Plato, and presuming, in one of his Spectators, to deliver his notions of humour in a kind of allegory, after the manner of that Greek author; which he calls "a formal method of trifling, introduced under a deep ostentation of learning, which deserves the severest rebuke1."

and perhaps a more severe one was never given upon so small a provocation: from gentlemen of so refined and delicate a taste, I can expect no mercy. But the public is to judge whether this be not as culpable an affectation as the contrary one, which prevailed so much in the last century.

One great view I had in mine eye when I put these thoughts together, was the benefit of youth, and especially those of them that are students and candidates for the sacred ministry; for which they will find no science more immediately necessary (next to a good acquaintance with the word of God) than that which is recommended to them in the following Treatise; to which every branch of human literature is subordinate, and ought to be subservient. For certain it is, the great end of philosophy, both natural and moral, is to know ourselves, and to know God. The highest learning is to

See Introduction to an Essay towards fixing the True Standard of Wit, &c. page 20, 21.

be wise; and the greatest wisdom is to be good, as Marcus Antoninus somewhere ob

serves.

It has often occurred to my mind in digesting my thoughts on this subject, what a pity it is that this most useful science should be so generally neglected in the modern methods of education; and that preceptors and tutors, both in public and private seminaries of learning, should forget that the forming the manners is more necessary to a finished education than furnishing the minds of youth. Socrates, who made all his philosophy subservient to morality, was of this sentiment: and took more pains to rectify the tempers than replenish the understandings of his pupils; and looked upon all knowledge as useless speculation that was not brought to this end, to make us wiser and better men. And, without doubt, if in the academy the youth has once happily learned the great art of managing his temper, governing his passions, and guarding his foibles, he will find a more solid advantage from it in after life, than he could expect from the best acquaintance with all the systems of ancient and modern philosophy.

It was a very just and sensible answer which

2 Totam philosophiam revocavit ad mores. Sen. Ep. 72.

Agesilaus, the Spartan king, returned to one who asked him, "What it was in which youth ought principally to be instructed?" He replied, "That which they have most need to practise when they are men3." Were this single rule but carefully attended to in the method of education, it might probably be conducted in a manner much more to the advantage of our youth than it ordinarily is: for, as Dr. Fuller observes, "That pains we take in books or arts, which treat of things remote from the use of life, is but a busy idleness." And what is there in life which youth will have more frequent occasion to practise than this? What is there which they afterwards more regret the want of? What is there in which they want more direction and assistance than the right government of their passions and prejudices? And what more proper season to receive those assistances, and to lay a foundation for this difficult but very important science, than the early part of youth?

It may be said, "it is properly the office and care of parents to watch over and correct the tempers of their children in the first years of

3 See Plutarch's Laconic Apothegms, under the word Agesilaus.

4 Rule of Life, page 82.

their infancy, when it may easiest be done." But if it be not done effectually then (as it very seldom is) there is the more necessity for it afterwards. But the truth is, it is the proper office and care of all who have the charge of youth, and ought to be looked upon as the most important and necessary part of edu

cation.

It was the observation of a great divine and reformer, “ That he who acquires his learning at the expense of his morals, is the worse for his education":" and we may add, That he who does not improve his temper together with his understanding, is not much the better for it: for he ought to measure his progress in science by the improvement of his morals; and remember that he is no further a learned man than he is a wise and good man; and that he cannot be a finished philosopher till he is a Christian6.

But whence is it that moral philosophy, which was so carefully cultivated in the ancient academy, should be forced in the mo

5 Qui proficit in literis et deficit in moribus, non proficit sed deficit. Oecolampadias. See Hist. of Pop. Vol. ii. page 337.

6 Te in scientiâ profecisse credas quantum in moribus fueris emendatior; eo usque doctum, in quantum bonum: ita philosophum, ut christianum. Præf. ad Nem.

b

dern to give place to natural, that was originally designed to be subservient to it? Which is to exalt the handmaid into the place of mistress. This appears not only a preposterous, but a pernicious method of institution; for as the mind takes a turn of thought in future life, suitable to the tincture it hath received in youth, it will naturally conclude that there is no necessity to regard, or at least to lay any stress upon what was never inculcated upon it as a matter of importance then and so will grow up in a neglect or disesteem of those things which are more necessary to make a person a wise and truly understanding man than all those rudiments of science he brought with him from the school or college.

It is really a melancholy thing to see a young gentleman of shining parts, and a sweet disposition, who has gone through the common course of academical studies, come out into the world under an absolute government of his

7 Things were coming to this pass so early as Seneca's time; who laments that plain and open truth was turned into a dark and intricate science. 66 Philosophy (says he) is turned into Philology; and that through the fault both of masters and scholars; the one teach to dispute, not to live; and the other come to them to mend their wits, not their manners: whereas philosophy is nothing else but a rule of life. Quid autem philosophia, nisi vitæ lex est."