omit making observations on the rest of the sermon, because I accede to many things which you profess to believe, or to the mode in which you have represented the sentiments of Trinitarians, in regard to various topics. I might mention the manner in which you accuse us of treating the moral attributes of God; your appropriating to yourself and your party, by implication, the exclusive belief in all that is amiable and excellent in the Deity, (pp. 15-18); your assertion that the reproaches which you are obliged to encounter are occasioned chiefly by your zeal to vindicate the dishonoured goodness and rectitude of God, (p. 18); the manner in which you state our views of the atonement, and by implication appropriate to Unitarians only many important things in which we all agree (pp. 18—21); the appropriation also to Unitarians only, in a similar way, of many views respecting the love of God, rational zeal in religion and the benevolent virtues; and the intimations that we are opposed to all that is excellent, and rational, and worthy of belief. The manner in which you have treated these topics, I do very much regret; and I cannot think that this is the way to convince opponents, or to terminate disputes. If I have attempted to hold up you, or Unitarians, to ridicule-if I have misrepresented your sentiments-made any effort to use the argumentum ad invidiam-appealed to human authorities to decide the question between us-or appealed to any thing but the sober rules of exegesis—then I desire to know it, and be humbled for it. I will

not say that I have not transgressed in any of these particulars; for who that knows the human heart does not know that it is deceitful? But, I can say sincerely, I did not mean to transgress; and that I will, with all my heart, thank the man who, in the spirit of Christian love, will point out my error, and show me wherein I have written in such a way as to endanger or render repulsive the cause which I am advocating. That cause I believe to be just; and I should regret to employ any unfairness to defend it. What real interest have we but to know the truth? And what but simple argument can lead us to it?

I retire, then, from the field of review which the remainder of your sermon presents; for, since the pressure of my official duties, that cannot be abandoned or neglected, is so great, I am compelled to relinquish the idea, which I at first entertained, of pursuing the investigation of the topics presented by the remainder of your sermon.

I have but a few considerations to add, on the subject of the preceding pages, which must be reserved for another Letter.

LETTER V.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

IN page 14 of your sermon, you inform us of the method in which you explain those passages which seem to speak of the divine nature of Christ. The paragraph is as follows:

"I am aware that these remarks will be met by two or three texts, in which Christ is called God, and by a class of passages, not very numerous, in which divine properties are said to be ascribed to him. To these we offer one plain answer. We say, that it is one of the most established and obvious principles of criticism, that language is to be explained according to the known properties of the subject to which it is applied. Every man knows, that the same words convey very different ideas when used in relation to different beings. Thus, Solomon built the temple in a different manner from the architect whom he employed; and God repents differently from man. Now we maintain, that the known properties and circumstances of Christ, his birth, sufferings, and death, his constant habit of speaking of God as a distinct being from himself, his praying to God, his ascribing to God all his power and offices,—these acknowledged properties of Christ, we say, oblige us to interpret the comparatively few passages, which are thought to make him the supreme God, in a manner consistent with

his distinct and inferior nature. Is it our duty to explain such texts by the rule which we apply to other texts, in which human beings are called gods, and are said to be partakers of the divine nature, to know and possess all things, and to be filled with all God's fulness? These latter passages we do not hesitate to modify, and restrain, and turn from the most obvious sense, because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the beings to whom they relate; and we maintain that we adhere to the same principle, and use no greater latitude, in explaining, as we do, the passages which are thought to support the Godhead of Christ."

I must hesitate, however, to adopt this principle, without examining its nature and tendency. On the supposition that you admit the Bible to be a revelation from God, as you aver, permit me to ask, whether it is the object of a revelation to disclose truths which are NOT known, or are insufficiently established; or whether it is the object of a revelation to disclose truths already known and established? If you answer, The latter, then your answer denies, of course, that it is a revelation. What the book of nature exhibits, the Scriptures do not reveal. Is there, then, any thing in the Scriptures, which the book of nature does not exhibit? If you concede this, then I ask, How are we, on your ground, to obtain any notion of that thing which was unknown before it was revealed?—e. g. the resurrection of the body is revealed. Now it is a known property of the human body to corrupt and perish. Shall I construe a passage of Scripture, then, in such a manner as to contradict this known property? If not, then I can never suppose the resurrection of the body to be revealed. I, however, do construe the

Scriptures so as to contradict this apparently known property of the human body-following the obvious assertion of the sacred writers, and not allowing myself to force a constructive meaning upon their language. Yet, if I understand you, I am at liberty" to restrain and modify, and turn the words from their most obvious sense,' because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the matter of which our bodies are composed.

The case is just the same, in regard to any other fact or doctrine. What I know already of a thing is, if you are correct, "to modify and restrain, and turn from their obvious sense," the words which are employed in revealing it, because what is revealed, I suppose to be at variance with some known doctrines or properties. Is there not room here for great caution, and great doubt as to the correctness of your principle?

According to this principle, moreover, the Scriptures may be construed very differently by persons of different degrees of knowledge. One man knows the properties of things far more extensively than his neighbour. He sees that what is revealed may consist with known properties of things; but his neighbour, who lacks this knowledge, is unable to perceive the consistency of revelation with what he knows; and this, because his knowledge does not qualify him to judge, or because what he thinks he knows, he is really ignorant of. The same text in the Bible, therefore, may be received by one as a consistent part