Black river on lot number eleven in the sixth range of the township of Durham, and all obstructions erected thereon by him, to such extent as to leave the waters of said Black river below plaintiff's said mills to flow away therefrom in their original channel, and in default of his so doing, that such dam and obstructions be so as aforesaid lowered, reduced and abated, at the costs and charges of said defendant, by the sheriff of the district of St. Francis, and doth adjudge and condemn the defendant to pay and satisfy to the plaintiff, for his damages occasioned by the defendant's erecting his said dam, the sum of fifty pounds current money of this province, with interest thereon from this day, and costs of this suit.

Holt, on behalf of the defendant, moved to quash the writ of saisie-arrét in the cause, on the ground that the affidavit upon which it issued was not in conformity with the form prescribed by the statute; that it was not sworn to in the

said affidavit that the defendant was about to secrete his estate, debts and effects, but that on the contrary, the affidavit being in French, the word "receler " had been employed in the body of the affidavit and had been subsequently crased, and the word "celer" inserted in the margin; that the word "receler" was essential to entitle a plaintiff to the issuing of a writ of saisie-arrét; that it was the term employed in the statute regulating the issuing of writs of saisie-arrêt, and that unless it were sworn that the defendant was about to "" "receler his effects, a party was not entitled to the issuing of the writ; that the word "celer" did not convey the same meaning as the word "receler," and that although a party might be about to "celer" his effects, yet it might to done openly and in perfect good faith, and with no intention whatever to defraud his creditors, and that such an act would not place him in the position contemplated by the statute, so as to give any of his creditors a right to seize and arrest his effects; that the object of the law it was quite apparent, was to prevent a debtor from fraudulently making away with his effects in order to defraud his creditors, and for this purpose the word "receler" had been used, he therefore considered the word "receler " as essential, and inasmuch as the plaintiff had not used it in the affidavit the writ of saisie-arrêt ought to be quashed. That it would also be found on reference to the affidavit, that the word "celer" could not even be considered as forming part of the affidavit, for it was in the margin only, and no mention or reference to it whatever was made in the jurat; this he also considered a fatal objection.

Dechène, in showing cause against the motion, argued that in using the word "celer" he had complied in the strictest manner with the requirement of the statute. That the signification of the word "celer " was to secrete, to conceal, put away or hide; that upon reference to a very recent publication, and one of high authority on this

subject, (1) it would be found that the word "celer" conveyed this signification, if possible, more distinctly than the word "receler; " that it meant to secrete, carry away, hide or conceal; that under the word "receler " it would also be found that the two words were synonymous in point of signification; that it was true, that in the statute the word "receler " had been used in preference to the word "celer," but this was no reason why the latter term should not be considered equally good, or that for that reason it should be considered as having lost its signification; he contended that the word "celer," which he had used in the affidavit, was a much more correct term than the word "receler," and that for this reason he had erased the latter word from the affidavit and had inserted the former; that with respect to the objection that the erasure and marginal note in the affidavit had not been mentioned in the jurat, he maintained that it was not necessary, inasmuch as the prothonotary had affixed his initials to the marginal note when subscribing the jurat, and that the erasures could not invalidate the allegations in the affidavit.

Per curiam, on reference to the authority cited, there will be found a difference in the signification of the two words. The word "receler" is the proper and more correct term, and is also the word used in the statute. There is not such a difference, however, as to justify the Court in quashing the writ of saisie-arrêt. With respect to the objection that the erasure and marginal note in the affidavit are not mentioned in the jurat, the Court is of opinion, that, inasmuch as the prothonotary's initials appear affixed to the marginal note, the necessity of mentioning the erasures and marginal notes in the jurat is obviated.

PLAMONDON and DECHÈNE, for plaintiff.

HOLT and IRVINE, for defendant.

(1) Flemming et Tibbins, Grand Dictionnaire, Français-Anglais, vbo., Celer, Ed. 1857.

This case was submitted upon a motion made on behalf of John Bell, one of the defendants, arrested under a writ of Capias, on the 12th. November, 1857; the motion was as follows:

"Motion on behalf of John Bell, one of the defendants in "this cause, that he be permitted to put in special bail. "

Upon showing cause against the motion it was contended that it could not be granted, inasmuch as it did not set forth special matter in support thereof. That the 12th. section of the 12th. Vic., cap. 42, provided that applications of this nature, made after the expiration of eight days from the return day, should be granted upon special application and sufficient cause shewn; that the rules of practice prescribed that all motions founded on special matter should contain the grounds of such motion, and that no grounds, not set forth in such motion, should be allowed to be urged in support thereof, and that inasmuch as the defendant in this cause, had not set forth any special grounds in his motion, and could urge none not so set forth, that therefore the motion could not be granted.

In support of the motion it was argued, that the defendant was entitled to the application, and that the motion, as it

stood, was quite sufficient for the purpose, and referred the Court, in support of this view of the case, to the case of Campbell and Atkins, decided in Appeal.

In reply, it was alleged that a case more strongly in point in support of the position of the plaintiffs than the one quoted, could not possibly be found, for in that case, as well as in the case of Owen and Wyse, of 1856, the motion for permission to put in special bail not only specified the special grounds in support thereof, which were of the strongest nature (alleging misrepresentation on the part of the sheriff), but was also supported by affidavit in which the same special reasons were sworn to; so that the case referred to, if it had any application whatever to the present case, could only be urged against the motion.

CHABOT, Justice :-The terms of the 12th. section of the Act cited are positive; they enact that applications of this nature shall be special and only granted upon sufficient cause shewn; now, there are no grounds whatever set forth in the present motion, and therefore I hold that it must be rejected.

POPE, R., for plaintiffs.

HOLT and IRVINE, for defendants.