dences influence my mind to believe that the Bible is of divine origin, in the same proportion it becomes improbable to me that this Bible contains absurdities, errors, or contradictions.* When any apparent error or contradiction attracts my attention, I hesitate to pronounce it such as it appears to be. My reason for doing so is the strength of the evidence in favour of its divine origin; which is such, that I must do violence to my convictions, if I admit that the book contains either what is erroneous or contradictory. I am, then, slow to attribute, in any case, such a sense to words in the Scriptures, as would make a passage speak either absurdity or contradiction. But if, after all the light which I could gain, it should appear still to be a plain case, that there is either absurdity or contradiction in the sacred text; then I must find a different reading-or give up the

*It would have been a happy thing for Dr. Priestley, and other leaders amongst English Socinians, could they, like sincere lovers of truth, have taken their stand upon a fair and simple argument like this, and so have avoided the many absurdities into which they fell, as to the inspiration of the Scriptures. Dr. Priestley, surely, could not forsee the result to which his notion would lead, when he maintained that some of the New Testament writers were so misled by Jewish prejudices as to quote improperly some texts of the Old Testament. He surely must have forgotten, that if the New Testament writers were misled by their prejudices in their application of one text, they must, from the same cause, have been equally liable to be misled in their application of others; and so would have been incapable of giving any real warrant for our believing them in their application of any passage. Better (certainly more honest) had it been for Dr. Priestley and his party to have denied the inspiration of the Scriptures in toto, than, under colour of an admission of some sort or degree of inspiration, to aim at undermining the basis of our faith in the Scriptures as the infallible and unchangeable word of God.-EDITOR.

passage or renounce the whole book. I may suspend an opinion, while I live, as to doubtful cases. My convictions respecting the nature and design of the Holy Scriptures, the imperfection of my knowledge, diffidence in myself—all demand that I should act in this manner. But in any

clear case, where the meaning of a sacred writer, or what he originally designed to say, can be definitely ascertained by the common laws of interpretation—and it appears plainly that this meaning is erroneous, or contradicts some other passage-I have no right to put a constructive sense upon the words, and do violence to the passage, in order to avoid the consequences that may follow. I cannot honestly do it. The same common sense and reason which prescribe the laws of exegesis, decide that the meaning of a writer must be that which those laws determine it to be. Of course, if I put a gloss upon any passage, which represents it as conveying a meaning different from that which the laws of interpretation would assign to it, I may deceive others, or I may serve the interests of party; but I violate the reason which God has given me by so doing, and act a part dishonest, and unworthy of an inquirer after truth.

If the fundamental maxims of exegesis lead to the belief that a writer of the New Testament has contradicted himself, or another sacred writer, then I must revert at once to the question, Is the book divine? Can it be so, if there is contradiction? This question I may settle (on my responsibility to

God) as I please. But I have no right to violate the fundamental rules of language, by forcing a meaning upon the writer to make him consistent; which it is obvious, on the universal principles of explaining language, he never designed to convey. In determining the question, whether the writers of the New Testament were inspired, I must always, in attending to the internal evidence of the books, consider whether they have contradicted each other. To determine this question, I cannot violate the simple rules of grammatical exegesis. I must read this book as I do all other books. Then, if there evidently be contradiction, I must reject its claims; if there be not, and I think the evidence is sufficient that they are well-founded, I must admit them. But, at any period subsequent to this, when I have admitted the book to be inspired, I am not at liberty to aver that the writers could never have taught some particular doctrine which I may dislike; and therefore to do violence to the rules of grammatical interpretation, in order to explain away a doctrine of this nature, which they seem to inculcate. My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that passage convey, without violence or perversion of rule? When this question is settled philologically (not philosophically), then I either believe what is taught, or else reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the New Testament has taught this doctrine or not? My investigation

must be conducted independently of my philosophy, by my philology. And when I have obtained his meaning by the simple and universal rules of expounding language, I choose the course I will take; I must believe his assertion, or reject his authority.

If these be not sound maxims of interpretation, I confess myself a stranger to the subject; nor can I help thinking that you will accord with me at once in the views just expressed.

Guided then by these principles, let us now come to the investigation of a few passages in the New Testament, which concern the divine nature of Christ. I take this point because you have dwelt most upon it; and because very obviously, when this is admitted or rejected, no possible objection can be felt to admitting or rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity.

You will not require of me, however, to examine at length every text of the New Testament, which I may suppose to have any connexion with the subject in question. I must be permitted, in order to save time, to select only those texts, the language of which appears to be genuine, and above the condemnation of textual criticism; and such as appear to contain the best and most decisive proof of the point to be discussed. Believing the New Testament to be of divine origin and authority, you will permit me to add that I cannot think the decision of this or any other question, depends on the number of times in which the terms of their decision are repeated.

I observe, then,

I. The new Testament gives to Christ the appellation of God, in such a manner as that, according to the fair rules of interpretation, only the SUPREME GOD can be meant.

A conspicuous passage in proof of this I should find in John i. 1-3, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made." Verse 10, "and the world was made by him."

All known manuscripts agree in the text here. Griesbach has indeed recorded, that, for i Oɛos (Theos, God) there is a conjectural reading Oεov; and that for και Θεος ην ὁ λόγος, there is a conjectural reading of Θεος ην και ὁ λογος. The first of these conjectures was made by Crellius. (Initium Evang. Johan. restauratum per L. M. Artemonium, P. i. c. 2.) The reason of making such a conjecture Crellius has given.

"The greater Christ is," says he, "compared with other gods (the Father excepted), the less can he be expressly called God, lest he should be taken for the supreme God the Father." And again: "If he (Christ) had been expressly called God by the sacred writers, and had not always been distinguished from God, the sacred writers would have given an occasion to unskilful men to regard him as the supreme God." (Init. Evang. Johan. p. 295.)

To liberate John from being taxed with this imprudence, Crellius proposed to substitute cov