Act. On presentation to A. of the
first of the renewed Bills, he served
notice on the Bank not to part with
the securities so deposited with
them, alleging that the Bills drawn
and renewed by him were accom-
modations bills, for which he had
not received any consideration, and
were renewed on the faith of the
securities being applicable to their
discharge. The assignees of Fer-
gusson & Co. redeemed the copper
by paying to the Bank the amount
of the principal and interest due
upon the Bills drawn by Fergusson
& Co. All the Bills drawn by A.
were dishonoured, and the Bank of
Bengal brought an action against
A. for their amount. On a Bill
filed by A., the Bank were re-
strained by Injunction from pro-
ceeding with the action at law.
Held on Appeal by the Judicial
Committee, discharging the Injunc-
tion and reversing the Decree of
the Supreme Court, that, under the
circumstances, the redemption of
the securities was a sale within the
meaning of the condition contained
in the deposit Bills, and that such
sale was not a release to A. as
surety for the previous Bills, the
condition not being that the copper
or the proceeds thereof should be
applied preferentially or pari passu
with the other debts, but simply
in reimbursement to the Bank, of
the principal and interest due upon
the Bills. [The Bank of Bengal v.
Radakissen Mitter] -
The Vicar-General of the Roman Ca-
tholic Church at Gibraltar is liable
to account for the fees received by
him for administering the offices of
the Church, such fees being by cus-
tom regulated, and subject to the
control of the Assembly of Elders
or Junta of which he is the head,
and disposed of by them for the
general purposes of the Church.
Decree granting injunction against
the receipt of such fees by the
Vicar-General, and directing him
to replace in certain parts of the
Church, the tariff, or table thereof,
varied by dissolving the injunction,
and decreeing him only to account
as receiver, for all sums paid to him
on account of the same.
v. Porral]
See" SPIRITUAL COURT, SENTENCE
OF."
A sheriff's officer, in execution of a
bailable writ, peaceably obtained
entrance by the outer door, but
before he could make an actual
arrest, was forcibly expelled from
the house, and the outer door fas-
tened against him. The officer
obtained assistance, broke open the
outer door, and made the arrest.
Held that the officer was justified
in so doing.
Held also, that demand of re-entry,
under such circumstances, was not
requisite to justify his breaking open
the outer door.
Quære. If indictment for an as-
sault and false imprisonment will,
under such circumstances, lie against
the sheriff's officer. [Aga Kur-
boolie Mahomed v. The Queen]
SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION
ACT.
Seizure and condemnation of a Por-
tuguese vessel, under 2 & 3 Vict.,
c. 73, affirmed on appeal by the
Judicial Committee.
Proceedings taken against a vessel
seized under the 2 & 3 Vict., c. 73,
are to be according to the rules
and regulations, established under
the 2 & 3 Will. IV., c. 51, and not
according to the forms of the Civil
Law.
The affidavit of a person present at
the seizure, though not the seizer
himself, is sufficient to ground a
monition citing the master in par-
ticular, and all others in general, to
appear, &c. [Guimaraens v. Preston]
167
By the 44th sec. of the 5th Geo.
IV., c. 113, the captors of a ves-
sel employed contrary to the pro-
visions of the Act, are only enti-
tled to a moiety of the proceeds of
the sale thereof, after deducting
the costs of prosecution. [Jennings
v. Hill]
The validity of a sentence passed in
1816, by the Consistory Court of
London, decreeing a divorce, á vin-
culo, in a suit of nullity of mar-
riage, may be impeached in a suit
brought in 1842, in the Prerogative
Court, for granting Letters of Ad-
ministration, by the issue of the
marriage, pronounced null and
void by the sentence of 1816.
But in order to set aside such sen-
tence, collusion between the par-
ties, and fraud practised thereby
upon the Court, must be satisfacto-
rily shown.
An allegation, impeaching a sentence,
and pleading facts which, if proved,
might amount to fraud, but not
collusion, rejected. [Meddowcroft
v. Huguenin] -
See" BAPTISM."
"CHURCH DISCIPLINE."
"EXCOMMUNICATION."
"PILOT ACT."
"SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION ACT."
