CHAPTER XI.

COMPLICATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

Foreign Relations.-Points in Dispute.-The Canton Viceroy.The Right of Entry.-Even Diplomatists excluded.—The Character of the Viceroy.-A Difficulty long foreseen.Mr. Bonham's Proposition.-What Su had said.-The Facts of the Case.-A Right in abeyance.-A Precedent of Concession.-Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bonham on the Question.What Muchangah had said.-Pekin Government admits English Right.-Consequences of Hienfung's Accession.Dr. John Bowring. His temporary Appointment.- Strict Instructions. Views of the English.-" All irritating Discussions to be avoided."-Lords Granville and Malmesbury on our Chinese Policy.-Viceroy postpones Interview.Definite Appointment of Sir John Bowring.-Lord Clarendon's change of Policy.-Interview again put off.-Question of Entrance. Chinese Refusal.- Mr. Medhurst proceeds to Canton.-Failure of his Journey.-"You do not wish for an interview."-Bowring goes to Shanghai.-Eleang's Reply.Consequences of the Rebellion at Canton.-Yeh asks for English Co-operation.-Refused.-Strict Neutrality.-Precautions to safeguard English Rights.-The Rebellion suppressed in the South.-Yeh's Attitude less yielding than ever. Effect of Crimean War.- The Perils from Want of Communication.-The Attack on the Lorcha "Arrow."Lorchas.-Insult to the English Flag.-Mr. Parkes's Despatch. The Facts.-Demand for the Return of the Crew.Yeh justifies his Conduct.-A Pirate said to be on Board.→ The Evidence.-Its Weakness-and Irrelevancy.-Ignoring of Treaty Rights.-Yeh declines to make any Excuses.

The Act of Reprisal.-The True History of the "Arrow."— Her Antecedents.-Was she entitled to Protection ?—A Prophecy.-Capture of the Barrier Forts.-The Events which led up to the "Arrow" Case.-Attacks on Englishmen.— A French Missionary murdered.-The "Arrow" Incident not to be treated alone.-Arrival of Sir Michael Seymour at Canton.-Yeh's Firmness.-Still makes no Sign of yielding.-A Price placed on English Heads!" We must now engage in war."-The Bombardment.-Capture of Forts.Attack on the Wall.-Capture of a Gate.-Entry into Yeh's Yamen. The Bogue Forts.-Chinese Fortitude.-Yeh defiant.-Military Preparations.- Re- armament of Forts.Difficulties of Position.-Desultory Operations.-Conflagration at Canton.-Destruction of the Foreign Settlement.Chinese encouraged by this Success.-Sir Michael Seymour's Plans. Outrages. - Personal Attacks. Ships seized.Activity of Junks.-Withdrawal from the Factory Garden.Request for 5,000 Troops.- Alarm at Hongkong.— The Poisoned Bread. Yeh's Activity at Canton. Constant Engagements on the River.-Growing Confidence of China.An ingenious Engine.-The English Sailors.-Yeh's Policy his own. What his Colleagues thought of it.-Views at Pekin.-Reports of Victories.-Hienfung's Wish.-Responsi bility on Yeh.-General Reflections on Crisis.-Views as to English Policy.-China's Misfortune.

THE home difficulties of the Chinese Government could not avert the perils that necessarily accrued from the many unsettled points in connection with the foreign intercourse. The Pekin authorities still disdained to hold any direct communication with the foreign Powers. The Canton viceroy was deputed

both to control the trade at Canton and to direct such official intercourse as could not be avoided with

the Chief Superintendent at Hongkong. His voice decided all questions at the other treaty-ports with the exception of Shanghai, where the Intendant of

