæteris paribus, namely, with the concurrence of the freeholder, a recovery my be suffered with effect, either by the tenant of an estate-tail in possession, or of an estate-tail in remainder or reversion (i) or by the person on whom an estate already (i) Supra, 16, and 2 R. Ab. 394, 1. 10. alienated, devested, or discontinued, was [139]entailed (j), and even by the issue in tail, although the estate-tail has been previously barred, by a fine with proclamations levied by their ancestor (k): or as a consequence and deduction from the same principles, by the statute of limitations, or warranty, &c. But, as has already been observed, no one except a tenant of an estate-tail in possession can suffer with effect a common recovery with single voucher; and then a recovery so suffered will only bar this particular estatetail, and the remainders, &c. expectant on that estate. A person who has a remote estate-tail may, by merger, surrender, &c. of the estate for life, or even disseisin (7) of tenant for life, when the estate-tail is immediately expectant on the estate for life, become tenant in tail in possession. But in Lincoln College Case (m) it was assumed that the disseisor could not suffer an effectual recovery as tenant of the freehold. The ground of the point, as found in Rolle's Abridgment, is, that the owner of the first estate of inheritance does not, by the disseisin of the tenant for life, devest the remainder in tail, (j) Manxel's case at the end of Plow. page 8. Sheffield v. Ratcliffe, Hob. 334. Lincoln College case, 3 Co. (k) Supra, 126, and Hob. 259. (7) 2 R. Ab. 5. 395. or put it to a right. He is merely a disseisor to the extent of the estate for life, and then by the union of the two estates the remainder in tail becomes an estate-tail in possession. And it is material to this purpose that a stranger may, by claiming the estate of a tenant for life, disseise that tenant and acquire the freehold, without disseising the remainder-man or reversioner, or devesting his estate. The alienee of a tenant in tail, or the assignee of the crown, claiming the estate of a tenant in tail under an attainder for treason (n) cannot, in any case, bar the estate-tail or the remainders by suffering a common recovery. The privilege of suffering a recovery is given to the tenant in tail and his issue, and is personal to them. And a corruption of the inheritable blood of the issue, by the attainder of their ancestor for treason (0), will preclude their right [140] to suffer a common recovery. After such attainder they cannot bar the remainders. By the corruption of the inheritable blood, the issue are strangers. They forfeit the character of heirs in tail. They are incapacitated to take any benefit under the intail, though the estate continues by reason of the continuance of issue (p). And attainder of tenant in tail creates a disability (q) to suffer a common recovery. He is civiliter mortuus. Between the crime and attainder, it should, from analogy, seem, that a common recovery may be suffered (r). A recovery suffered by an alien, who is tenant in tail, will bar the remainders expectant on his estate (s). He is tenant in tail till office found, and as tenant in tail he has all the powers exerciseable in respect of that estate. It is for the benefit of the crown only, and not of remainder-men, that there is any disqualification. When the intail is of a subject which has a limited duration, as a rent-charge, created de novo, and limited for an estate-tail, without any remainders over, then, as already observed, the recovery of tenant in tail cannot enlarge the estate beyond the period prescribed for its duration (t). And, it is apprehended that when an estate-tail in lands is derived out of a qualified or determinable fee, the recovery cannot do more than acquire the ownership for the time of that determinable or qualified fee (u). In short, the fee acquired by means of the recovery of the tenant in tail, cannot, (q) See Barton's case, 2 R. Ab. 394, I. 37. (13 Jac.) Jenk. Cent 250. 1 Keb. 398. cites Burton and Bremer's case, (37 & 38 Eliz.) as contra. (r) Stevens V. Winning, |