A Testator left two substantive Wills,
each disposing of his entire pro-
perty. By the first, dated in 1838,
he appointed Executors, to one of
whom he gave the residue of his
estate. By the second Will, dated
in 1839, which contained no revo-
cation of the prior one, he gave
the whole of his property to his
wife, with the exception of £5;
but appointed no Executors. Held,
affirming the Decree of the Court
below, that the second Will ope-
rated as a revocation of the first
Will, and was alone entitled to
probate. [Henfrey v. Henfrey]
2. Will executed by a blind Testatrix
established. The Will being in
conformity with the instructions
given by the Testatrix to her Soli-
citor, though not proved to have
been read over to the Testatrix pre-
vious to execution. [Edwards v.
Fincham]
[Meddowcroft 3. The mere circumstance of the de-
ceased having called in two wit-
nesses 'to sign a paper for him,"
(which they did in his presence,)
but without any explanation of the
nature of the instrument being
made to them, or the witnesses
being able to see if any signature
or writing was upon it when they
attested it. Held by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council,
affirming the Judgment of the Pre-
rogative Court not to amount to an
acknowledgment of the signature
by the deceased, so as to satisfy
the provisions of 1 Vict., c. 26, sec.
9, and probate refused to such pa-
per. [Ilott v. Genge]
265
4. A domiciled Englishman (while
resident at Milan) executed in Oc-
tober 1838, a Codicil disposing of
personal property situate in the
United States of America. This
Codicil was holograph, signed,
though not attested, but was well
executed, according to the Austrian
Law. Held by the Judicial Com-
mittee (affirming the Judgment of
the Prerogative Court), 1st, That
the validity of the Codicil was to be
governed by the Law of the domi-
cile; and 2dly, That the provisions
of the 1st Vict., c. 26, applied to
testamentary papers made in foreign
countries by a domiciled English-
Testator, by his Will, made in 1823,
directed his Executors to pay any
legacies he might afterwards give
by any testamentary writing, wit-
nessed or not; and after making
various Codicils, he, in 1838, made
a Codicil, which was signed but
not attested, and by a further Co-
dicil in 1839, duly signed and at-
tested, he declared that he thereby
"ratified and confirmed his said
Will and Codicils." Held, that
such general reference was not suf-
ficient to identify and so incorpo-
rate the Codicil of 1838, in that of
1839, and probate of such Codicil
refused. [Croker v. The Marquis of
Hertford]
339
5. The factum of a Will, held under
the circumstances of the case, to
be sufficiently proved, though one
of the subscribing witnesses de-
posed that he did not see all that
the Testator wrote, only the large
initial of his Christian name; and
the other witness stated that she
did not see what he wrote, but
that he acknowledged the paper to
be his Will, in their joint presence.
Evidence of illiterate witnesses as to
acts not affecting their interests
when opposed to the probable acts
of an educated man, no fraud being
in question, is to be received with
great caution.
The Will contained alterations and
erasures, affecting the amount and
objects of the Testator's bounty,
the existence of which, at the time
of the execution, the attesting wit-
nesses could not depose to.
Held by the Judicial Committee, in
the absence of all direct evidence
as to the alterations and erasures,
that the presumption of law was,
that such alterations and erasures
were made after the execution of
the Will, and probate of the Will
No general rule exists that a witness
who is interested at the time of
his examination cannot be re-exa-
mined after a release of his in-
terest. But in granting leave to
re-examine a witness, the Court
will regulate itself by the peculiar
circumstances of each case, and
the nature of the interest of the
witness.
A subscribing witness, produced by
the Executor, was examined upon
an allegation, to prove the Will.
Upon his answer to the interroga-
tories, he admitted that he was the
Solicitor to the Executor (the pro-
movent), and that he had em-
ployed the Proctor in the suit, and
that if the Executor failed in pay-
ing the costs, he would himself be
legally liable to the Proctor. Pub-
lication passed, and the cause was
assigned for hearing. Upon mo-
tion, the Prerogative Court re-
scinded the conclusion of the cause,
and granted the promovent leave
to re-examine the witness after a
release of his liability. Affirmed
on Appeal by the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council. [Clark
v. Carter]
RICHARD KINDER, Printer, Green Arbour Court, Old Bailey.
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