the Susungtai district was invested with plenary powers. But even at Canton the English representative was not admitted within the city walls. Such interviews as were granted and were in themselves unavoidable were held at some spot outside the limits of the city of Canton, which was matter of arrangement on each occasion. When it is remembered that as far back as the year 1840 it had been laid down as absolutely necessary to the harmony of relations between the two peoples that there should be some channel of direct communication with the Pekin Government, and that in the year of Hienfung's accession to the throne the matter had not advanced in any appreciable degree towards solution, it will be difficult to maintain that the question was in a satisfactory condition, or that there was any better guarantee for the continuation of peace than the forbearance of the Europeans, disappointed in their expectations by the results of the last war and exasperated by the persistent finesse and ever-ready literary skill of the mandarins to thwart their views, and to continually remind them that in the eyes of their great and all-powerful sovereign these matters of trade and of diplomatic intercourse were not worthy of a moment's considera

tion.

There were many reasons for objecting to an arrangement which prevented England and the other chief States of Europe from being diplomatically represented at the Chinese capital besides the fact that it argued a position of inferiority. In the interests of China herself it was matter of regret that the Emperor and

his responsible advisers should have no real knowledge of the wishes, power, and intentions of the great trading nations of the West. Had there been greater knowledge there must have been fewer mistakes, and many regrettable passages in Anglo-Chinese history would not have had to be written. For not only were Hienfung and his ministers, when neither Keying nor Keshen succeeded in finding the way to their master's favour, completely ignorant of the character and capacity of Europeans, but they were dependent for their information upon men who had every motive to conceal the truth and to report what was most flattering to themselves. The Viceroy at Canton, so long as he avoided an absolute rupture, might pursue the most dictatorial course he pleased; the more dictatorial it was, the greater emphasis with which he dwelt on the inferiority of the outer barbarians, the nearer would it accord with the traditional claims of the Chinese ruler. There was grave danger in such an arrangement, no matter who the Viceroy might be, but it became perceptibly greater when the wielder of that authority happened to be a zealot such as Lin, a truculent minister like Su, or a boaster as in the case of Yeh.

The coming difficulty had been long foreseen. From the first there had been a want of cordiality on the part of the Chinese officials that augured ill for either the harmony or the durability of the relations. In 1848 Mr. Bonham's proposition that the Viceroy should place some of his subordinates in communication with the secretaries at Hongkong had been curtly declined.* It * Official Papers, China, 1857, p. 150.

was followed in a few months by the shelving of the question of opening the gates of Canton, and to postpone the settlement of a question with the Chinese has been shown over and over again to mean its abandonment, or at least the resumption of the discussion at the very beginning. The English Government in 1849, out of consideration for the strong statement of the Chinese authorities that they were unable to restrain the turbulent Cantonese, had consented to put off the execution of Keying's agreement until a more favourable opportunity. The Chinese officials placed but one interpretation on this proceeding, and that was that the right had been finally waived and withdrawn.*

* Viceroy Su completely ignored the whole affair of Keying's promise even in 1848: "As to entrance into the city-Since the various nations have traded in Canton, none of the officers or merchants of their respective countries had ever any business requiring their going into the city. When our Government concluded a Treaty of Peace with your honourable nation, no entrance into the city was stipulated. Natives and foreigners lived previously peacefully together, and the commerce was in a flourishing condition. When, however, the entrance into the city became subsequently a subject of discussion, all the inhabitants entertained fears and suspicion; the merchants were, on this account, hampered, and their trade gradually dwindled away. The late Imperial Commissioner Keying, therefore, ordered some deputed officers and the local authorities to take proper steps for quieting the populace, and fortunately no disturbance ensued. If we now again enter upon the previous consultations about it, the public will, as before, feel fear and annoyance, goods will become unsaleable, and very great obstacles accrue to the trade. The British merchants have traversed a wide ocean, and should they have come here in order to enter the city? The entrance into the city is moreover in reality injurious, and no ways advantageous to English merchants. Why should, then, by the useless entrance into the city, the commerce, their original object, be lost?"-China Papers, 1857, p. 150. It will be observed that in this document there is not a single word of reference to the pledge given by Keying that the gates should be opened in April 1849.